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Editorial
Now that the holiday season is behind us, we bring you one last gift: the third 
volume of  Correspondences. This volume marks the end of  the third year of  our 
open access adventure, a year which has included some important changes for 
the journal. We began our new publication model in which articles go online 
in advance form as soon as they are ready (which has proved to be a success); 
we migrated our webpage to a new server which will stabilise the journal and 
allow us to add new features which will further help its maintenance in the 
future; and we welcomed Kennet Granholm as an editorial board member. 
The current volume of  the journal contains research articles by a junior and 
a senior scholar in the field of  Western esotericism. In “Israel Regardie and the 
Psychologization of  Esoteric Discourse,” Christopher A. Plaisance re-examines 
and clarifies the relationship between esoteric and psychological discourses in 
the works of  Israel Regardie, thereby contributing to the theoretical discussion 
on the “psychologisation” of  esotericism that has been underway for quite 
a while. It also provides a historical exposition of  Regardie’s life and work. 
Wouter J. Hanegraaff  follows with the “The Globalization of  Esotericism,” 
an expansion of  his keynote lecture delivered at the Fifth International 
Conference of  the European Society for the Study of  Western Esotericism 
in Riga (April 2015). After examining the scholarly discussions concerned 
with letting the study of  “Western esotericism” part with its geographical or 
cultural denominator, Hanegraaff  concludes that it is advisable to keep the 
concept as it was originally construed, “not for reasons of  conceptual theory 
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but for reasons of  historical method.” Together, these two articles provide 
theoretical discussions that we hope to see more of  in forthcoming issues of  
Correspondences, and we are looking forward to any responses they may provoke.
In this volume we also introduce three review articles—a new format for 
Correspondences. The first two both deal with volumes of  Christian Clement’s 
Rudolf  Steiner: Schriften – Kritische Augsgaube—a venture that has sparked much 
debate in the German speaking world. Peter Staudenmaier and David W. 
Wood, respectively, plunge us into the Steiner debate, taking two somewhat 
different sides on key questions in Rudolf  Steiner research; we are happy to 
present these side by side in this volume. Our book review editor, Egil Asprem, 
provides the third review article: a final, updated, and standardised version 
of  his essay on Michael Stausberg and Berndt-Christian Otto’s Defining Magic: 
A Reader. We feel that the review article format offers a very good space for 
providing deeper analysis than fits a more traditional book review, and we are 
looking forward to exploring this format more in the future. 
Alongside the review articles, we are happy to provide a dense book review 
section with reviews by no less than seven authors. We offer more traditional 
academic reviews, such as Allessandro Vigorelli Porro’s review of  Giovanni Pico 
della Mirandola. Mito, Magia, Qabbalah, but have also decided to include reviews 
of  primary texts such as Thomas Karlsson’s Amongst Mystics and Magicians 
in Stockholm, and scholar-practitioner books, such as Damon Zacharias 
Lycourinos’s Occult Traditions. Ever since its foundation, Correspondences has 
been an academic peer-reviewed journal that has insisted on not being bound 
by traditional academic publishing models. We deem it important to review 
books which may not normally be given attention in an academic setting, but 
which are still important for specialists, researchers and enthusiasts of  the 
study of  Western esotericism. 
Although we are not committed to a view of  “esotericism” as something 
that exists as an object, it becomes an object when esoteric actors become 
increasingly familiar with scholarship from the field of  Western esotericism.1 
This calls for an increased emphasis on scholarly reflexivity—it is important 
to remember the role scholars have played, and are playing, in the continual 
development of  “esotericism” as object.2 By offering reviews of  scholar-
1 For a discussion of  this, see Egil Asprem and Kennet Granholm, “Constructing 
Esotericisms: Sociological, Historical and Critical Approaches to the Invention of  Tradition,” 
in Contemporary Esotericim, eds. Egil Asprem and Kennet Granholm (Sheffield: Equinox, 2013), 
43–45. 
2 Asprem and Granholm, “Constructing Esotericisms,” 48. For a discussion of  reflexivity 
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practitioner books,3 Correspondences provides an academic forum in which to 
critique not only the merits of  particular texts, but also the ways in which 
scholars participate in creating the very object that they have set out to analyse. 
We think this enables a much-needed awareness of  the discursive processes at 
work. First hand sources may not first and foremost be important on the basis 
of  their academic merit, but can still be reviewed based on what they offer to 
researchers, or how they may potentially contribute to deepening academic 
discussion. 
Ever since we started this journal we have intended Correspondences to form a 
forum in which meaningful (and non-polemical) interaction between research-
ers from all disciplines, outlooks and backgrounds can be held. We deem it 
important to allow researchers from all levels and backgrounds to dialogue 
with others inside and outside the field, inside and outside the so-called “ivory” 
tower. We hope that this third volume will provide a good foundation for 
research as we enter the fourth year of  the journal’s existence, and that it will 
host many new fascinating discussions in forthcoming volumes. 
and praxis in Western esotericism and Pagan Studies, see Amy Hale, “Navigating Praxis: Pagan 
Studies vs. Esoteric Studies,” The Pomegranate 15, no. 1–2 (2013): 151–163.
3 For another example of  a scholar-practitioner book that we’ve published a review of, 
see Ethan Doyle White, Review of  Pathways in Modern Western Magic, edited by Nevill Drury, 
Correspondences 2, no. 1 (2014): 115–118. 
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Abstract
This is an article in the history of  Western esoteric currents that re-examines and clarifies the 
relationship between esoteric and psychological discourses within the works of  Israel Regardie. 
One of  the most common ways in which these two discourses have been found to be related 
to one another by scholars of  the esoteric is through the process of  “psychologization”—
with Regardie often being put forth as a paragon of  the process. This paper argues that a 
unitary conception of  psychologization fails to adequately describe the specific discursive 
strategies utilized by Regardie. In order to accurately analyze his ideas, a manifold typology of  
complementary, terminological, reductive, and idealist modes of  psychologization is proposed 
instead. Through this system of  classification, Regardie’s ideas regarding the relationship 
between psychological and esoteric discourses are understood as a network of  independent 
but non-exclusive processes, rather than as a single trend. It is found that all four modes of  
psychologization are present, both in relative isolation and in combination with one another, 
throughout his works. These results demonstrate that while it is accurate to speak of  Regardie 
as having psychologized esoteric discourse, this can only be the case given an understanding 
of  “psychologization” that is differentially nuanced in a way that, at least, accounts for the 
distinct discursive strategies this paper identifies.
Keywords
psychologization; method and theory; psychology and esotericism; science and religion; Israel 
Regardie; Golden Dawn
Christopher A. Plaisance 
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1. Introduction
Of  all the exponents of  the esoteric current initiated by the Hermetic Order 
of  the Golden Dawn (HOGD),1 Francis Israel Regardie (1907–1985) contends 
with the titans of  modern Western esoteric currents, such as Samuel Liddell 
MacGregor Mathers (1854–1918), Arthur Edward Waite (1857–1942), Aleister 
Crowley (1875–1947), and Dion Fortune (1890–1946), as perhaps the most 
prolific and widely influential author on the practice of  magic. Tremendous 
portions of  Regardie’s esoteric writings concern themselves with a single, 
unified question: what is the nature of  the relationship between esoteric 
and psychological discourses?2 Although Regardie explored this family of  
1 For treatments of  the order’s history, see: Ellic Howe, The Magicians of  the Golden Dawn: 
A Documentary History of  a Magical Order 1887–1923 (York Beach: Samuel Weiser, 1972); Ithel 
Colquhoun, Sword of  Wisdom: MacGregor Mathers and the Golden Dawn (New York: G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1975); R.A. Gilbert, Golden Dawn: Twilight of  the Magicians (Wellingborough: The Aquarian 
Press, 1983); Mary K. Greer, Women of  the Golden Dawn: Rebels and Priestesses (Rochester: Park 
Street Press, 1995); R.A. Gilbert, The Golden Dawn Scrapbook: The Rise and Fall of  a Magical Order 
(York Beach: Samuel Weiser, 1997); Daniël van Egmond, “Western Esoteric Schools in the 
Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” in Gnosis and Hermeticism from Antiquity to 
Modern Times, eds. Roelof  van den Broek and Wouter J. Hanegraaff  (Albany: State University 
New York Press, 1998), 311–46; Mary Greer and Darcy Küntz, The Chronology of  the Golden 
Dawn: Being a Chronological History of  a Magical Order, 1378–1994 (Edmonds: Holmes Publishing 
Group, 1999); Henrik Bogdan, Western Esotericism and Rituals of  Initiation (Albany: State 
University of  New York Press, 2007), 121–44; Christopher McIntosh, “‘Fräulein Sprengel’ 
and the Origins of  the Golden Dawn: A Surprising Discovery,” Aries 11, no. 2 (2011): 249–57.
2 Within the nascent field of  Western esotericism, uses of  the term “esotericism” (and 
“esoteric”) have ranged from strongly essentialist frameworks describing “esotericism” as 
a Ding an sich (e.g., Antoine Faivre, Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke), to empirical treatments that 
view “esotericism” as an historiographical construct (e.g., Wouter J. Hanegraaff, Kocku 
von Stuckrad), to intermediary positions between these two poles (e.g., Marco Pasi). It is 
far beyond this paper’s scope to examine the individual merits of  such arguments, or to 
venture into defining related terms, such as “occultism” or “magic.” It will suffice to say 
that within this paper, I use the term “esoteric discourse” in preference to “esotericism.” 
The theoretical underpinnings of  this shift conceptualize ‘the esoteric,’ as a discourse in 
European and American religion in which claims of  higher knowledge are characterized by 
a dialectic of  revelation and concealment.  For more on “esoteric discourse” as a theoretical 
alternative to “Western esotericism,” see: Kocku von Stuckrad, Locations of  Knowledge in Medieval 
and Early Modern Europe: Esoteric Discourse and Western Identities (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 43–66; 
Kocku von Stuckrad, The Scientification of  Religion: An Historical Study of  Discursive Change, 1800–
2000 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014), 152–58; Kennet Granholm, Dark Enlightenment: The 
Historical, Sociological, and Discursive Contexts of  Contemporary Esoteric Magic (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 
28–29; Egil Asprem, The Problem of  Disenchantment: Scientific Naturalism and Esoteric Discourse, 
1900–1939 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 546–51. Additionally, I follow Kennet Granholm’s lead in 
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concerns in a variety of  ways throughout his six decades of  involvement in 
Western esoteric currents, his overriding focus—to elucidate the ways in which 
esoteric theory and praxis overlapped with the psychological modelling and 
psychotherapeutic practice of  his day—remained relatively constant. Given 
this focus, the question naturally emerges as to what degree Regardie’s ideas 
fall within the scope of  what many scholars of  esoteric discourse now term 
“psychologization.” In his pioneering works on the New Age movements, 
Wouter Hanegraaff  noted that one of  the characteristic attitudes of  such 
intellectual currents is the “double phenomenon of  a psychologizing of  religion 
combined with a sacralization of  psychology.”3 Far from being a peculiarity of  the 
New Age, Hanegraaff  identifies psychologization as the “dominant tendency 
among 20th-century magicians” as well.4 This psychologizing trend has been 
that “esoteric currents can be analyzed as ‘discursive complexes,’ i.e. collections of  distinct 
discourses in specific combinations” (Granholm, Dark Enlightenment, 36).  For more on this, 
see: Kennet Granholm, “Esoteric Currents as Discursive Complexes,” Religion 43, no. 1 (2013): 
46–69.  For useful overviews of  this definitional debate (apart from the specific advocates for 
discursive approaches listed above), see: Antoine Faivre, Access to Western Esotericism (Albany: 
State University of  New York Press, 1994), 3–48; Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “Empirical Method 
in the Study of  Esotericism,” Method & Theory in the Study of  Religion 7, no. 2 (1995): 99–129; 
Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “On the Construction of  ‘Esoteric Traditions,’” in Western Esotericism 
and the Science of  Religion, eds. Antoine Faivre and Wouter J. Hanegraaff  (Leuven: Peeters, 
1998), 11–61; Kocku von Stuckrad, “Western Esotericism: Towards an Integrative Model 
of  Interpretation,” Religion 35 (2005): 78–97; Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, The Western Esoteric 
Traditions: A Historical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3–14; Wouter 
J. Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge in Western Culture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “The Power of  Ideas: Esotericism, 
Historicism, and the Limits of  Discourse,” Religion 43, no. 2 (2013): 252–73; Marco Pasi, 
“The Problems of  Rejected Knowledge: Thoughts on Wouter Hanegraaff ’s Esotericism and the 
Academy,” Religion 43, no. 2 (2013): 201–12; Egil Asprem and Kennet Granholm, “Constructing 
Esotericisms: Sociological, Historical and Critical Approaches to the Invention of  Tradition,” 
in Contemporary Esotericism, eds. Egil Asprem and Kennet Granholm (Sheffield: Equinox, 2013), 
25–48.
3 Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “The New Age Movement and the Esoteric Tradition,” in Gnosis 
and Hermeticism: From Antiquity to Modern Times, eds. Roelof  van den Broek and Wouter J. 
Hanegraaff  (Albany: State University of  New York Press, 1998), 378 (emphasis in original). 
For nearly identical wording, see: Wouter J. Hanegraaff, New Age Religion and Western Culture: 
Esotericism in the Mirror of  Secular Thought (Albany: State University of  New York Press, 1998), 
196–7; Wouter J. Hanegraaff, Western Esotericism: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013), 137 (emphasis in original).
4 Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “How Magic Survived the Disenchantment of  the World,” Religion 33 
(2003): 366. In later works, Hanegraaff  caveats this assertion somewhat: “The psychologizing 
trend is very common in modern and contemporary esotericism, but is certainly not universal.” 
Hanegraaff, Western Esotericism, 137.
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further identified as the hallmark of  modern emic discourses on magic by a 
wide range of  contemporary scholars.5 Amid this flurry of  recent research 
touching on the psychologization of  esoteric discourse, Regardie has come into 
view as one of  the phenomenon’s chief  representatives—with Hanegraaff,6 
Marco Pasi,7 John Selby,8 Egil Asprem,9 and Kocku von Stuckrad10 putting 
him forth as a primary example of  modern esoteric discourse’s trend towards 
psychologization. However, in none of  these cases is the assertion that Regardie’s 
esoteric discourse is psychologized supported by a full critical review of  his 
writing on the subjects. As such, the degree to which this characterization is 
a true reflection of  Regardie’s work remains an open question, one which is 
addressed by this present work.
In examining the relationship between psychological and esoteric discourses 
in Regardie’s writings, I argue that the notion of  “psychologization” as a singular 
process is imprecise and ill-suited for describing the particular discursive 
5 T.M. Luhrmann, Persuasions of  the Witch’s Craft: Ritual Magic in Contemporary England (Berkeley: 
North Atlantic Books, 2010), 280–2; Alex Owen, The Place of  Enchantment: British Occultism 
and the Culture of  the Modern (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 2004), 231; Kocku von 
Stuckrad, Western Esotericism: A Brief  History of  Secret Knowledge (London: Equinox, 2005), 144; 
Jennifer Walters, “Magical Revival: Occultism and the Culture of  Regeneration in Britain, c. 
1880–1929” (PhD diss., University of  Sterling, 2007), 111; Egil Asprem, “Magic Naturalized? 
Negotiating Science and Occult Experience in Aleister Crowley’s Scientific Illuminism,” Aries 
8 (2008): 140; John Warne Monroe, Laboratories of  Faith: Mesmerism, Spiritism, and Occultism in 
Modern France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 202; Jesper Aagaard Petersen, “‘We 
Demand Bedrock Knowledge’: Modern Satanism Between Secularized Esotericism and 
‘Esotericized’ Secularism,” in Handbook of  Religion and the Authority of  Science, eds. James R. 
Lewis and Olav Hammer (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 89; Alison Butler, Victorian Occultism and the 
Making of  Modern Magic: Invoking Tradition (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 180–81; Marco 
Pasi, “Varieties of  Magical Experience: Aleister Crowley’s Views on Occult Practice,” in 
Aleister Crowley and Western Esotericism, eds. Henrik Bogdan and Martin P. Starr (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 55; Colin Duggan, “Perennialism and Iconoclasm: Chaos Magick and 
the Legitimacy of  Innovation,” in Contemporary Esotericism (Sheffield: Equinox, 2013), 94.
6 Hanegraaff, “How Magic Survived,” 368; Hanegraaff, Western Esotericism, 137.
7 Marco Pasi, “La notion de magie dans le courant occultiste en Angleterre (1875–1947)” 
(PhD diss., École Pratique des Hautes Études, 2004), 395–98; Pasi, “Varieties of  Magical 
Experience,” 76.
8 John Selby, “Dion Fortune and Her Inner Plane Contacts: Intermediaries in the Western 
Esoteric Tradition” (PhD diss., University of  Exeter, 2008), 199.
9 Egil Asprem, Arguing With Angels: Enochian Magic and Modern Occulture (Albany: State 
University of  New York Press, 2012), 7. It should, however, be noted that Asprem suggests 
that Hanegraaff ’s overreliance on Regardie as an example is partially responsible for his model 
of  the psychologization process being somewhat one-dimensional (“Magic Naturalized,” 142).
10 Von Stuckrad, The Scientification of  Religion, 72.
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entanglements at play. Thus, after providing a brief  biographical sketch of  
Regardie, which examines his careers as both a magician and psychotherapist, 
I propose a model of  “psychologization” as a manifold network of  
discursive strategies that are mutually independent, but non-exclusive and 
capable of  overlap. The specific component processes of  this typology 
that bear discussion in Regardie’s case are, respectively, the complementary, 
terminological, reductive, and idealist modes of  psychologization. Following 
this, I briefly look into the origins of  the psychologizing trends in modern 
Western esoteric currents, finding that the bidirectionally formative nature 
of  the relationship between esoteric and psychological discourses makes the 
blanket characterization of  modern esoteric discourse as being psychologized 
troublesome. Descriptions of  Regardie as a paragon of  psychologized esoteric 
discourse by Hanegraaff, Asprem, and Pasi then follow, with a picture emerging 
of  each author describing Regardie’s “psychologization” in somewhat different 
terms—each accurately reflecting aspects of  Regardie’s work in parts, but 
painting with an overly broad brush in others. Through a careful documentary 
analysis of  Regardie’s esoteric corpus, the conclusion proposed is that the issue 
of  “psychologization” within his esoteric discourse is far from a simple matter 
with a “yes-or-no” solution. 
2. The Life and Times of  Israel Regardie
2.1 The Initiate
In order to understand Regardie’s relationship with the two disciplines in 
question, a biographical sketch that charts the course of  his life in relation to 
these fields of  study will prove useful in contextualizing his writings within the 
broader framework of  his life, education, vocations, and avocations. Regardie, 
whose surname was originally Regudy, was born on 17 November 1907 in 
London to a small immigrant family of  Orthodox Jews from Russia.11 When 
the family left London for Washington, DC, in 1921, Regardie ostensibly took 
up the study of  art. However, at the age of  fifteen or sixteen—sparked by a 
reference to Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831–1891) in a book belonging to 
11 Nicolas Tereshchenko, “Israel Regardie (1907–1985) and the ‘Golden Dawn,’” ARIES: 
Association pour la Recherche et l’Information sur l’Esotérisme 4 (1986): 71; Gerald Suster, Crowley’s 
Apprentice: The Life and Ideas of  Israel Regardie (York Beach: Samuel Weiser, 1990), 1; Pasi, 
“La notion,” 391; Richard Kaczynski, Perdurabo: The Life of  Aleister Crowley (Berkeley: North 
Atlantic Books, 2010), 432. The family name, Regudy, was changed to Regardie in 1921 after 
an army recruiter misspelled the name of  Israel’s older brother on his enlistment papers.
Plaisance / Correspondences 3 (2015) 5–5410
his sister—Regardie’s interests began to tend towards the esoteric.12 This soon 
blossomed into the exploration of  Theosophy, yoga, and the Qabalah, with 
the works of  Blavatsky,13 Paul Foster Case (1884–1954), and Charles Stansfeld 
Jones (1886–1950)14 making particular impressions upon him. Spurred in part 
by his Jewish heritage, his early delving into the Qabalah was supplemented by 
a year’s study of  Hebrew language under the tutelage of  a student of  George 
Washington University, as was recommended to Regardie by the head of  
the Library of  Congress’s Semitic Language Division after the young man 
expressed his interest in translating heretofore untranslated Qabalistic texts.15 
Between 1926 and 1927, Regardie’s descent into the world of  the esoteric was 
doubly affected by his discovery of  Crowley’s writings and by his initiation into 
the Societas Rosicruciana in America (SRIA).16 In 1928, Regardie’s fascination 
with Crowley’s work reached its apogee, and he made contact with Crowley. 
The result this time was that Regardie was invited to leave the US and join 
Crowley in Paris as his (unpaid) secretary, travelling companion, and student.17 
Three years later—once Crowley could no longer afford to keep Regardie 
12 Israel Regardie and Christopher S. Hyatt, “Regardie Pontificates: An Interview,” in An 
Interview With Israel Regardie: His Final Thoughts and Views, ed. Christopher S. Hyatt (Phoenix: 
Falcon Press, 1985), 19; Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 1; Pasi, “La notion,” 391; Kaczynski, 
Perdurabo, 432.
13 Regardie and Hyatt, “Regardie Pontificates,” 9, 52–53.
14 Israel Regardie, “Introduction to the Second Edition,” in A Garden of  Pomegranates: Skrying 
on the Tree of  Life, eds. and ann. Chic Cicero and Sandra Tabitha Cicero (Woodbury: Llewellyn 
Publications, 1999), xxii: “I began the study of  Qabalah at an early age. Two books I read 
have played unconsciously a prominent part in the writing of  my own book. One of  these 
was Q.B.L. or the Bride’s Reception by Frater Achad (Charles Stansfeld Jones), which I must have 
first read around 1926. The other was An Introduction to the [Study of  the] Tarot by Paul Foster 
Case, published in the early 1920s.”
15 Israel Regardie, “The Qabalah of  Number and Meaning,” in Foundations of  Practical Magic: 
An Introduction to Qabalistic, Magical and Meditative Techniques (Wellingborough: The Aquarian 
Press, 1979), 113; Israel Regardie, vol. 1 of  The Complete Golden Dawn System of  Magic, 10 vols 
(Tempe: New Falcon Publications, 1984), 30; Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 4; Nicholas Popadiuk 
et al., “From the Occult to Chiropractic Psychiatry: Francis Israel Regardie, D.C.,” Chiropractic 
History 27, no. 2 (2007): 35.
16 Popadiuk et al., “From the Occult,” 35; Kaczynski, Perdurabo, 432. Regardie received special 
permission, due to his age, to join the the Washington, DC, chapter of  the SRIA in early 1926. 
He was initiated into the Neophyte in March of  that year, and advanced to the subsequent 
grade of  Zelator in June of  the following year. His introduction to Crowley came through a 
friend who lent him a copy of  Book Four, and was soon followed by Regardie’s acquisition of  
a full set of  The Equinox, obtained directly from Karl Germer (1885–1962) after Regardie had 
made his initial contact with Crowley via correspondence.
17 Tereshchenko, “Israel Regardie,” 71; Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 31–51; Pasi, “La notion,” 
391; Kaczynski, Perdurabo, 423–43.
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on—the pair parted on friendly terms, and, although they did enter into a 
rather vicious quarrel in 1937,18 Regardie greatly valued his relationship with 
Crowley, remarking later in life: “Everything I am today, I owe to him.”19
Following his separation from Crowley, Regardie’s life became devoted to 
the pursuit of  two subjects: psychology and the esoteric. In 1932, Regardie 
published a pair of  books, The Tree of  Life and A Garden of  Pomegranates, both 
of  which drew deeply from the wealth of  HOGD material that Regardie 
had studied in The Equinox and with Crowley. These books at once proved 
polarizing within the wreckage of  the now-defunct order.20 In the following 
years, Dion Fortune took on the mantle of  Regardie’s champion. Not only 
did she defend his work in print against detractors, but she petitioned for 
his acceptance into the Stella Matutina (SM), an offshoot of  the HOGD to 
which she belonged.21 With Fortune’s sponsorship, Regardie was initiated 
into the SM’s Bristol chapter in 1934, taking the magical motto: Ad Majorem 
Adonai Gloriam.22 Although Regardie progressed rapidly through the order’s 
grades and greatly valued its teachings, he quickly became disillusioned with 
the generalized opposition to the practice of  practical magic within the order.23 
The order was, he determined, “in a state of  irreversible decay”24 and had 
become “an ossified system” in need of  vivification.25 The only solution that 
would ensure the revitalization of  the HOGD current, Regardie surmised, was 
to break his oaths of  secrecy and make public the teachings and rituals of  the 
order.26 This he did between 1937 and 1940, with the publication of  the four-
volume compendium The Golden Dawn through Aries Press.
2.2 The Student of  the Psyche
Although Regardie “had first begun to read about psychoanalysis in the writings 
of  Freud and Jung as early as 1926,”27 it was his tenure with the SM that allowed 
18 Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 48–51; Kaczynski, Perdurabo, 494–95.
19 Quoted in Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 51.
20 Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 61.
21 Kaczynski, Perdurabo, 494.
22 Popadiuk et al., “From the Occult,” 36; Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 61.
23 Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 73.
24 Tereshchenko, “Israel Regardie,” 74.
25 Gilbert, Golden Dawn, 79.
26 Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 74.
27 Israel Regardie, “Introduction to the Second Edition,” in The Middle Pillar: The Balance 
Between Mind and Magic, eds. and ann. Chic Cicero and Sandra Tabitha Cicero (Woodbury: 
Llewellyn Publications, 2010), xxx.
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this interest to blossom into what would become a career. Although she had no 
formal qualifications, Fortune had long been practicing as a lay analyst when 
she and Regardie first met in 1932, and had in 1922 already published—as 
Violet Firth—The Machinery of  the Mind, a collection of  essays on Freudian 
psychology.28 When Regardie joined the SM, it was Fortune who acted as the 
initial catalyst Regardie needed to begin taking the study of  Sigmund Freud 
(1856–1939) and Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1916) seriously.29 Concurrently, 
Regardie became acquainted with another SM initiate, Eric Graham Howe 
(1897–1975),30 a medical doctor and psychologist who was a noted mediator 
of  Jungian psychology.31 Regardie’s friendship with Howe further stoked the 
fires of  his “interest in and involvement with the world of  psychology.”32 In 
early 1937, Regardie himself  entered into a course of  psychoanalytical therapy 
and study under “Dr. E.A. Clegg of  Harley Street, and with Dr. J.L. Bendit, a 
Jungian of  Wimpole Street in London.”33 He also received private instruction 
in “relaxation techniques” from Oskar Köllerström (c. 1897–1977),34 himself  a 
student of  the eminent psychoanalyst Georg Groddeck (1866–1934).35 During 
this period, Regardie underwent analysis and received training in both Freudian 
and Jungian psychology, and went on to become a lay analyst himself.36
Later in 1937, Regardie returned to America from England to commence 
his formal higher education. Although he never graduated from high school, 
Regardie applied and was admitted to the Columbia Institute of  Chiropractic 
(CIC) in New York City for the fall term in 1937.37 At the time, Regardie 
28 Alan Richardson, The Magical Life of  Dion Fortune: Priestess of  the 20th Century (London: The 
Aquarian Press, 1991), 51–56; Selby, “Dion Fortune,” 132ff.
29 Popadiuk et al., “From the Occult,” 36.
30 Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 67. 
31 James Webb, The Occult Establishment (La Salle: Open Court, 1976), 476. 
32 Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 60. It is worth noting that Howe was the uncle of  Ellic Howe, 
the author of  The Magicians of  the Golden Dawn.
33 Regardie, “Introduction to the Second Edition,” The Middle Pillar, xxx. Outside of  this and 
other brief  notes made by Regardie mentioning the names of  these two therapists, little is now 
known about their identities or practices.
34 Israel Regardie, Be Yourself: A Guide Book to the Art of  Relaxation (Cheltenham: Helios, 1965), 8.
35 Kristine Stiles, ed., Correspondence Course: An Epistolary History of  Carolee Schneemann and Her 
Circle (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 164. Apart from his tutelage in psychoanalysis 
under Groddeck, Köllerstöm was deeply involved in both the Theosophical Society and the 
Liberal Catholic Church.
36 Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 79.
37 Popadiuk et al., “From the Occult,” 37. CIC was a private institution, established in 1919 
by Frank E. Dean—who headed the school still in 1937, when Regardie was enrolled. CIC 
eventually merged with the Columbia College of  Chiropractic in 1954, and again with the 
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identified himself  as a writer and masseur, expressing an interest in studying 
chiropractic due to massage’s lack of  efficacy in treating patients.38 He graduated 
from the CIC with a Doctor of  Chiropractic degree in 1941 and stayed on 
at the college, teaching anatomy.39 On 18 April 1942, in what he would later 
refer to as a “ghastly error,”40 Regardie enlisted to serve in the United States 
Army. His enlistment records indicate that he entered the service as a Branch 
Immaterial Warrant Officer, with the rank of  Private, and that his term was 
to last “for the duration of  the War or other emergency, plus six months.”41 
During this time, Regardie was assigned to a medical department, where he 
provided training to new recruits on a variety of  military subjects, including 
basic medical training (e.g., first aid).42 
2.3 The Chiropractic Psychiatrist
Towards the war’s end, Regardie was discharged, whereupon he returned to the 
United States and sought employment as a chiropractor. In 1944, he was initially 
hired by the Los Angeles College of  Chiropractic (LACC) in Hollywood, 
California, where he taught chiropractic and “chiropractic psychiatry.”43 As 
doctors of  chiropractic are not medical doctors and do not have the ability 
to prescribe medicine, the use of  the term “psychiatry” to describe Regardie’s 
subject is “a misnomer, and might better have been referred to as the practice 
of  psychology.”44 However, the subject was regularly offered both at LACC 
and the Hollywood College of  Chiropractic, where Regardie taught after 
leaving LACC in 1952.45 Not content to simply teach, he continued to study 
Atlantic States Chiropractic Institute of  Brooklyn in 1964. It was, in the end, renamed as the 
New York Chiropractic College, which still exists today.
38 Popadiuk et al., “From the Occult,” 37–8.
39 Ibid., 39.
40 Quoted in Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 110.
41 Record for Francis Israel Regardie; Electronic Army Serial Number Merged File, ca. 1938–
1946 (Enlistment Records) [Electronic Record]; World War II Army Enlistment Records, 
created 6/1/2002–9/30/2002, documenting the period ca. 1938–1946; Record Group 64; 
National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD [retrieved from the Access to Archival 
Databases at www.archives.gov, September 26, 2006]. As a note, while Popadiuk et al., in 
“From the Occult” (40), quote Regardie as giving his enlistment date as 28 April 1942, the 
enlistment record shows the date as 18 April.
42 Popadiuk et al., “From the Occult,” 40.
43 Ibid., 42–43. Originally founded in 1911, LACC is known today as the Southern California 
University of  Health Sciences.
44 Ibid., 43–44.
45 Ibid., 44. 
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psychotherapy as well. Through his own Reichian analysis under Nandor 
Fodor (1895–1964),46 as well as his correspondence with both Wilhelm Reich 
(1897–1957) himself47 and his daughter Eva Reich (1924–2008),48 Regardie 
came to have a great appreciation for Reich’s idiosyncratic approach to somatic 
psychotherapy, which augmented Freudian theories of  psychoanalysis with the 
practice of  massage. Regardie said of  this that “it was inevitable then that the 
vital biological approach of  Wilhelm Reich should appeal to me.”49 In Reich’s 
form of  practice, Regardie believed that he had discovered “a bridge between 
conventional psychotherapy and occultism.”50 However, as Marco Pasi notes, 
following his return to the United States, Regardie had largely disengaged from 
“les milieux occultistes” and published hardly anything on the subject of  the 
esoteric until the 1960s.51
In 1947, while still employed with LACC, Regardie became a state licensed 
chiropractor and set up a private practice in Los Angeles,52 specializing in 
Reichian techniques,53 and practicing a form of  Reichian analysis which 
combined Reich’s somatic psychotherapy with more conventional chiropractic 
as well as yoga.54 Regardie maintained this practice until his retirement in 1981, 
when he moved from California to a resort community in Sedona, Arizona.55 
That same year, perhaps as a result of  his pending retirement, Regardie became 
directly involved in the revival of  the Golden Dawn. Though he had been 
publishing on the subject of  the HOGD and its esoteric curriculum for decades 
at this point, his involvement in order work had been at a standstill since 
leaving the Bristol SM. However, Regardie slowly re-entered the Golden Dawn 
46 Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 110.
47 Regardie and Hyatt, “Regardie Pontificates,” 53–4. Regardie notes of  Reich: “I discovered 
him around 1947. Again we don’t need to go into the how and why. I became enamoured of  
him almost immediately. Within a very short period of  time I got myself  involved in Reichian 
therapy, in which I stayed for four years. Reich and I had a number of  personal communica-
tions, which must remain private. I explain why in my book on Reich to be published in 1984.” 
The book Regardie references here was never published.
48 Popadiuk et al., “From the Occult,” 37.
49 Regardie, Be Yourself, 7–8.
50 Regardie, “Introduction to the Second Edition,” The Middle Pillar, xxx.
51 Pasi, “La notion,” 394. Regardie’s publishing output on strictly chiropractic topics was 
pronounced during the period between 1944 and 1965. For a bibliography of  his chiropractic 
publications, see: Popadiuk et al., 45.
52 Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 110.
53 Pasi, “La notion,” 393.
54 Popadiuk et al., “From the Occult,” 48.
55 Ibid. 51.
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circles and began individually tutoring select students during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.56 In 1980, Regardie began corresponding with Chic Cicero 
(b. 1936), who had established an autonomous Golden Dawn organization 
with his wife called the Isis-Urania Temple No. 18 in Columbus, Georgia, in 
1978.57 Then, after Cicero completed the construction of  his temple’s Vault 
of  the Adepti in 1982, Regardie performed the ceremony to consecrate the 
vault, marking “the re-establishment of  a valid initiating Second Order in the 
United States.”58 Regardie died on 10 March 1985 in Sedona of  a heart attack,59 
leaving behind a tremendous literary legacy—which spanned both esoteric and 
chiropractic domains—and, thanks to his work during the last decade of  his 
life, a revivified incarnation of  the HOGD.
3. The Psychologization of  Esoteric Discourse
3.1 Defining “Psychologization”
The question of  the degree to which Regardie’s esoteric discourse is 
psychologized necessitates a brief  examination of  just what is meant by the 
term “psychologization.” At its core, any treatment of  the psychologization of  
discourse on the esoteric is discussing a relationship between two categories 
of  discourse: psychological and esoteric. There is a wide range of  ways in 
which these two categories can become entangled; however, it is not within the 
scope of  this paper to develop a typology that claims to exhaust all relational 
possibilities. Rather, the typology presented here should be seen as exhaustive 
only insofar as it identifies all of  the relational strategies present in Regardie’s 
work, as well as those found in secondary analyses of  his work. The members 
of  the typological schema are to be viewed as modes of  interaction, dynamic 
discursive processes by which Regardie attempts to reconcile what are often 
seen—outside esoteric currents, at any rate—as mutually exclusive categories. 
Within this context, I have identified four different processes which constitute 
instances of  psychologization as found or identified within Regardie’s works:
56 Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 150–51; Joseph Lisiewski, “Subtle is the Way: A Personal Portrait 
of  Dr. Francis Israel Regardie,” in What You Should Know About the Golden Dawn (Tempe: New 
Falcon, 2006), 199–203.
57 Greer and Küntz, The Chronology, 50–51.
58 Ibid., 51. At that time, the only operating orders with charters reaching back to the original 
HOGD were in New Zealand.
59 Tereshchenko, “Israel Regardie,” 75; Suster, Crowley’s Apprentice, 178; Popadiuk et al., “From 
the Occult,” 51; Greer and Küntz, The Chronology, 51.





Mode-one psychologization is the process by which psychological and esoteric 
discourses are viewed as separate but complementary domains. While this 
relational modality does begin with the position that psychological and esoteric 
discourses are distinct categories, it does not rise to the level of  exclusivity 
we see in Stephen Jay Gould’s non-overlapping magisteria model of  the 
relationship between religion and science, wherein the two are treated as 
wholly separate domains whose natures permit no intrusion of  one into the 
other’s sphere of  authority.60 What we see with mode-one psychologization is 
something more akin to Ian Barbour’s dialogue model, which portrays science 
and religion’s relationship as being one of  a constructive dialogue between two 
non-identical, but non-oppositional domains.61 Alister E. McGrath interprets 
Barbour’s dialogue model of  this relationship in terms of  complementarity, 
and draws on examples of  modern Catholic theologians who position science 
and religion as participating in a complementary relationship.62 This notion 
of  relational complementarity—where both domains are separate but one 
completes the other in some way—is the essence of  mode-one psychologization. 
This mode of  complementary psychologization, then, describes a situation 
where psychological and esoteric discourses are seen as separate categories, 
but as relating to one another in a way that is complementary—with one 
picking up where the other leaves off. As we shall see presently, this mode of  
psychologization is strongly exemplified in Regardie’s near-constant assertion 
60 Stephen Jay Gould, “Nonoverlapping Magisteria,” Natural History 106 (March 1997): 16–22.
61 Ian G. Barbour, When Science Meets Religion (New York: Harper Collins, 2000), 23.
62 Aleister E. McGrath, Science and Religion: A New Introduction (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010), 48: “How might they complement each other? For John Paul II, the answer was clear: 
‘Science can purify religion from error and superstition; religion can purify science from 
idolatry and false absolutes. Each can draw the other into a wider world, a world in which 
both can flourish.” For similar treatments of  science and religion’s complementarity, see: 
Erwin N. Hiebert, “Modern Physics and Christian Faith,” in God and Nature: Historical Essays 
on the Encounter Between Christianity and Science, eds. David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers 
(Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1986), 441–43; Mikael Stenmark, How to Relate Religion 
and Science: A Multidimensional Model (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2004), 38; Victor G. 
Cicirelli, “Can Science and Christian Religion Coexist: Compatibility or Conflict,” in Religion 
and Psychology: New Research, ed. Sylvan D. Ambrose (Hauppauge: Nova Science Publishers, 
2006), 259–60.
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that psychotherapy serves as a necessary precursor to any esoteric practice.63 
Through mode-one’s relational discourse, Regardie positions psychotherapeutic 
and esoteric techniques as complementary in nature, insofar as they both work 
towards achieving the same goal, but distinct in that they respectively represent 
different stages of  the work’s continuum.
Mode-two psychologization is the process whereby the metaphysical 
terminology of  an esoteric discourse is replaced with psychological terminology, 
all while maintaining the meaning of  the original esoteric concepts. Strikingly 
similar to Olav Hammer’s identification of  “terminological scientism” as a 
typical discursive strategy within Theosophy and the New Age,64 this mode of  
psychologization has been identified by Asprem as “an increasing tendency to 
incorporate terminology and theories borrowed from the new psychological 
discourses so prevalent from the beginning of  the 20th century, and to use 
these in the interpretation of  occult theories and practices.”65 This is then a 
discursive strategy through which esotericists attempt to legitimize their beliefs 
and practices by adapting the terminologies of  psychology. The intended 
effects of  this process are nearly identical to those of  terminological scientism, 
and can thus be considered a specific sub-modality of  that broader discursive 
strategy. Terminological psychologization at once seeks to position esoteric 
discourse as being relevant to modernity by “demonstrating” the esoteric’s 
agreement with science, and to subordinate science to the esoteric through the 
“revelation” that scientists are just now discovering truths known to esotericists 
for centuries.66 What is important to keep in mind here is that within mode-two 
psychologization, unlike in mode-one, esoteric and psychological discourses 
are not seen as separate categories. Rather, their identity is maintained in a 
very particular way, which reinforces the inward metaphysical primacy of  
the esoteric alongside the outward terminological primacy of  psychology. 
63 For a characteristic example, see: Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 20–21.
64 Olav Hammer, Claiming Knowledge: Strategies of  Epistemology from Theosophy to the New Age 
(Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2004), 206. Hammer defines terminological scientism as “the 
active positioning of  one’s own claims in relation to the manifestations of  any academic 
scientific discipline, including, but not limited to, the use of  technical devices, scientific 
terminology, mathematical calculations, theories, references and stylistic features — without, 
however, the use of  the methods generally approved within the scientific community, and 
without subsequent social acceptance of  the mainstream of  the scientific community.”
65 Asprem, “Magic Naturalized,” 141. See also: Butler, Victorian Occultism, 180–81; Hanegraaff, 
New Age Religion, 216.
66 Hammer, Claiming Knowledge, 328; Petersen, “We Demand Bedrock Knowledge,” 89; Owen, 
The Place of  Enchantment, 13.
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The paramount example of  this process in action is esotericists’ utilization 
of  Jung’s terms “archetype” and “collective unconscious.”67 Through this 
process of  terminological psychologization, we see “the ‘gods’ of  traditional 
pantheons … interpreted as archetypes, and reversely the archetypes of  the 
collective unconscious are seen as powerful, numinous realities.”68 In this way, 
there is a dual process, whereby esoteric concepts are on the one hand couched 
in a psychological terminology, and on the other, psychological terms are 
imbued with an esoteric metaphysics.
Mode-three psychologization is very nearly the converse of  mode-two. 
Whereas the latter essentially masks an esoteric metaphysical system with 
psychological terminology, the former reverses this vector—masking a 
psychological system with esoteric terminology. Reductive psychologization 
can be defined as the active utilization and reinterpretation of  the results of  
the psychological reduction of  esoteric discourse. The general idea driving 
reductionism is that the ability of  one system to be reduced to something 
else, which is itself  irreducible, casts that which is being reduced as “not 
fully real,” with reality being characteristically irreducible.69 In terms of  
esoteric doctrines, three distinct reductive processes can be identified: (1) 
epistemological reductionism, which posits that complex behavioral systems 
like religion follow naturally and can be deduced from, and thus reduced 
to, biological and physical laws; (2) definitional reductionism, which posits 
that the terminology of  natural science is necessarily universal, and that 
the terminological apparatuses of  religious and esoteric discourses can, by 
definition, be translated into scientific terms; and (3) ontological reductionism, 
which posits that religious phenomena have no existence of  their own, and 
can be explained away as being “nothing but” combinations of  “other types 
of  things that are real.”70 Reductive theories of  religion originated with the 
nineteenth-century anthropologists and sociologists of  religion, such as 
Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872), Edward Burnett Tylor (1832–1917), and 
Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), and the particular process of  psychological 
reduction is generally thought to owe its origin to Freud’s interpretation of  
religious doctrines as social projections of  internal psychological processes.71 
67 Luhrmann, Persuasions, 172.
68 Hanegraaff, New Age Religion, 216.
69 Richard H. Jones, Reductionism: Analysis and the Fullness of  Reality (Cranbury: Associated 
University Presses, 2000), 16; Ralph W. Hood Jr. et al., The Psychology of  Religion: An Empirical 
Approach (New York: The Guilford Press, 2009), 22.
70 James M. Nelson, Psychology, Religion, and Spirituality (New York: Springer, 2009), 45–47.
71 Hanegraaff, New Age Religion, 224–25; Hood et al., The Psychology of  Religion, 23; Jones, 
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Where the psychological reduction of  religious or esoteric doctrines shifts 
direction and becomes the reductive psychologization of  the same doctrines is 
in the reinterpretation of  psychological reductive theories of esoteric discourse 
by esotericists. The paramount example of  this reinterpretative process is 
Crowley’s essay “The Initiated Interpretation of  Ceremonial Magic” (1903), 
wherein he poses the question as to “the cause of  my illusion of  seeing a 
spirit in the triangle of  Art,” and answers himself: “That cause lies in your 
brain.”72 In this way, we see Crowley begin with a psychologically reduced 
interpretation of  the magical practice of  evocation, and then reinterpret this 
as something to be applied to magical practice—acting as a practicing magician 
rather than as a psychologist. For, although the magical practice is reduced to 
psychological terms, Crowley still advocates for the performance of  the ritual 
itself, rather than utilizing the psychological reduction as a means to advocate 
for conventional psychotherapy in ritual’s stead.
Mode-four psychologization differs greatly from modes-two and -three 
in that, while it does maintain an identity between psychological and esoteric 
discourses, its modus operandi is neither reductive nor strictly terminological 
in nature. It is the most complex of  the modes examined here. This 
psychologizing mode, like its terminological and reductive cousins, maintains 
an identity between psychological and esoteric discourses. However, this 
identity is not positioned in a way that subordinates one category to the other. 
Rather, idealistic psychologization comes closest to Hanegraaff ’s definition 
of  the process as being bidirectional, whereby the esoteric is psychologized at 
the same time as psychology is esotericized. He notes that since “the subject 
is conceived as an objective reality and an object as a subjective experience,” 
this mode of  psychologization “is not correctly described in terms of  objective 
realities versus subjective realities.”73 Although idealistic psychologization does 
indeed represent a fundamentally subjectivized reinterpretation of  esoteric 
discourse, it does not do so in a reductive manner, as does mode-three. Mode-
four’s subjectivization does not proceed by reducing formerly objective esoteric 
phenomena to a wholly private psyche. On the contrary, the psychologized 
vista is seen as public in the sense that it is not ontologically contained within 
Reductionism, 232.
72 Aleister Crowley, “The Initiated Interpretation of  Ceremonial Magic,” in The Goetia: 
The Lesser Key of  Solomon the King, Clavicula Salomonis Regis, trans. Samuel Liddell Mathers 
and ed. Aleister Crowley (York Beach: Samuel Weiser, 1997), 16. For more on Crowley’s 
psychologization of  magic, see: Asprem, “Magic Naturalized,” 142, 152, 156–59, 163; Pasi, 
“Varieties of  Magical Experience,” 53–55, 69–70.
73 Hanegraaff, New Age Religion, 196–97.
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a single esotericist’s psyche, but is rather seen as a “separate but connected” 
locus accessible to all by means of  the application of  esoteric praxis. In this 
way, although esoteric discourse is radically reinterpreted in psychological 
terms, idealistic psychologization is not a simple reduction of  the esoteric to 
psychology, but is rather grounded in a valuation of  the psyche itself  as the 
root of  sacrality.74 
Through mode-four psychologization, the esotericist reinterprets the idea 
of  sacrality in such a way that its locus is not conceived of  as a god who is 
separate from the individual, but rather the individual psyche itself.75 For this 
reason, it appears that psychologized strains of  esoteric discourse “tend to 
dislike references to a personal creator-God,”76 favoring instead the notion 
of  divinity as something more akin to a “state of  consciousness.”77 This 
mode of  psychologization allows esotericists to at once “talk about God 
while really meaning their own psyche, and about their own psyche while 
really meaning the divine.”78 What is important to remember, however, about 
esoteric practice within this idealistic psychologization is that such experiences 
are not seen by practitioners as a retreat into a private interior world where 
the truths gleaned are only subjective.79 On the contrary, the psychologized 
divine is treated as something objectively real, but whose reality can only 
be accessed and understood through esoteric practices of  “elevating” or 
“exalting” individual consciousness such that it comes to reach the divine 
locus that is the psyche. 
The relocation of  esoteric phenomena to a “separate but connected” psychic 
vista that characterizes mode-four’s psychologization has been identified 
by Asprem—drawing at once on Tanya Luhrmann and Hanegraaff—as 
arising out of  the cognitive dissonance felt by esotericists as their beliefs and 
practices come into disjunctive contact with modern rationalism and scientific 
naturalism.80 This is to say that the esotericist who, for example, believes in the 
existence of  angels and demons on the one hand, yet in the descriptive efficacy 
of  science on the other, finds himself  divided. This mode of  psychologization 
allows for the alleviation of  this cognitive dissonance by means of  suspending 
their “disbelief  by confining magic to a place outside the empirical realm of  
74 Hanegraaff, “The New Age Movement,” 378.
75 Hanegraaff, New Age Religion, 216, 245–46; von Stuckrad, Western Esotericism, 144.
76 Hanegraaff, “How Magic Survived,” 366.
77 Owen, The Place of  Enchantment, 13.
78 Hanegraaff, New Age Religion, 513.
79 Owen, The Place of  Enchantment, 148.
80 Asprem, “Magic Naturalized,” 141–42.
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verification, evidence and rational criticism.”81 The specific tool used to effect 
this doxic suspension is the “magical plane,” which is described as separate 
from but connected to the mundane world.82 According to Hanegraaff, the 
magical plane functions to rationalize magic by positing that it operates 
“on a different level of  reality,” in which “processes of  secularisation and 
disenchantment in the everyday world simply have no bearing … and hence do 
not have to affect the reality of  magic.”83 Luhrmann describes this idea of  
the separate-but-connected magical plane as having been given “particular 
force” by “the advent of  psychoanalysis.”84 The connections drawn between 
the magical plane of  the esotericists and the unconscious mental realms of  the 
psychoanalysts served to legitimize the construct in the eyes of  esotericists—
to imbue it with the scientific credibility desperately craved by so many late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century practitioners. In Luhrmann’s analysis, 
apart from its separateness, the defining feature of  the magical plane is the 
fact that it is either presented as being composed of  a different substance or 
as operating under different rules than the mundane plane of  the everyday 
world.85 The overall effect and function of  this differentiation is “to insulate 
magical practice from rational critique, thereby legitimising it.”86 However, this 
insulation from “rational” criticism should not be misconstrued as implying 
that esoteric truths were conceived as being non-demonstrable. What we see 
instead is a particular type of  empiricism whereby esoteric phenomena are 
viewed as being non-testable on the “material plane,” but as fully testable on 
the “magical plane.” A prime example of  this mode of  psychologization can 
be seen in Regardie’s statement that magical techniques of  visualization and 
skrying on the magical planes “are seen to be technical methods of  exalting 
the individual consciousness until it comes to a complete realisation of  its 
own divine root.”87
The four psychologizing modalities now having been described, the 
question of  the modes’ relations to one another arises. As I have intimated, 
81 Ibid., 142.
82 Luhrmann, Persuasions, 277; Hanegraaff, “How Magic Survived,” 370; Asprem, “Magic 
Naturalized,” 141–42.
83 Hanegraaff, “How Magic Survived,” 370 (emphasis in original). 
84 Luhrmann, Persuasions, 277.
85 Ibid., 274, 280.
86 Asprem, “Magic Naturalized,” 141–42 (emphasis in original). 
87 Israel Regardie, “Introduction,” in The Golden Dawn: An Account of  the Teachings, Rites and 
Ceremonies of  the Golden Dawn, ed. Israel Regardie, 4 vols. (Chicago: The Aries Press, 1937–
1940), 29.
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and as will be demonstrated presently, Regardie’s psychologization of  esoteric 
discourse is not limited to one of  these modalities—or even to utilizing one 
at a time. Rather, what we see throughout his work is a tendency to make 
use of  two or more modes of  psychologization within the same book or 
essay. How, then, do these modalities relate to one another? It would appear 
at the outset that certain modes would exclude one another, rendering any 
attempt to engage in all four at once to be logically inconsistent. Mode-one 
would seem to be excluded by the other three modes, as it is the only one 
considered here that insists on treating psychological and esoteric discourses 
as separate categories, while the others maintain some type of  identification. 
Similarly, there appears to be a great logical disjunction between modes-two 
and -three, as each category is nearly the exact converse of  the other. Finally, 
mode-four’s particular method of  identifying psychology and the esoteric 
would put it at odds with all three of  the other modalities. These disjunctions 
being the case, what does it mean for a single individual to simultaneously 
engage in more than one mode of  psychologization? Logically, this would be 
permissible by redefining our categories P (psychological discourse) and E 
(esoteric discourse) from being singular entities to constellations of  related 
entities (i.e., P becomes P1, P2, …; and E becomes E1, E2, …). In this way, in 
order to maintain consistency, any combination of  mode-one alongside other 
modes would need to distinguish why some aspects of  these categories remain 
separate, while others are identified (i.e., rather than broadly identifying or 
distinguishing P and E, P1 could be identified with E1 while P2 is distinguished 
from E2). Now, if  the individual were to, within a single work, identify E1 with 
P1 via mode-two (or mode-three or -four) and at the same time distinguish 
E1 from P1
 via mode-one, then we would arrive at a clear logical impasse. As 
such, any challenges regarding the internal logic of  Regardie’s multimodal 
psychologization of  esoteric discourse must be careful to account for the 
specific esoteric phenomena being psychologized at the time.
3.2 Origins of  the Psychologizing Trend
The cultural context within which the psychologization processes emerged 
is denoted by Hanegraaff  as “secularization,” which in turn leads to the 
related cultural process of  “disenchantment.”88 As he defines it, secularization 
is “the totality of  historical developments in modern western society” that 
has resulted in Christianity’s demotion from being the foundational centre 
of  discursive hegemony in the West, reducing it “to merely one among a 
88 Hanegraaff, “How Magic Survived,” 358–60.
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plurality of  institutions within the context of  a culture which is itself  no longer 
grounded in a religious system of  symbols.”89 Disenchantment, then, is the 
resulting set of  circumstances that arise from secularization, and is defined by 
Hanegraaff  as “the social pressure exerted upon human beings to deny the 
spontaneous tendency of  participation, by accepting the claims of  a culturally 
established ideology according to which instrumental causality amounts to a 
worldview capable in principle of  rationally explaining all aspects of  reality.”90 
Within the specific discussion of  the psychologization of  modern magic, 
Hanegraaff  contends that, owing to the fact of  secularization, “although 
the Golden Dawn-magic of  the 20th century is rooted in the hermetic and 
kabbalistic currents which flourished in the Renaissance … there yawns a gulf  
between Renaissance magia naturalis and the occultist magic of  today,” such 
that modern magical practitioners “actually appear to have serious trouble 
understanding the original meaning of  the worldview” from which their own 
practices emerged.91 The consequence of  this process of  psychologization is 
that, although this “is a survival of  magic in a disenchanted world … this will 
no longer be the same magic that could be found in periods prior to the process 
of  disenchantment. It will be a disenchanted magic.”92 Within the broader 
context of  the study of  religion, particularly sociological approaches, both the 
secularization and disenchantment theses have been interpreted and applied in 
widely diverging ways.93 Furthermore, since Hanegraaff ’s original formulation 
of  the psychologization thesis, there has been a good deal of  debate among 
scholars of  Western esoteric currents regarding both the broader idea of  
secularization and the particular applicability of  the disenchantment thesis to 
modern esoteric currents.94 In both cases, the debates in question are outside 
89 Ibid., 358–59.
90 Ibid., 377.
91 Ibid., 366 (emphasis in original). 
92 Ibid., 359–60 (emphasis in original).
93 For overviews of  the origin and reception of  both the secularization and disenchantment 
theses, see: William H. Swatos Jr. and Kevin J. Christiano, “Secularization Theory: The Course 
of  a Concept,” Sociology of  Religion 60, no. 3 (1999): 209–28; Michael Saler, “Modernity and 
Enchantment: A Historiographic Review,” American Historical Review 111, no. 3 (2006): 692–716.
94 For major discussions after Hanegraaff, see: Owen, The Place of  Enchantment, 10–11; Corinna 
Treitel, A Science for the Soul: Occultism and the Genesis of  the German Modern (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2004), 29–55; Christopher Partridge, vol. 1 of  The Re -Enchantment of  
the West: Alternative Spiritualities, Sacralization, Popular Culture, and Occulture, 2 vols. (London: T&T 
Clark International, 2004–5), 8–15, 40–44, 67–70; von Stuckrad, Locations of  Knowledge, 11; 
Kocku von Stuckrad, “Discursive Transfers and Reconfigurations: Tracing the Religious and 
the Esoteric in Secular Culture,” in Contemporary Esotericism, 228, 233; Kennet Granholm, “The 
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the scope of  this paper to address, as it is Hanegraaff ’s original position that 
particularly informs the notion of  psychologization. 
Before moving on to Regardie, the nature of  the complex relationship 
that exists between psychological and esoteric discourses must be addressed. 
Although a full examination of  this relationship’s nature is well beyond this 
paper’s scope, a brief  explanation will prove useful in understanding Regardie’s 
work. According to the eminent historian of  psychology Henri Ellenberger, 
the safest general characterization of  modern psychology is that there exists 
“an uninterrupted continuity … between exorcism and magnetism, magnetism 
and hypnotism, and hypnotism and modern dynamic schools.”95 Ellenberger 
sees the emergence of  early modern psychology as being birthed through “the 
antagonism and the interplay between the Enlightenment and Romanticism.”96 
The major figures involved in this dynamic interrelationship between pre-
Enlightenment esoteric currents and the burgeoning schools of  psychology 
include Franz Anton Mesmer (1734–1815),97 Armand-Marie-Jacques de 
Chastenet Marquis de Puységur (1751–1825),98 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 
Schelling (1775–1854),99 Freud,100 Jung,101 and Wilhelm Reich (1897–1957).102 
Secular, the Post-Secular and the Esoteric in the Public-Sphere,” in Contemporary Esotericism, 
309–29; Egil Asprem, “The Problem of  Disenchantment: Scientific Naturalism and Esoteric 
Discourse, 1900–1939,” (PhD diss., Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2013).
95 Henri E. Ellenberger, The Discovery of  the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of  Dynamic 
Psychiatry (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 48. 
96 Ibid., 198–99.
97 Ibid., 58–66; Monroe, Laboratories of  Faith, 67–71; Robert Darnton, Mesmerism and the End 
of  the Enlightenment in France (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 14.
98 Ellenberger, The Discovery of  the Unconscious, 112.
99 Ibid., 77–78, 159, 202–3; Treitel, A Science for the Soul, 34–35; Hanegraaff, “Magnetic Gnosis,” 
127; S.J. McGrath, The Dark Ground of  Spirit: Schelling and the Unconscious (London: Routledge, 
2012), 1–2, 21–23, 44–45, 107; Matt Ffytche, The Foundations of  the Unconscious: Schelling, Freud 
and the Birth of  the Modern Psyche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 106, 112. 
100 Ffytche, The Foundations of  the Unconscious, 17, 71–72, 219; Webb, The Occult Establishment, 
359, 364–65, 371–78; Ellenberger, The Discovery of  the Unconscious, 218, 542, 887–88; Owen, The 
Place of  Enchantment, 143; Odo Marquard, Transzendentaler Idealismus, romantische Naturphilosophie, 
Psychoanalyse (Köln, Germany: Verlag fur Philosophie J. Dinter, 1987), 163.
101 Hanegraaff, New Age Religion, 487, 500–501; Ellenberger, The Discovery of  the Unconscious, 
208, 223, 728–30; Richard Noll, The Jung Cult: Origins of  a Charismatic Movement (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 41–42, 48, 69, 169, 171; Richard Noll, The Aryan Christ: The 
Secret Life of  Carl Jung (New York: Random House, 1997), 30–32, 126–27, 131; Ffytche, The 
Foundations of  the Unconscious, 223.
102 Webb, The Occult Establishment, 472; Myron Sharaf, Fury on Earth: A Biography of  Wilhelm 
Reich (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 55, 235; William Edward Mann, Orgone, Reich, 
and Eros: Wilhelm Reich’s Theory of  Life Energy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), 91–93; 
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In general, it appears that the connections between post-Enlightenment depth 
psychology and pre-Enlightenment esoteric currents are such that the former 
“basically continues the esoteric project by other means.”103 This being the 
case, we must keep in mind that characterizations of  modern esoteric currents 
as being psychologized depend on a psychology that is itself  greatly dependent 
prior esoteric currents—the relationship between the two being bidirectionally 
formative. To speak of  modern esoteric discourse being “psychologized” in 
some sense refers to post-Enlightenment esoteric currents being interpreted 
in light of  a system of  thought (i.e., psychology) that is itself  the product 
of  pre-Enlightenment esoteric currents, and is thus something of  an esoteric 
current—albeit one of  a different sort than the openly esoteric currents with 
which it is being related.
3.3 Regardie as a Paragon of  the Psychologization Process
In his discussion of  the psychologization of  modern magic, Hanegraaff  
singles out Regardie as a paragon of  the psychologization process. He sees 
Regardie’s Middle Pillar ritual as epitomizing “the basic approach to ‘magic’ 
in modern occultism, which rests essentially on training the imagination by 
means of  visualisation techniques.”104 In Regardie’s work, Hanegraaff  views 
magical practice as having been transformed “essentially into a series of  
psychological techniques for ‘exalting the individual consciousness,’ involving 
meditational practices and, most importantly, visualisation.”105 He characterizes 
Regardie’s psychologized interpretations of  the HOGD’s and SM’s rituals 
as occurring within “a perspective grounded in Freudian psychoanalysis.”106 
For Hanegraaff, this focus on constructive visualization—as opposed to the 
strictly passive reception of  images—is the characteristic attitude of  mode-
four psychologization.107 In his analysis, Regardie’s “magical techniques are 
T.E. Weckowicz and H.P. Liebel-Weckowicz, A History of  Great Ideas in Abnormal Psychology 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1990), 265.
103 Von Stuckrad, Western Esotericism, 146.
104 Hanegraaff, “How Magic Survived,” 369. The Middle Pillar ritual can be found in: Regardie, 
vol. 1 of  The Golden Dawn, 179–82.
105 Hanegraaff, “How Magic Survived,” 368. Hanegraaff  is here quoting, Regardie, “Introduction,” 
in The Golden Dawn, 29. Regardie states in this passage that magic “is a poetic or dramatic 
convention,” and that “from a purely psychological point of  view” it can be seen as “technical 
methods of  exalting the individual consciousness until it comes to a complete realisation of  its 
own divine root.”
106 Hanegraaff, Western Esotericism, 137.
107 For a counter-argument, demonstrating the historical continuity between the visualization 
practices of  contemporary esoteric currents with their antique, medieval, and Renaissance 
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psychological techniques intended to develop a mystical consciousness,” which 
is to say that they represent a psychologically subjectivized reformulation of  the 
pre-modern esoteric worldview, which “was based upon the belief  in a personal 
God,” further demonstrating Hanegraaff ’s characterization of  Regardie’s work 
as participating in the idealist mode of  psychologization.108 Hanegraaff  is here 
following in Luhrmann’s footsteps. In her treatment of  the magical plane, 
she puts Regardie forth as one who “at times … seems to regard magic as no 
more than a system of  psychology,” noting that Regardie’s presentation of  
magic often centers on the conscious manipulation of  “powerful symbols to 
gain direct access to his unconscious feelings.”109 This analysis also seems to 
characterize Regardie’s magic as exemplifying mode-four psychologization.
Although hesitant to extrapolate Regardie’s positions as being representative 
of  the whole of  modern esoteric discourse, Asprem does “believe that 
there is much merit in describing Regardie’s own take on ritual magic as 
‘psychologized.’”110 Indeed, Asprem is somewhat critical of  Hanegraaff ’s 
general characteristic of  modern esoteric discourse as psychologized, insofar as 
his sample set (i.e., Regardie’s writings, Luhrmann’s anthropological study of  a 
single group) is insufficiently broad to warrant such a sweeping generalization.111 
As Asprem does not expand on what he precisely means in describing Regardie’s 
magic as psychologized, we are somewhat less than certain as to whether 
he is concurring with Hanegraaff ’s characterization, and to which mode of  
psychologization he refers. However, the fact that he is referencing Regardie’s 
psychologizing of  magic within the context of  Hanegraaff ’s argument leads 
one towards that assumption. Selby’s statement that Regardie “was one of  
the first authors seriously attempting to integrate psychology and magic” is 
similarly vague.112 We are left in the dark as to what exactly Selby means by the 
“integration” of  psychology and magic, although it is clear that—whatever 
this process is—Regardie is seen as a paragon of  the psychologization process.
A far more in-depth discussion of  Regardie’s psychologization is given by 
Pasi. He begins his treatment of  Regardie’s psychologization by discussing 
the continuum leading from Blavatsky’s notion of  the Ascended Masters 
precursors, see: Christopher A. Plaisance, “Magic Made Modern? Re-evaluating the Novelty 
of  the Golden Dawn’s Magic,” Correspondences: Online Journal for the Academic Study of  Western 
Esotericism 2, no. 2 (2014): 159–87.
108 Hanegraaff, “How Magic Survived,” 366.
109 Luhrmann, Persuasions of  the Witch’s Craft, 276.
110 Asprem, Arguing With Angels, 77.
111 Ibid., 76–77.
112 Selby, “Dion Fortune,” 199.
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as “des êtres incarnés” (incarnated beings) to the more fluid and gradually 
psychologized positions of  Fortune and Crowley, seeing Regardie as having 
crossed “le dernier seuil” (the final threshold) to arrive at “une interprétation 
complètement psychologique de la magie” (a completely psychological 
interpretation of  magic).113 Pasi notes that, despite Fortune’s training as a 
lay analyst, Regardie tends to “‘subjectiviser’ et ‘psychologiser’ la pratique 
magique” (“subjectivize” and “psychologize” the practice of  magic) in a far 
more radical way than does Fortune, in whose system “la communication avec 
des entités extérieures et objectives reste fondamentale” (the communication 
with external and objective entities remains fundamental).114 For Pasi, then, 
Regardie’s psychologization is principally mode-four, and is fundamentally 
tied to the shift from objectivity to subjectivity in the focus of  modern 
esoteric practice. In general, Pasi notes that for Regardie, “there seems to be 
an almost perfect equation between psychology and magic,”115 which results 
in “une conception totalement individualiste et sécularisée de la magie” (a 
totally individualistic and secular conception of  magic) whose ultimate aim 
is “le développement ‘intégral’ de sa propre personnalité” (the “integral” 
development of  his own personality).116
As a case in point of  this wholly subjectivized psychologization, Pasi 
examines Regardie’s treatment of  the Holy Guardian Angel (HGA). He notes 
that within Crowley’s system, even though he had begun to introduce “des 
interprétations d’ordre psychologique, voire physiologique, au sujet des entités” 
(psychological or physiological interpretations of  [supernatural] entities), 
he stuck fast to the position that certain beings—such as the HGA—“ne 
pouvaient pas être ramenées à la psyché du magicien” (could not be reduced 
to the psyche of  the magician).117 For Regardie, the primary goal of  magic is to 
enter into a relationship with one’s HGA, an objective that Pasi sees Regardie 
as identifying with the psychological process of  “l’ouverture de la conscience 
vers le ‘Soi Supérieur’” (the opening of  consciousness to the “Higher Self ”).118 
The centralization of  this process, which is essentially psychological self-
knowledge draped in a facade of  religious terminology, at once participates 
in mode-two and mode-four psychologization. This reformulation of  magical 
113 Pasi, “La notion,” 387–88.
114 Ibid., 397.
115 Pasi, “Varieties of  Magical Experience,” 76.
116 Pasi, “La notion,” 397.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid., 395.
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practice is, for Pasi, a radical innovation, whereby magical practice has ceased 
to function as a means through which the magician either communicates with 
“des entités désincarnées” (disincarnate entities) or attempts to “manipuler la 
réalité extérieure et objective par le biais de forces ou qualités impersonnelles” 
(manipulate external and objective reality through impersonal forces or 
qualities), but has rather become “une technique pour interagir avec une partie 
(‘supérieure’ ou ‘inconsciente,’ peu importe) de soi-même” (a technique for 
interacting with a portion [“higher” or “unconscious,” it does not matter] of  
oneself).119 This shift from a strictly external and objective conception of  magic 
to a more internal and subjective view is, Pasi tells us, “un signe, certainement, 
de l’impact de la culture moderne (ou, si l’on préfère, de la sécularisation) sur 
les théories de la magie” (a sign, surely, of  the impact of  modern culture [or, if  
you prefer, secularization] on theories of  magic).120 This final characterization 
of  Pasi’s seems to strongly tend towards mode-four psychologization.
4. Psychology in Regardie’s Esoteric Corpus
4.1 Psychological and Esoteric Discourses
The requisite theoretical background now having been developed, we may 
proceed with a documentary analysis of  Regardie’s esoteric corpus, with the 
overriding goals being to illuminate the ways in which he relates psychological 
to esoteric discourses and to determine what modes of  psychologization 
appear in his works. In working towards this understanding, the natural 
starting point is the collection of  explicit statements made by Regardie as 
to the nature of  this relationship. Although his earliest works, A Garden of  
Pomegranates and The Tree of  Life, certainly contain a mixture of  psychological 
and esoteric elements, it is in My Rosicrucian Adventure (1936) that we see the 
first explicit statement.121 Here, Regardie directly quotes Jung’s commentary 
on Richard Wilhelm’s (1873–1930) edition of  the Chinese alchemical text The 
Secret of  the Golden Flower, noting that “magical practices are … the projections 
of  psychic events which, in cases like these, exert a counter influence on the 
soul, and act like a kind of  enchantment of  one’s own personality.”122 This is a 
119 Ibid., 397.
120 Ibid.
121 Israel Regardie, What You Should Know About the Golden Dawn (Tempe: New Falcon 
Publications, 2006), 67. The book was originally titled My Rosicrucian Adventure; subsequent 
reprintings were retitled as What You Should Know About the Golden Dawn.
122 Carl Gustav Jung, “Commentary,” in The Secret of  the Golden Flower: A Chinese Book of  Life, 
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clear statement of  the mode-three reduction of  magical processes to psychic 
processes, which is characteristic of  Regardie’s reliance on Crowley’s essay 
“The Initiated Interpretation of  Ceremonial Magic.”123 
Two years later, with the publication of  The Middle Pillar (1938), we see 
Regardie moving away from this reductive identification to see “analytical 
psychology as the spouse of  the ancient system of  magic,”124 with “broad 
divisions of  certain principles common to both.”125 This, then, is a statement 
of  a collaborative relationship, where both magic and psychology address the 
same fundamental issues from different angles. This sense is maintained in 
Regardie’s other 1938 publication, The Philosopher’s Stone, where he makes use 
of  the same quotation from Jung’s commentary above, but this time frames it 
with a comment noting that “the psychological approach borders very closely 
on the magical one,” and that magic’s objective is “to bring the student into 
an awareness of  his own divine nature,” which is essentially “to effect psycho-
logical integration.”126 Thus, although we see Regardie making something of  
a differentiation between psychological and esoteric discourses here, they are 
both positioned as working towards the same goal, which is itself  bound up 
with the fourth mode of  psychologization, wherein divine illumination and 
psychological holism are one and the same.
After Regardie’s break from publishing on esoteric topics following his 
enlistment in the army, we see him return to the topic with his 1968 book Roll 
Away the Stone. Here, Regardie returns to his previous reliance on Crowley’s 
early reductive psychologization, plainly stating that “magic is the name for a 
primitive psychological system” whose goal is “the transcendental experience” 
of  illumination, which he identifies with Jung’s notion of  individuation.127 Two 
years later, in his 1970 introduction to The Middle Pillar’s second edition, Regardie 
speaks of  a “correlation of  the practice of  magic to modern psychotherapy,” 
noting that the difference is terminological rather than conceptual, which 
trans. Richard Wilhelm (London: Kegal Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1931), 100.
123 Crowley, “The Initiated Interpretation of  Ceremonial Magic,” 15–19.
124 Israel Regardie, The Middle Pillar: The Balance Between Mind and Magic, eds. and ann. Chic 
Cicero and Sandra Tabitha Cicero (Woodbury: Llewellyn Publications, 2010), 20.
125 Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 25.
126 Israel Regardie, The Philosopher’s Stone: A Modern Comparative Approach to Alchemy from the 
Psychological and Magical Points of  View (Saint Paul: Llewellyn Publications, 1970), 150–51.
127 Israel Regardie, “Roll Away the Stone,” in Roll Away the Stone: An Introduction to Aleister 
Crowley’s Essays on the Psychology of  Hashish, With the Complete Text of  the Herb Dangerous, ed. Israel 
Regardie (Saint Paul: Llewellyn Publications, 1968), 9.
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seems to be a clear statement of  mode-two psychologization.128 The same year, 
in his psychological interpretation of  Crowley, The Eye in the Triangle, Regardie 
emphasizes the same identity between the two. In one passage, he claims 
that both Reich’s and Crowley’s techniques were essentially the same, with 
Reich’s “vegeto- and orgone therapy which levelled its attacks on the neurotic 
armoring” and Crowley’s “yoga and magical processes” both working towards 
the unified goal of  “gaining access to a different level of  psychic functioning.”129 
Similarly, he makes a clear terminological identification between “the Jungian 
concept of  creative fantasy” and the HOGD practice of  “skrying in the spirit 
vision,” seeing “little difference” between the two and stating that they are 
“practically identical” practices—which seems to indicate a terminological 
psychologization of  magic.130
In one of  his last works, The Art and Meaning of  Magic (1971), Regardie 
maintains his previously held position that “magic is a series of  psychological 
techniques” that allow us to “understand ourselves more completely” and to 
“more fully express that inner self  in every-day activities.”131 This would, at 
first, appear to be a return to his Crowley-influenced reductive phase, wherein 
magical techniques were seen as something akin to methods of  hypnotic 
autosuggestion. However, he is quick to note his “emphatic disagreement” with 
this idea that the efficacy of  a magical talisman is “due entirely to suggestion,” 
which seems to indicate an instance of  mode-four psychologization.132 In the 
last year of  his life, Regardie came out rather strongly against the efficacy of  
Jungian practice, calling active imagination “plain mental masturbation”—a 
characterization that plainly calls into question his previous statements as to 
active imagination’s identity with certain magical practices.133 During this final 
interview, however, Regardie still speaks highly of  Jung’s ideas, noting the 
degree to which it shaped his personal philosophy and terminology, saying 
that Jungian psychology “still has a place in my life, but as a therapy I think it’s 
utterly useless.”134 Thus, we see a continuation in his late period: the mode-four 
dual process of  the psychologization of  magic going hand in hand with the 
enchanting of  psychology. He would have us see the two categories as either 
128 Regardie, “Introduction to the Second Edition,” in The Middle Pillar, xxix.
129 Israel Regardie, The Eye in the Triangle: An Interpretation of  Aleister Crowley (Tempe: New 
Falcon Publications, 1982), 314.
130 Ibid., 204.
131 Israel Regardie, The Art and Meaning of  Magic (Toddington: Helios Book Service, 1971), 44.
132 Ibid., 23–24.
133 Regardie and Hyatt, “Regardie Pontificates,” 24.
134 Ibid.
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identical or deeply related, but seeks to strike such a balance so as to neither 
reduce magical processes to psychological processes like simple suggestion 
(mode-three), nor reduce psychological techniques to mere terminological 
blinds for interactions between an ontologically separate magician and 
legions of  angels and demons (mode-two). However, as we have seen already, 
Regardie did clearly espouse both mode-two and mode-three psychologization, 
vacillating between the latter three modes in his explicit statements on the 
entangled relationship between esoteric and psychological discourses.
4.2 Mode-One: Complementary Psychologization
We have now examined two categories of  statements found within Regardie’s 
esoteric corpus that deal with his opinions on the nature of  the relationship 
between psychological and esoteric discourses. This briefest of  overviews of  
his explicit statements of  this entanglement has demonstrated occurrences 
of  modes-two, -three, and -four psychologization. There are still, however, 
hundreds of  other disparate attestations of  psychologization to be found in 
Regardie’s writings. The proceeding sections 4.2–4.5 will identify and discuss 
specific examples of  each of  the four modes of  psychologization culled from 
the corpus. 
One of  the most unique and consistent ways in which Regardie expressed 
his views on the relationship between esoteric and psychological discourses 
was in his continued insistence that some form of  psychotherapy functioned as 
an essential precursor to the practice of  magic—mode-one psychologization. 
Of  all the modes under discussion here, mode-one is singular in that none of  
the secondary analyses of  Regardie identify this process at work. As opposed 
to the patterns of  change we saw in the previous section, Regardie’s opinion on 
this matter remained fixed throughout his entire magical career. It is in 1938, 
in The Middle Pillar, that Regardie first proposes this idea, and the fact that this 
came about less than a year after he began undergoing analysis with Bendit 
and Clegg leads us to think that there is a relationship between the two.135 
However, we cannot strictly deduce whether Regardie’s decision to enter 
analysis formed or was formed by this position. Initially, Regardie positions 
therapy as “the logical precursor” that should “comprise definitely the first 
stage” of  the practice of  or attainment in magic, going so far as to say that 
for esoteric schools to remain viable, they need to create departments of—
specifically analytical—psychology.136 He viewed the psyche of  the student 
135 Popadiuk et al., “From the Occult,” 37.
136 Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 20–21. See also: Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 40, 98.
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as being “hopelessly clogged with infantile and adolescent predilections,”137 
and believed that any failure to recognize and deal with these foundational 
psychological issues would open the student up to much deeper neuroses and 
nervous breakdowns.138 In this way, Regardie saw psychoanalysis as a requisite 
first step which any would-be magician need take before entering into a proper 
course of  esoteric studies. 
Moving forward to Regardie’s 1968 re-emergence into esoteric publishing, 
we see that he has adjusted somewhat his opinion as to the place of  
psychotherapy within a magical curriculum, but that his position has not 
fundamentally changed. In Roll Away the Stone, we see him reassert his belief  
that analysis should “precede practical experiments” with magic.139 Here, 
however, we do see two subtle shifts in Regardie’s position. First, rather than 
specifically endorsing Jungian analysis, as he appears to have done in 1938, he 
explicitly notes that it “makes little difference” whether the student undergoes 
Freudian, Jungian, or Reichian analysis.140 Second, although he does note the 
use of  analysis as a protective measure in removing psychotics and neurotics 
from esoteric schools, he here notes its importance in bringing the student 
in touch with hitherto unknown aspects of  himself.141 The same year, we see 
Regardie elsewhere espouse an almost identical position in his introduction 
to The Golden Dawn, noting that the choice of  therapeutic styles “is of  small 
consequence” compared to the preparation and aid it provides to the student 
of  magic.142 The essential point of  the preparative nature of  psychotherapy 
in relation to magical practice is again reinforced two years later, in The Eye 
in the Triangle, where Regardie clearly notes that “there must be no confusion 
between the two,” emphasizing that while therapy makes an excellent precursor 
to esoteric practice, the two are not identical.143 This emphatic point serves to 
strongly reinforce the nature of  mode-one psychologization as differentiating 
psychological and esoteric discourses in a non-oppositional, collaborative 
manner.
The last decade of  his life saw Regardie categorically emphasizing the 
137 Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 21.
138 Ibid., 86.
139 Regardie, “Roll Away the Stone,” 61.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Israel Regardie, “Introduction to the Second Edition: Volume I,” in The Golden Dawn: 
A Complete Course in Practical Ceremonial Magic, ed. Israel Regardie (Saint Paul: Llewellyn 
Publications, 1998), 5.
143 Regardie, The Eye in the Triangle, 432.
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preparative nature of  psychology within an esoteric curriculum in a largely 
similar way to his work in earlier decades, but, again, with a few small adjustments 
and developments that differentiate it from his earlier opinions. During the 
course of  his 1980 essay on the HGA, Regardie makes the analogy that a 
student attempting to invoke his HGA without having first undergone analysis 
is like “pouring fine wine into an unwashed bottle,” in that any good result 
will tend to be tainted and distorted by unresolved neuroses and psychoses.144 
In his final interview with his colleague Christopher S. Hyatt (1943–2008), 
he is quite firm in reinforcing his tenet that “anyone getting into the Golden 
Dawn … MUST precede any practical work with some psychotherapy,”145 as 
it is “the only valid requirement for a sane occultism.”146 He again makes it 
perfectly clear that we are not to identify psychotherapy with magical practice, 
but that it is a prerequisite.147 Similar to what we see from his middle period 
as well, late period Regardie strongly emphasizes the self-knowledge and 
freedom from delusion and phantasy that comes from honest analysis.148 Thus, 
we see that over the course of  nearly fifty years, Regardie maintained the 
general position that while psychoanalysis is a distinct operation from magical 
experimentation, it forms a necessary precursor to the latter. And although we 
see small shifts in those aspects of  therapy and particular therapies Regardie 
values, there is a remarkable consistency in this position throughout the whole 
of  his esoteric corpus. It is curious that while we have seen previously that 
Regardie concurrently argued for some form of  identity between psychological 
and esoteric discourses—varying between modes-two, -three, and -four—in 
this specific doctrine, he assiduously denied an identity between analysis and 
magical practice. This latter position is, for our purposes, quite interesting in 
that it appears that Regardie was engaged in parallel modes of  psychologization, 
and that he did not appear to view his continued utilization of  mode-one as 
disjunctive with his varied uses of  the further three modes.
4.3 Mode-Two: Terminological Psychologization
Continuing with mode-two psychologization, we find it to be a continual 
trend present in a great deal of  Regardie’s esoteric writings. He more or less 
144 Israel Regardie, Ceremonial Magic: A Guide to the Mechanisms of  Ritual (Wellinborough: The 
Aquarian Press, 1980), 73.
145 Regardie and Hyatt, “Regardie Pontificates,” 41.
146 Ibid., 23.
147 Ibid., 34.
148 Ibid., 24, 111.
Plaisance / Correspondences 3 (2015) 5–5434
continually propounded the position that the relationship between esoteric and 
psychological discourses was such that nearly all (if  not all) of  the former’s 
concepts could be expressed using the latter’s terminological apparatus. 
In his 1946 book on Christian Science, The Romance of  Metaphysics (later 
retitled The Teachers of  Fulfillment), Regardie notes his belief  that “the average 
person is not at all interested in religious terminology, which is a medieval 
barbarity.”149 Rather, he proposes that religions must adapt their language, 
not their ideas, to better comport with that of  modern science if  they wish to 
remain relevant. Similarly, in one of  his final books, Healing Energy, Prayer and 
Relaxation (1982), Regardie tells us that the utilization of  “psychological rather 
than metaphysical” terminology may allow for the conference “of  scientific 
and popular recognition on metaphysics.”150 This is the very definition of  
terminological psychologization in its most consciously directed form.
Apart from these explicit statements of  Regardie’s on his reasons for 
propounding mode-two psychologization, there are dozens of  examples of  
his doing so. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, and then again in the 1970s 
and 1980s, we see Regardie espouse the identity of  esoteric and psychological 
terminologies in a shifting and often contradictory manner. We begin with his 
identifications of  the five Qabalistic components of  the soul (in ascending 
order) and various Freudian and Jungian terms. Regardie describes the nephesh, 
which he defines as “the animal soul” and “the life of  the body,” as the focus 
of  the investigations of  Freud, Jung, and Alfred Adler (1870–1937).151 In 
The Tree of  Life, he vaguely equates the nephesh with “what the analysts call 
the Unconscious,”152 and then in The Middle Pillar more specifically identifies 
it with both “the Freudian unconscious” and “the Jungian concept of  the 
unconscious.”153 Apparently treating these terms as identical as well, Regardie 
additionally uses the term “subconscious” as another synonym for the nephesh 
in instances where he previously identified it with “the unconscious.”154 He 
defines the next component of  the soul, the ruach, as individual consciousness 
149 Israel Regardie, The Teachers of  Fulfillment (Phoenix: Falcon Press, 1983), 128.
150 Israel Regardie, Healing Energy, Prayer and Relaxation (Las Vegas: Golden Dawn Publications, 
1989), 13.
151 Israel Regardie, A Garden of  Pomegranates: Skrying on the Tree of  Life, eds. and ann. Chic 
Cicero and Sandra Tabitha Cicero, (Woodbury: Llewellyn Publications, 1999), 94.
152 Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 84.
153 Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 36.
154 Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 105; Regardie, A Garden of  Pomegranates, 95–97; Israel Regardie, 
“Mysticism and Oedipus,” in Mysticism, Psychology and Oedipus, ed. Christopher S. Hyatt (Phoenix: 
Falcon Press, 1985), 23.
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singularly identified with the psychological term “ego.”155 Following this, 
Regardie takes the neschamah and the chiah as a gendered pair comprising both 
the “divine soul” and “higher Self,”156 and respectively identifies them as Jung’s 
primary archetypes of  the collective unconscious: the anima and animus.157 The 
highest component of  the soul, the yechidah, he at once identifies with the 
Freudian id, Groddeck’s es, and the supernal triad of  Sephiroth on the Tree 
of  Life.158
Moving from the microcosm to the macrocosm, we immediately encounter 
the superior classes: gods, archangels, angels, demons, and so on. Regardie is quite 
consistent in a Jungian interpretation of  these classes of  beings. He consistently 
identifies the higher types as Jungian archetypes or dominants, specifically 
equating them with “gods and archangels and angels” in two instances;159 
in another, “great gods and spiritual forces, Cosmocratores, who become the 
intelligent architects and builders of  the manifold parts of  the universe”;160 and 
in yet another, specifically the god Bacchus as an archetype.161 At this point, I 
would like to call attention to the fact that Regardie’s characterization of  the 
gods in The Art and Meaning of  Magic (1971) is decidedly non-reductive. As we 
have just seen, he proposes a terminological identity between the gods and 
Jung’s archetypes, but maintains that the gods are gods insofar as they are the 
demiurges who shape and govern the manifold universe. This maintaining of  
the esoteric meaning of  “god” juxtaposed with the Jungian term “archetype” 
is decidedly characteristic of  mode-two psychologization. This is important 
to note because, as we shall see in the following section (4.4), his treatment of  
Jungian complexes in that same volume, as well as elsewhere, does not appear 
to be non-reductive, and instead comports to mode-three psychologization.
The final point to examine within this section’s discussion on Regardie’s 
terminological psychologization is that of  his widely varying esoteric 
155 Regardie, A Garden of  Pomegranates, 94; Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 33; Regardie, “Mysticism 
and Oedipus,” 23.
156 Regardie, “Mysticism and Oedipus,” 23.
157 Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 30–31.
158 Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 27, 32; Regardie, The Philosopher’s Stone, 20.
159 Identical wording is found in the following: Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 60; Regardie, The 
Art and Meaning of  Magic, 95.
160 Regardie, The Art and Meaning of  Magic, 13–14.  It is of  interest that Regardie here uses the 
term ‘cosmocrator’ to denote one of  the superior classes.  For more on this designation, see: 
Christopher A. Plaisance, “Of  Cosmocrators and Cosmic Gods: The Place of  the Archons 
in De mysteriis,” in Daimonic Imagination: Uncanny Intelligence, 64–85, ed. Angela Voss and William 
Rowlandson (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013).
161 Regardie, Ceremonial Magic, 87.
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correspondences to Jung’s collective unconscious in particular, and the idea 
of  the unconscious in general. The first of  these identifications is with the 
esoteric locus, variously referred to as the astral plane, world, light, and so on. 
Throughout his writings, Regardie variously defines this as being composed 
of  some “subtle electro-magnetic substance,”162 or as “a four-dimensional 
plane composed of  a luminous etheric substance.”163 In esoteric terms, 
Regardie at once syncretically identified the astral plane with both the ninth 
Qabalistic sphere of  Yesod, the Platonic world soul,164 and the alchemical 
Sea of  the Wise.165 In his very first book, Regardie already speaks of  a “clear 
correspondence” between the esoteric “Astral Light and the concept of  the 
162 Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 55. For further instances of  the electromagnetic nature of  the 
astral, see: Regardie, “Introduction,” in The Golden Dawn, 27; Israel Regardie, “A Qabalistic 
Primer,” in Foundations of  Practical Magic: An Introduction to Qabalistic, Magical and Meditative 
Techniques (Wellingborough: The Aquarian Press, 1979), 78–79; Regardie, A Garden of  
Pomegranates, 104; Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 42; Regardie, Be Yourself, 29–30; Israel Regardie, 
The One Year Manual: Twelve Steps to Spiritual Enlightenment (York Beach: Samuel Weiser, 1981), 
42–43; Regardie, The Art and Meaning of  Magic, 86; Israel Regardie, How to Make and Use 
Talismans (New York: Sterling, 1983), 48.
163 Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 71. For further instances of  extra-planar and etheric 
identifications, see: Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 72, 74; Regardie, “Introduction,” in The Golden 
Dawn, 27.  For further information on planar and dimensional terminologies within modern 
esoteric discourse, see: Christopher A. Plaisance, “Occult Spheres, Planes, and Dimensions: 
Geometric Terminology and Analogy in Modern Esoteric Discourse,” Journal of  Religious 
History (forthcoming).
164 Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 55; Regardie, A Garden of  Pomegranates, 54; Regardie, 
“Introduction,” in The Golden Dawn, 27.
165 Regardie, The Philosopher’s Stone, 119, 137.
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Collective Unconscious.”166 We see this terminological correlation between 
Jung’s collective unconscious and the constellation of  esoteric identifications 
bound up with the astral plane carry forward throughout many of  Regardie’s 
subsequent writings as well.167 
However, as strong as this identity between the collective unconscious and 
the astral plane is in Regardie’s writings, it does appear that he wavered in his 
consistency—at times proposing other identities for the unconscious that were 
quite at odds with the astral. In one notable instance, he specifically identifies 
Yesod “with the Freudian idea of  the Unconscious.”168 This is not too far a 
stretch from Jung’s collective unconscious, but is different enough to give us 
pause. Elsewhere, we see Regardie identify “the Unconscious” with the five 
classical elements, and, although he is not here specifically referencing the collective 
unconscious, the hylic elements are themselves a far cry from the astral forms 
of  the sublunary sphere.169 Far more disjunctive is the direct identification 
Regardie makes in two places between the collective unconscious and the 
three supernal Sephiroth.170 This is particularly troublesome because of  the 
previous identification Regardie made between the supernals and Freud’s id, 
but more importantly because of  the vast gap that exists between the first three 
supernal Sephiroth and Yesod, the ninth. As Regardie is clearly not supposing 
an identity between Yesod and the supernal Sephiroth, the disjunction between 
these two identifications of  Jung’s collective unconscious is rather stark. Just as 
troubling is the clear identity Regardie proposes between God and the collective 
unconscious,171 and between God and the (undifferentiated) unconscious.172 
Again, since Regardie does not appear to be proposing that God and Yesod 
are identical, we have a clear disjunction between his systems of  identities 
between the psychological and esoteric terminologies. However, for all these 
disjunctions, we can glean one important point from this section and the 
previous section (4.2) taken together: in terms of  mode-two psychologization, 
it appears that Regardie tended to limit himself  to proposing identities between 
descriptive models rather than normative techniques. In other words, while his 
166 Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 84.
167 Regardie, A Garden of  Pomegranates, 54; Regardie, The Philosopher’s Stone, 25, 52, 45, 119, 203, 
137; Regardie, The Art and Meaning of  Magic, 55; Regardie, Ceremonial Magic, 88, 92, 97.
168  Regardie, “Mysticism and Oedipus,” 6.
169 Regardie, The Art and Meaning of  Magic, 60.
170 Regardie, “Introduction,” in The Golden Dawn, 28; Regardie, The Philosopher’s Stone, 77.
171 Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 60; Israel Regardie, The Art of  True Healing, ed. Marc Allen (San 
Rafael: New World Library, 1991), 52.
172 Regardie, The Teachers of  Fulfillment, 167–68; Regardie, Healing Energy, 56–57.
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instances of  mode-two psychologization commonly substitute psychological 
terms for essentially esoteric metaphysical concepts, we do not see the same 
mode of  psychologization at play in regards to esoteric practice.
4.4 Mode-Three: Reductive Psychologization
As mode-three psychologization is nearly the precise converse of  mode-two, 
and given that Regardie clearly made extensive use of  mode-two terminological 
psychologization, we would not expect to see mode-three reductive 
psychologization present throughout his works. However, as mentioned 
previously in discussing his mode-two interpretation of  Jung’s archetypes, it does 
appear that his interpretations of  complexes tended towards mode-three. It is 
quite telling as to Regardie’s continued reliance on Crowley’s essay “The Initiated 
Interpretation of  Ceremonial Magic”—which itself  proposed a mode-three 
interpretation of  the evocation of  lesser spirits—that the most glaring instance 
of  reductive psychologization in Regardie’s esoteric corpus is his interpretation 
of  evocation. As early as 1932, we see Regardie proposing a comparison between 
the object of  a magical evocation and psychological neuroses or complexes, 
specifically noting that “the same subjective rationale” by which a neurotic 
patient delves into his personal unconscious to confront harmful complexes 
“may be extended to the Goetic aspect of  Magic, the evocation of  spirits.”173 In 
the same book, he clearly states that it can be argued that such spirits are “but 
previously unknown facets of  our own consciousness” and that “their evocation 
… is certainly not incomparable to a stimulation of  some part of  the mind or 
imagination” by a patient undergoing psychoanalysis.174 Regardie’s language 
here is important to make note of  in order for us to distinguish the identity 
he proposes between spirits and complexes as reductive from the previously 
identified non-reductive identity between gods and archetypes. In this case, Regardie 
specifically relegates these “spirits” to the personal unconscious rather than the 
collective unconscious, and clearly indicates their ultimately subjective rather than 
objective nature. In this way, Regardie’s interpretation represents a fundamental 
shift from the medieval demonological ontology, which considered the Goetic 
demons as objectively existing entities, separate from the magician. Regardie 
restructures this dynamic, positing a wholly subjective mode of  existence for 
the demons, ontologically relocating them to a position within the magician’s 
being. This is the very essence of  reductive psychologization.
Regardie maintained this reductive identity between demonic spirits and 
173 Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 296.
174 Ibid., 153.
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complexes of  the personal unconscious throughout the rest of  his esoteric 
career. In the mid-period essay “Mysticism and Oedipus,” we see Regardie 
“remind the reader that ‘angels,’ ‘spirits,’ and ‘powers’ of  the practical Qabalah 
and Magic are … ‘ideas’ of  varying degrees of  power and significance which 
exist and function unperceived in the different regions of  our subliminal 
consciousness.”175 This interpretation, which Regardie specifically identifies 
as Freudian, maintains his early-period mode-three treatment of  lesser spirits 
as wholly subjective denizens of  the magician’s individual unconscious. This 
reductive interpretation, however, reaches its apogee in 1971 during the course 
of  Regardie’s discussion of  evocation in The Art and Meaning of  Magic. Therein, 
he clearly states that “what modern psychology calls a complex” is identical with 
what “the ancient psychology of  Magic … named a Spirit.”176 He is clear in his 
assertion that while there is “a purely objective occult theory” of  evocation, 
his position “is the subjective point of  view.”177 In this sense, he describes the 
practice of  evocation as a technique by which these unconscious complexes are 
personalized and given “tangible shape and form” by the magician’s imagination, 
and are then called forth and “brought within the dominion of  the stimulated 
will and consciousness of  the theurgist” where they can be “assimilated into 
consciousness.”178 In other words, the evocation technique is, for Regardie, 
something akin to a dramatic facade superimposed over a process that is, at 
its core, psychotherapeutic. The “demons” with which the evocator deals are 
not, for Regardie, objective beings from the nether worlds, but rather mere 
aspects of  his own unconscious psyche. The magic of  evocation has thus been 
effectively reduced to the psychoanalytic confrontation of  complexes of  the 
personal unconscious by the conscious mind.
The second category of  examples of  mode-three psychologization in 
Regardie’s writings is his consistently reductive interpretation of  the HOGD 
and SM’s initiation rituals. In his early work, My Rosicrucian Adventure, referencing 
Jung’s reductive description of  magic from The Secret of  the Golden Flower quoted 
above in section 4.1, Regardie identifies the officers of  the orders’ initiation 
rituals as representing “psychic projections … just as figures in dreams do,” 
being “personifications of  abstract psychological principles inhering within 
the human spirit.”179 Using the Neophyte ritual as an example, he describes 
175 Regardie, “Mysticism and Oedipus,” 9–10.
176 Regardie, The Art and Meaning of  Magic, 51.
177 Ibid., 52.
178 Ibid., 54–55.
179 Regardie, What You Should Know About the Golden Dawn, 67.
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the various facets of  the individual psyche symbolized and personified by 
the ritual officers.180 Additionally, the overall characteristic of  the Vault of  
the Adepti—within which rituals of  the higher grades of  the HOGD and 
SM took place—and its connection to the mythology of  Isis and the tomb 
of  Osiris was interpreted in a Freudian manner as “a highly interesting and 
complex symbol of  the Mother.”181 Nearly identical descriptions of  the order 
officers as psychic projections of  the initiate’s personal unconscious appear 
throughout Regardie’s later works as well, demonstrating a continuing strain 
of  mode-three psychologization throughout. In his introduction to the first 
edition of  The Golden Dawn, he makes use of  the same Jung quotation and 
nearly identical language in interpreting the officers as “psychic projections” and 
“personifications of  abstract psychological principles inhering within the human 
spirit.”182 In each of  these instances, not only do we see the same principles 
being relayed, but also nearly identical verbiage. There is, in all of  these examples, 
a consistent characterization of  the projections as being personal in nature, and 
as existing within the initiate’s psyche. Similar to Jung’s reductive interpretation 
of  evocation, the projections Regardie here describes are eminently subjective 
in nature and are ontological dependents of  the initiate’s own mind. Such an 
interpretation of  ritual is paradigmatic of  reductive psychologization, insofar as 
the initiating officers are seen as mere vessels onto which the initiate may project 
aspects of  his personal unconscious.
4.5 Mode-Four: Idealistic Psychologization
Moving forward to mode-four psychologization, we do not see instances where 
Regardie describes psychological and esoteric discourses as equivalents, either in 
180 Ibid.,: “Thus, in the preliminary Neophyte or 0°=0□ grade, the Kerux personifies the 
reasoning faculties. He is the intelligent part of  the mind, functioning in obedience to the Will; 
the Qabalistic Ruach in a word. The highest part of  that mind, the aspiring, sensitive, and the 
intuitive consciousness, the Neschamah, is represented by the Hegemon who ever seeks the rising 
of  the Light, while the active will of  man is signified by the Hiereus, the guardian against evil. 
The Hierophant, in this initial ceremony of  Neophyte, acts on behalf  of  the higher spiritual 
soul of  man himself, that divine self  of  which but to rarely, if  ever at all, we become aware.”
181 Ibid., 85.
182 Regardie, “Introduction,” in The Golden Dawn, 43–44. Just a year later, in The Philosopher’s 
Stone, we see Regardie again using nearly identical language to describe the initiating officers 
as “just such psychic projections as Jung refers to,” and “personifications of  psychological 
principles active within the psyche (151). This mode of  psychologization carries forward to 
1970, in The Eye in the Triangle, where he again utilizes the same Jung quotation, and similarly 
describes the officers as “psychic projections” and “personifications of  abstract psychological 
principles inhering within the human organism” (136–37).
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a terminologically or reductive mode of  psychologization, but rather narratives 
that express a bidirectional non-reductive relationship where psychology is 
esotericized alongside a psychologization of  esoteric discourse. As we have 
seen, Regardie seems to have had no trouble in making use of  what would 
appear to be mutually exclusive modes of  psychologization within a single 
work. As such, it should come as no surprise that we see evidence of  mode-
four psychologization among the same early works wherein he first made use 
of  modes-one, -two, and -three as well. In A Garden of  Pomegranates, we see 
this trend emerge in an already developed form, with Regardie questioning 
“whether the Qabalah resolves itself  into an objective or subjective scheme,” 
and arriving at the position he terms “objective idealism,” wherein “the 
universe is subjective without denying in the least its objectivity.”183 This idea 
is unpacked with greater detail in The Tree of  Life, where Regardie examines the 
question of  the interiority of  the astral plane and the objectivity of  its denizens. 
While he does concede that “the Gods and the Universal Essences come to be 
apprehended within the interior constitution of  man,” which seems to imply a 
subjective ontology that “has no primary reference to any external subject,”184 
they are neither “the products of  his imagination” nor “subjective creations.”185 
This discursive strategy, then, allows Regardie to combine an esoteric ontology 
of  the superior classes as objective beings with a psychologized understanding 
of  religious experience as an interior phenomenon that is ontologically within 
the experiencing subject—a confluence of  objectivism and subjectivism.
Regardie tends to justify this idealistic psychologization by means of  
combining a macrocosmic theology with the Hermetic axiom of  the 
microcosm’s reflective relationship to the macrocosm.186 In The Tree of  Life, 
he makes this doctrine plain, noting that “one of  the fundamental postulates 
of  Magic is that Man is an exact image in miniature of  the universe, both 
considered objectively, and that what man perceives to be existent without is 
also in some way represented within.”187 In this way, Regardie proposes what 
is essentially an orthodox Hermetic doctrine of  man’s external and internal 
structure being a mirror of  the greater structure of  the cosmos. This reflective 
axiom is found in Regardie’s earliest works, and is a strain that continued 
183 Regardie, A Garden of  Pomegranates, 128–29.
184 Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 95.
185 Ibid., 234–36.
186 For the origins of  this doctrine within the Hermetic corpus, see: Corpus Hermeticum, 4 vols., 
ed. A.D. Nock and trans. A.J. Festugière (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1946–54), XI.15; Asclepius, 
in vol. 2 of  Corpus Hermeticum, I.10. 
187 Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 95.
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well into his final works as well, appearing in early works such as A Garden 
of  Pomegranates and The Middle Pillar as well as late-period works such as The 
Art and Meaning of  Magic and Ceremonial Magic.188 One of  the more interesting 
ways in which this Hermetic doctrine of  the microcosm was filtered through 
Regardie’s mode-four psychologization is found in his essay “Mysticism and 
Oedipus,” where he draws a connection between this esoteric anthropology 
and Freudian psychology by means of  Ernst Haeckel’s (1834–1919) theory 
that, among all organisms, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.189 Here, following 
in the footsteps of  a long succession of  Naturphilosophen from Goethe onwards, 
Regardie posits that just as man’s external physical ontogeny recapitulates his 
species’s physical phylogeny—which is to say that man’s physical development 
from embryo to adult recapitulates mankind’s development from single-
celled organism to Homo sapiens—so does his internal psychological ontogeny 
recapitulate man’s phylogenetic ascent, from that of  brute animal to civilized 
man.190 From this, Regardie develops a soteriological interpretation of  Freud’s 
Oedipus complex, rooted in the idea that all complex organisms desire a return 
to the unitary state of  their genesis. For, just as “the whole universe in all its 
manifold branches would be permeated with the inherent desire to return to 
the material source of  life,”191 so does man desire to return to the womb, so as 
to “approach Nirvana” by recapturing the fetus’s “feelings of  peace, placidity 
and omnipotence.”192 Thus, in Regardie’s Hermetic recapitulation theory, we 
see a model of  magical soteriology that is at once subjective and objective, with 
domains of  psychological internality and physical externality being bridged by 
the doctrine of  the microcosm. 
A second way in which we see mode-four psychologization present itself  in 
Regardie’s works is in his theology. Making full use of  the Hermetic reflective 
axiom, Regardie’s theology is dipolar, with macrocosmic and microcosmic 
genera of  divinities comprising at once the respective poles. This being the case, 
any references that Regardie makes to divinities—particularly to “God”—must 
be contextualized so as to clearly understand whether he is referring to the 
God of  the macrocosm, or the God of  the microcosm. Regarding the greater 
macrocosmic God, we see a pronounced panentheistic current throughout 
188 Regardie, A Garden of  Pomegranates, 93; Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 77–78; Regardie, The Art 
and Meaning of  Magic, 85; Regardie, Ceremonial Magic, 13–14.
189 For the historical context of  Haeckel’s theory, see: Stephen Jay Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977).
190 Regardie, “Mysticism and Oedipus,” 13–17.
191 Ibid., 19–20.
192 Ibid., 10.
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the whole of  Regardie’s theology. Panentheism is a family of  theologies that 
affirm that “although God and the world are ontologically distinct and God 
transcends the world, the world is ‘in’ God ontologically.”193 This relationship 
between God and the world is most often portrayed by the panentheist as 
the world being God’s visible body, but that this body is ontologically within 
God. We see this doctrine laid out plainly in The Tree of  Life, where Regardie 
paraphrases Acts 17:28,194 telling us that in God “do we live and move and 
have our being,”195 describing “the totality of  all life in the universe” as God’s 
“cosmic body,” of  which we “are the minute cells and molecules.”196 This 
doctrine is continued forward and is manifestly present in later works as well, 
such as Regardie’s 1979 essay “A Qabalistic Primer,” where he impresses upon 
his reader “the realization of  the universe as a being divine, the entire body of  
God which includes every man and every form of  life within its vastness.”197 
At times, Regardie moves from an explicit panentheism to pantheism, but on 
the whole, the former more strongly characterizes his thought.198 Additionally, 
Regardie’s conception of  the macrocosmic divine is strongly characterized 
by polycentricity,199 as is evidenced both by early statements that the world’s 
divinity “is represented by hosts of  mighty Gods, divine beings, cosmic 
spirits or intelligences,”200 and by later works that similarly characterize the 
demiurgic divinities as plural in nature.201 However, whether panentheistic 
193 John W. Cooper, Panentheism: The Other God of  the Philosophers (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2007), 18. According to Cooper, within the Western theological tradition, this 
doctrine begins with Plato’s Timaeus, and was largely diffused into later currents through 
successive generations of  Platonic commentators, most notably the late antique Neoplatonists.
194 This phrase from Acts 17:28 (NRSV), “in him we live and move and have our being,” is 
so strongly identified with panentheism that a modified version of  it appears as the title of  a 
collection of  essays by contemporary panentheists: Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, eds., 
In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Penentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific 
World (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004).
195 Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 101.
196 Ibid., 22.
197 Regardie, “A Qabalistic Primer,” 61.
198 For a notable exception, see Regardie, The One Year Manual, 57: “There is no God and the 
World—there is not God and himself. There is only God. All is God.” This direct equation of  
God and the world, as opposed to the panentheistic supervening of  God over the world, is the 
very definition of  pantheism.
199 For polycentrism within antique Platonic theologies, see: Edward P. Butler, “Polycentric 
Polytheism and the Philosophy of  Religion,” The Pomegranate: The International Journal of  Pagan 
Studies 10, no. 2 (2008): 207–29.
200 Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 61–63.
201 Regardie, The Art and Meaning of  Magic, 13–14.
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or pantheistic—or whether monocentric or polycentric—what all of  these 
macrocosmic theologies have in common is an insistence that God is a reality 
external to the individual and objectively real. 
The opposite pole of  Regardie’s theology, the individual God, is the 
psychologized microcosmic reflection of  the macrocosmic God. Where the 
macrocosmic God is wholly external to the individual, the microcosmic God’s 
nature is fundamentally one of  internality. Variously identified by Regardie as 
the “higher genius,”202 “Divine Genius,”203 or “Holy Guardian Angel,”204 this 
being is seen as the internal and eminently personal reflection of  the external 
and impersonal macrocosmic God, and is correlated to various psychological 
concepts throughout Regardie’s career, such as the “higher self,”205 “the id,”206 
“the core of  the unconscious,”207 “the Unconscious,”208 “the central core of  
individuality, [and] the root of  the Unconscious.”209 Regardie sums up the 
relationship between this internal, psychologized God and the external God 
whose body is the cosmos:
By the magical hypothesis, the higher genius corresponds within man to the possi-
ble relationship of  God to the universe. That is to say, man being the microcosm 
of  the macrocosm, a reflection of  the cosmos, is a universe within himself, a 
universe ruled and governed by his own divinity.210 
Regardie’s soteriology tended to revolve around this God, with his 
understanding of  magic’s central process being at once represented as the 
magician’s invocation of  his HGA, and the ego’s confrontation and union with 
the higher self.211 In this way, when Regardie speaks of  “the belief  in a personal 
God” as “a poetic or dramatic convention,” and describes the goal of  magic as 
“purely psychological” with the goal of  “exalting the individual consciousness 
202 Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 77–78.
203 Regardie, Ceremonial Magic, 13–14.
204 Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 104.
205 Regardie, The Art of  True Healing, 5–6.
206 Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 42.
207 Ibid., 52.
208 Regardie, The Art and Meaning of  Magic, 48, 69.
209 Ibid., 69.
210 Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 77–78.
211 Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 104; Regardie, What You Should Know About the Golden Dawn, 60; 
Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 35; Regardie, The Art and Meaning of  Magic, 48–49; Regardie, Healing 
Energy, 56–57.
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until it comes to a realisation of  its own divine root,”212 we are to under stand 
that he is strictly speaking of  the microcosmic, not the macrocosmic, God. 
This reflective relationship that exists between the microcosm and macrocosm 
in Regardie’s ontology makes for a theology that allows for both an objective 
deity external to the subject, and a personal deity internal to the subject. 
This particular species of  dipolar theism is the very essence of  mode-four 
psychologization. It psychologizes the idea of  God by viewing an aspect of  
the self  as divine, but it sacralizes this psychological outlook by treating this 
personal divinity as a reflection of  an objective, universal God. 
The third aspect of  mode-four psychologization within Regardie’s 
work concerns his presentation of  the mind-body relationship. Far from 
compartmentalizing esoteric practice as something strictly psychological 
and disconnected from the body and materiality, we see a strong somatic 
component that clearly allows for the events that transpire on the “magical 
plane” to directly affect the world of  matter. As early as 1932, we see Regardie 
proposing a method whereby “health is restored by the persistent concentration 
of  divine power” by means of  a “flow of  energy” under the stimulus of  
which “diseased tissue and diseased cells … become gradually broken down 
and ejected from the personal sphere.”213 Six years later, in The Philosopher’s 
Stone, Regardie similarly presents us with an extensive list of  esoteric theorists 
in whose doctrines imagination was believed to directly affect matter,214 and 
follows this with the bold assertion that he can see “no valid reason why the 
interior psychical or magical power should not be able to effect a physical 
transmutation” or to “move a physical object without physical contact” by 
virtue of  the soul’s ability to “exude its own subjective astral substance into 
objective materialization.”215 This belief  of  Regardie’s in the ability of  mind 
to causally exert influence over matter does not disappear in his later works, 
but continues to reassert itself. In 1946, we see him claiming that the “great 
spiritual powers” of  the mind to affect matter have “concretely been proven 
by magnetic experiments.”216 And again, in 1965, although he claims to “loathe 
the glib phrase” of  “mind over matter,” he finds himself  “disposed to accept 
the truth implicit in it,” insofar as he finds “that mental processes have a 
212 Regardie, “Introduction,” The Golden Dawn, 28–29.
213 Regardie, The Art of  True Healing, 42–43.
214 Regardie, The Philosopher’s Stone, 90–91.
215 Ibid., 149.
216 Regardie, The Teachers of  Fulfillment, 35.
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remarkable influence on physiological activity” and healing.217 Although it 
does appear that Regardie’s later views are a bit more subdued than in earlier 
years, there is a continual train of  thought present in which the “magical plane” 
exerts causative influence over the material body.
The mechanism by which Regardie saw mind being able to exert this 
influence over matter appears to be his conception of  man’s astral or etheric 
body. While we have previously identified the way in which Regardie conceived 
the astral plane as being an electromagnetic mean between soul and body, it 
is here important to note that his doctrines continually make reference to a 
specialized body possessed by all that is composed of  this substance. We see 
this evidenced as early as 1932, when Regardie speaks of  “centers in our mental 
and spiritual nature” that are the correlates of  physical organs.218 He later 
described this “interior subtle or astral body” as “the medium or intermediate 
state between mind and body.”219 As Regardie gradually became acquainted 
with Reich’s somatic psychology, he came to integrate Reich’s notions of  
“orgone energy” and “vegetotherapy” into his practice. As early as 1938, we see 
Regardie—who, it should be remembered, worked as a masseur early in life—
utilizing massage as a means by which a therapist’s astral body could directly 
affect a patient. He notes that this spiritual energy “may be communicated like 
an electric current through the arm and hands to finger tips,” and enter “the 
patient’s body as the palms of  the masseur’s hands glide over the surface being 
treated.”220 This technique of  esoteric massage was eventually assimilated into 
Regardie’s understanding of  Reichian vegetotherapy. Later in life, Regardie 
came to adopt Reich’s belief  that, owing to the fact that “mind and body are 
phases of  a unitary living organism,” psychological tension was intimately 
connected with the particular “neuromuscular tension” that Reich termed 
“muscular armor.”221 Like Reich, Regardie identified this muscular armor with 
certain “neurotic character structure[s]” found in patients.222
217 Regardie, Be Yourself, 41–42.
218 Regardie, The Art of  True Healing, 15. For a view of  the astral body as composed of  psychic 
organs, see also: Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 52.
219 Regardie, The Philosopher’s Stone, 28–29.  For more on the development of  terminologies 
relating to the so-called ‘astral body,’ see: Christopher A. Plaisance, “The Transvaluation of  
‘Soul’ and ‘Spirit’: Platonism and Paulism in H.P. Blavatsky’s Isis Unveiled,” Pomegranate: The 
International Journal of  Pagan Studies 15, no. 1 (2013): 250–72.
220 Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 79.
221 Israel Regardie, “What is Psychotherapy?” in An Interview With Israel Regardie: His Final 
Thoughts and Views, ed. Christopher S. Hyatt (Phoenix: Falcon Press, 1985), 118.
222 Israel Regardie, “On Reich,” in An Interview With Israel Regardie: His Final Thoughts and Views, 
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As discussed in section 3.1, one of  the driving forces behind idealistic 
psychologization is the desire of  the magician to insulate himself  from 
rational critique of  scientific naturalism by relegating magic to a separate-but-
connected psychic plane. In phrasing his view of  this plane’s relationship with 
materiality—and thus the sacral psyche’s relationship with the body—Regardie 
notes that the “ideal is not to escape from the body but to become involved 
more and more in life … to bring down godhead so that one’s manhood being 
enriched may thereby be assumed into godhead.”223 Rather than proposing 
that the magical plane serves as an escape from material reality, Regardie 
implores the magician to become more involved in materiality through magic, 
but in a way that circumvents materialism by sacralizing the world of  body 
and flesh. Furthermore, like Crowley, Regardie explicitly did not seek to insulate 
his practice from experimental falsifiability, but sought to apply a method 
of  empirical verification that operated on and was native to the magical 
plane.224 With Crowley, we see a dedicated and sincere commitment (which 
was somewhat less than successful) both to discovering “scientific methods 
for reaching … the magical realm” and to devising ways by which such magical 
experiences could be empirically evaluated and tested.225 In both his early and 
late works on the subject,226 we see Regardie appeal to Crowley’s methods of  
“testing” astral visions by means of  checking the vision’s contents against the 
exhaustive symbolic frameworks that comprise the HOGD’s interpretation 
of  the Qabalah.227 Flawed as it is in its substitution of  confirmation bias in 
the aim of  verifying the Qabalah’s truth for the spirit of  open-ended inquiry 
that characterizes the epistemological framework of  true experimentation, 
Regardie’s attempts at incorporating experimental methods into his practice 
demonstrate a committed opposition to escapist psychologization throughout 
his works.
ed. Christopher S. Hyatt (Phoenix: Falcon Press, 1985), 133.
223 Regardie, The Middle Pillar, 77.
224 For Crowley’s relationship with the experimental method, see: Asprem, “Magic 
Naturalized,” 138–65; Pasi, “Varieties of  Magical Experience,” 53–87.
225 Asprem, “Magic Naturalized,” 163.
226 Regardie, The Tree of  Life, 227; Regardie, The Art and Meaning of  Magic, 91–96. 
227 For an outline of  Crowley’s method, see: Aleister Crowley, “Liber O vel Manus Sagittæ 
sub figura VI,” The Equinox: The Official Organ of  the A.A., The Review of  Scientific Illuminism 1, 
no. 2 (1909): 11–30.
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5. Conclusion
In concluding this documentary analysis of  Regardie’s esoteric corpus, it has 
become apparent that his doctrines and practices can be strongly characterized 
as being psychologized. However, it does not appear that speaking of  
“psychologization” as a unitary phenomenon greatly elucidates the particular 
ways in which Regardie saw esoteric and psychological discourses interfacing. 
Rather, I fear that such a treatment of  the issue may indeed serve to more 
greatly obfuscate the issue. In this way, I also believe that descriptions of  
Regardie’s interpretation of  esoteric discourse as “psychologized” made with 
this overly general definition do him and his works a disservice, by simplifying 
and generalizing what is in actuality quite a complicated network of  proposed 
relationships. The fourfold typology of  complementary, terminological, 
reductive, and idealistic modes of  psychologization most accurately describes the 
various ways in which psychological and esoteric discourse are entangled within 
Regardie’s work. In uncovering these modes within his corpus, and applying the 
resultant typological schema to the question of  his psychologization of  esoteric 
discourse, I believe we may come to a better understanding of  what processes 
are actually at work—both in terms of  evaluating prior statements made by 
other scholars regarding the issue, and in performing this present analysis. 
In summation, I have argued that while it is indeed accurate to speak of  
Regardie as having psychologized esoteric discourse, this can only be the case 
given an understanding of  “psychologization” that is differentially nuanced so 
as to distinguish between diametrically opposed psychologizing currents. This 
differential typology enables us to specifically identify Regardie as participating 
in four distinct psychologizing discursive strategies, both in isolation and 
in combination with one another in ways that are on occasion logically 
problematic, but tend towards an internal consistency. This clarification is, I 
believe, important not only insofar as it sets the record straight on Regardie in 
particular, but also in terms of  ironing out the idea of  psychologization itself  
as a discursive strategy within modern esoteric discourse. For, if  it is the case 
that such an analysis of  Regardie’s works necessarily leads to a nuanced and 
differentiated idea of  “psychologization,” it seems also to follow that any such 
statements regarding modern esoteric discourse being psychologized be re-
evaluated in light of  this typology.
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Abstract
In recent discussions about the study of  esotericism, the adjective “Western” has come under 
critical scrutiny. Shouldn’t “esotericism” be understood as a global rather than just a Western 
field of  research? Doesn’t the very concept of  a “Western esotericism” logically imply that 
there must be an “Eastern esotericism” as well? If  so, what would that be? And in what re-
spects would this “esotericism” common to Eastern and Western cultures be different from 
non-esoteric cultural formations? Or is the terminology supposed to imply, to the contrary, 
that esotericism is something unique to Western culture, with no parallels elsewhere? But if  so, 
what is it that makes it unique, and how are we supposed to define and demarcate “the West” 
from “the Rest”? Are we supposed to think in terms of  a geographical space or of  a cultural 
domain? In either case, doesn’t the very term “Western” imply an essentialist discourse with 
troubling political connotations and implications? The author of  this article argues that these 
problems are best approached from a historical rather than a strictly theoretical perspective. 
Reviewing the most important stages in the conceptualization of  “esotericism” as a distinct 
field of  study since the early modern period, he argues that it has always been theorized as a 
global rather than just Western phenomenon. Nevertheless, he concludes, it is advisable to 
maintain the concept of  “Western esotericism,” not for reasons of  conceptual theory but for 
reasons of  historical method. 
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As noted by Egil Asprem in a recent contribution to Correspondences, a strong 
case can be made for “dismissing the categorisation of  esotericism as 
intrinsically Western, on historical and terminological grounds.”1 In the present 
article I intend to examine this claim in some detail, with reference to the main 
arguments that have been presented for such a position in the recent scholarly 
literature. Are we moving from the concept of  “Western esotericism” to an 
understanding of  esotericism as a global phenomenon?
A Short History of  the Adjective
The adjective “Western” in combination with “esotericism” seems a fairly recent 
innovation. It appeared clearly in Antoine Faivre’s foundational monograph 
Accès de l’ésotérisme occidental (1986), and has become firmly established in the 
study of  esotericism at least since 2001. In that year, the French journal ARIES 
(an acronym of  the Association pour la Recherche et l’Information sur l’Esotérisme, 
founded in 1985 by Antoine Faivre together with Roland Edighoffer and 
Pierre Deghaye)2 was re-launched as a new series by Brill Academic publishers, 
resulting in the first professional peer-reviewed journal in the field. While the 
original series was devoted to the study of  “l’ésotérisme,” without adjective 
(although the journal was focused clearly on the occident), the new series 
was explicitly titled Aries: Journal for the Study of  Western Esotericism. This 
terminological specification had much to do with a new research agenda 
that reflected the more general move in Religious Studies, since the 1980s, 
from a predominantly “religionist” paradigm towards perspectives marked by 
methodological agnosticism, empiricism, and critical historiography.3 As the 
1 Egil Asprem, “Beyond the West: Towards a New Comparativism in the Study of  
Esotericism,” Correspondences 2, no. 1 (2014): 4 (and footnote 1 for references to the main 
contributions to the debate).
2 The original ARIES series (1985–1999) is now available online: www.esswe.org/journal.
3 On the notion of  “religionism” and its historical backgrounds, see Wouter J. Hanegraaff, 
Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge in Western Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), esp. 127, note 174, 295–314, 357–58. While religionism is mostly associated with 
Mircea Eliade and his “Chicago School,” that understanding is historically too narrow: its 
real origin lies in the famous Eranos meetings, 1933–1988. See Hans Thomas Hakl, Eranos: 
An Alternative Intellectual History of  the Twentieth Century (Sheffield/Bristol: Equinox, 2013) and 
expanded German original: Hakl, Eranos: Nabel der Welt, Glied der goldenen Kette. Die alternative 
Geistesgeschichte (Gaggenau: Scientia Nova, 2015). For an early programmatic statement on 
empirical versus religionist and reductionist method in relation to esotericism, see Wouter J. 
Hanegraaff, “Empirical Method in the Study of  Esotericism,” Method & Theory in the Study of  
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original ARIES series was created in the mid-1980s, when this development 
was just beginning to take off, it was still inspired by explicit spiritual and 
esoteric agendas. The editorial introduction to the first volume (1985) leaves 
no ambiguity about that point:
In his Liber introductorius in Apocalypsin, composed around 1190, Joachim of  Fiore 
compares the quest for God and the Truth to navigation. Maritime itineraries are 
multiple, with everyone choosing his own way as the spirit of  the wind blows; but 
this diversity does not need to be a bad thing, for all the mysteries are subject to the 
Truth, which is one. Thus all navigators, as little as they may know about consulting 
the stars, will finally arrive in the same haven and the same city. As for the trajectory 
traversed by their little boat: the sea (as in Ps. 77) will preserve no trace of  it.
 The metaphors that Joachim of  Fiore applied to the understanding of  Holy 
Scripture are relevant to all esoteric research. Those who are not satisfied by the 
rational explanations of  the universe, who reject positivist reductionism and the 
blinders of  scientism, those who are in search of  the unknowable, who are attract-
ed by the mysteries of  God, Man, and Matter, who are searching for the Spirit in 
Creation, must also attempt this journey.
 Aries is there to help them. Like the legendary Ram of  the Golden Fleece, it 
will lead them to the most recent sources of  esoteric thinking. The best academic 
specialists of  the Western world have agreed to regularly keep the readers of  the 
journal Aries informed about publications relevant to this domain. Their analyses 
and book reviews will be like so many boundary stones of  Hermes, beacons along 
the roads that lead towards the light.4
  
Such metaphors – scholars engaged in multiple esoteric trajectories over one 
and the same ocean of  Divine Truth that remains unaffected by what happens 
on its surface, and a journey towards one and the same spiritual haven of  
Light – are typical of  religionism in its most explicit form and may help us 
understand why “esotericism” could not be understood as limited to “the 
West” alone. It had to be as universal as Truth itself.  At this time it was still 
considered self-evident that students of  esotericism were motivated by some 
personal spiritual quest. 
By 2001, such crypto-theological perspectives were on their way out in the 
academic Study of  Religion,5 and Aries New Series reflected that change. The 
Religion 7, no. 2 (1995): 99–129. 
4 “Éditorial,” ARIES 1 (1985): 1.
5 See e.g. Charlotte Allen, “Is Nothing Sacred? Casting out the Gods from Religious Studies,” 
Lingua Franca (November 1996): 30–40. As far as I know, the history of  this theoretical and 
methodological transformation in the study of  religion since the 1980s remains to be written. 
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adjective “Western” in its title was meant to suggest an emphasis on historical 
specificity rather than trans-historical universality: the journal was concerned 
with studying a series of  neglected dimensions of  Western culture, not with 
finding spiritual salvation or lifting the veil of  Isis. Research of  esotericism 
should be conducted according to normal scholarly methods as practiced in 
the academy at large, not on the basis of  unverifiable a priori beliefs or spiritual 
commitments – no matter how commendable or inspiring these might be in 
themselves. This development was not just imposed upon “religionists” by 
their critics, as sometimes assumed by those who regret it; rather, it was part 
of  a process of  theoretical and methodological self-reflection among scholars 
of  religion during the period under discussion. Notably, Antoine Faivre 
himself  changed his mind during the 1990s and became a strong supporter 
and advocate of  historical/empirical approaches.6 
The adjective “Western” was further consolidated around 2005. At that 
time, the main scholarly organization in the field was the Association for the 
Study of  Esotericism (ASE), founded at Michigan State University in 2002, 
which organized its biannual conferences in the United States.7  As European 
scholars began to feel the need for a complementary organization based on 
their side of  the Atlantic, as well as a stronger demarcation from religionist 
perspectives,8 in January 2005 they decided to establish the European Society for 
the Study of  Western Esotericism (ESSWE). The ESSWE was legally incorporated 
on April 21, 2005, and has been organizing biannual conferences in Europe 
since 2007, alternating with those organized by the ASE.9 The creation of  the 
ESSWE happened to coincide with the publication of  the Dictionary of  Gnosis 
and Western Esotericism in the same year.10 As the first comprehensive scholarly 
reference work devoted to the field as a whole, it played an important role in 
defining its nature and boundaries at that time. As one can see, the adjective 
had been adopted as a standard part of  the terminology.
6 On Faivre’s development from religionism to empiricism, see Hanegraaff, Esotericism and 
the Academy, 334–55.  
7 “About the Association for the Study of  Esotericism,” www.aseweb.org.
8 The ASE and the ESSWE share a common emphasis on historical research, but whereas 
the ESSWE discourages religionism, the ASE discourages reductionism. Unfortunately, the 
latter position seems to reflect a misunderstanding of  the technical meaning of  “reductionism,” 
described on the ASE’s website as “the denigration rather than the study of  esoteric traditions 
or figures” (www.esoteric.msu.edu/main.html). 
9 Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “The Story of  ESSWE,” ESSWE Newsletter 1 (2006): 2–4. So far, 
conferences have been organized in Göttingen (2007), Strasbourg (2009), Szeged (2011), 
Gothenburg (2013), and Riga (2015). The next conference is due to take place in Erfurt (2017).
10 Wouter J. Hanegraaff, with Antoine Faivre, Roelof  van den Broek, and Jean-Pierre Brach 
(eds.), Dictionary of  Gnosis and Western Esotericism (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005).
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Contesting the Adjective
However, the focus and scope of  the Dictionary of  Gnosis and Western Esotericism 
has been questioned by a number of  critics and reviewers, and doubts have 
been raised about the usefulness or legitimacy of  the adjective “Western.” 
In an important recent discussion, Kennet Granholm concludes that “we 
should forgo the use of  it”;11 and Egil Asprem asks “[w]hy can we not have 
a comparative study of  esotericism on a truly global rather than a narrowly 
conceived ‘Western’ scale?”12 If  these critiques would carry the day, the ESSWE 
would presumably have to be renamed ESSE.
Let us have a quick look at the main arguments that have been adduced. 
First of  all, the scope of  “the West” as such has been criticized for being too 
narrow. With reference to the Brill Dictionary, some scholars have argued that 
Jewish and Islamic esotericism should be given the same amount of  attention 
as Hellenistic, Christian, and post-Christian modern currents.13 This is an 
important argument that deserves serious attention, although it must be said 
that implementing a “comparative esotericism of  the religions of  the book” 
is more difficult in practice than calling for it in theory.14 Others have noted a 
predominant focus on English, German, French, Italian, and North-American 
culture at the expense of  large European regions such as Scandinavia,15 and the 
11 Kennet Granholm, “Locating the West: Problematizing the Western in Western Esotericism 
and Occultism,” in Occultism in a Global Perspective, eds. Henrik Bogdan and Gordan Djurdjevic 
(Durham: Acumen, 2013), 31.
12 Asprem, “Beyond the West,” 5.
13 E.g. Kocku von Stuckrad, Locations of  Knowledge in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Esoteric 
Discourse and Western Identities (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010), 49. Surprisingly, von Stuckrad’s 
own introductory textbook is vulnerable to the same critique, since it devotes no more than 
three pages to Islam (Kocku von Stuckrad, Western Esotericism: A Brief  History of  Secret Knowledge 
[London/Oakville: Equinox, 2005]; Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “Textbooks and Introductions to 
Western Esotericism,” Religion 43:2 (2013), 182). Note that, in spite of  his focus on “European 
History of  Religion,” von Stuckrad seems to adhere to a notion of  global esotericism of  some 
kind: “I do not doubt that large parts of  what I understand by esotericism can also be found 
in other cultures, and that a transcultural and comparative approach can be most valuable for 
our understanding of  esotericism” (Western Esotericism, xi–xii). 
14 See discussion in Wouter J. Hanegraaff, Western Esotericism: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), 14–17. For an important early contribution, see Faivre, “La question d’un 
ésotérisme comparé des religions du livre,” in “Henry Corbin et le comparatisme spirituel” 
(Colloque tenu à Paris les 5 et 6 juin 1999), Cahiers du Groupe d’Études Spirituelles Comparées 8 
(2000): 89–120; and cf. Hanegraaff, “Empirical Method,” 121–24.
15 Henrik Bogdan and Olav Hammer, introduction to Western Esotericism in Scandinavia, eds. 
Henrik Bogdan and Olav Hammer (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2016).
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same argument could (and should) be made for all the former Soviet countries 
as well as for such countries as Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Yet others have 
noted a neglect of  contemporary esotericism as a dimension of  global popular 
culture online and offline.16 These are all legitimate concerns, even necessary 
ones, and have led to the emergence of  several ESSWE networks focused 
precisely on these formerly neglected domains: notably the Scandinavian 
Network for the Academic Study of  Western Esotericism (SNASWE), the 
Central and Eastern European Network for the Academic Study of  Western 
Esotericism (CEENASWE), and the Contemporary Esotericism Research 
Network (ContERN), next to the independent Russian Association for the 
Study of  Esotericism and Mysticism (ASEM).17
But the scope of  inquiry could and should be expanded further. Countries 
such as Israel (represented in the ESSWE context by the Israeli Network for 
the Academic Study of  Western Esotericism, INASWE), Australia, or New 
Zealand are usually perceived as “Western” from a cultural point of  view in spite 
of  their geographical location in the Middle East and Southward of  East-Asia.18 
Hence, if  we speak of  Western esotericism, we need to make up our minds. 
Do we mean a geographical space? (if  so, where do we draw its boundaries, 
and why?) Or do we mean a cultural domain? (if  so, how do we define it, and 
why?) There are no easy answers to these questions, not least because they 
carry highly sensitive political implications: you cannot think about the nature 
of  “the West” for very long – in fact, you probably cannot think about it at 
all – without coming face to face with the painful but unavoidable legacy of  
Western imperialism, colonialism, orientalism, racism, and so on.19
Moreover, if  all these previous questions and inquiries are still concerned 
with where we draw the internal boundaries of  “the West,” then what about 
“the Rest” – that is to say: everything that is clearly located outside of  those 
16 Egil Asprem and Kennet Granholm, eds., Contemporary Esotericism (Sheffield: Equinox, 2012). 
17 See www.esswe.org/Networks.
18 A classic argument for Western civilization as a cultural rather than a geographical entity 
is Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of  Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs (1993): 22–49. For its 
relevance in the present context, cf. the brief  discussion in Granholm, “Locating the West,” 21. 
19 With regard to the concept of  “religion,” among many other relevant titles, see for 
instance Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and “The Mystic East” 
(London/New York: Routledge, 1999); Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of  Religion: 
Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Tomoko 
Masuzawa, The Invention of  World Religions; or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the 
Language of  Pluralism (Chicago/London: The University of  Chicago Press, 2005); and David 
Chidester, Savage Systems: Colonialism and Comparative Religion in Southern Africa (Charlottesville/
London: University Press of  Virginia, 1996). 
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boundaries both culturally and geographically? Once we have decided to include 
Islamic esotericism in Europe as a matter of  principle, it becomes hard to see 
why esoteric currents in the Middle East and various other predominantly 
Islamic regions should not join the party as well. Moreover, it has recently been 
suggested that what we call “Western” esotericism has such close equivalences 
in Asian cultures such as India or China that it should make sense to speak of  
an “Indian,” a “Chinese,” or indeed a far-Eastern “esotericism.”20 Furthermore, 
scholars of  African American religions have (correctly) noted a serious neglect 
of  “black esotericism” in current scholarship,21 and this has recently led to 
a program called “Africana Esoteric Studies” focused on what they describe 
as “esoteric” lore and practices in Africa and the African diaspora.22 Similar 
initiatives focused on esotericism in Middle and Latin America are currently 
being implemented as well.23 To my knowledge (and profound regret), we do 
20 This is the drift of  e.g. Gordan Djurdjevic, India and the Occult: The Influence of  South Asian 
Spirituality on Modern Western Occultism (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), and Henrik 
Bogdan and Gordan Djurdjevic, introduction to Occultism in a Global Perspective, 1–15. I have 
rather serious reservations about the definitions of  “esotericism” and “occultism” on which 
their arguments are based; but for my present purposes, the fact that such arguments are being 
made by important scholars in the field is more important than the question of  whether they 
are ultimately convincing.
21 My own statement that “participants in the ‘cultic milieu’ of  post-war esotericism have 
always been, and still remain, overwhelmingly white” (Western Esotericism, 131) stands to 
be corrected in the light of  several contributions to Stephen C. Finley, Margarita Simon 
Guillory and Hugh R. Page, Jr., eds., Esotericism in African American Religious Experience: “There 
is a Mystery”… (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2015), which demonstrate the esoteric dimension in e.g. 
the Five Percenters (Biko Mandela Grey, “Show and Prove: Five Percenters and the Study of  
African American Esotericism,” in Esotericism in African American Religious Experience, 177–97), 
Nation of  Islam (Stephen C. Finley, “Mathematical Theology: Numerology in the Religious 
Thought of  Tynnetta Muhammad and Louis Farrakhan,” in ibid., 123–37; Justine M. Bakker, 
“On the Knowledge of  Self  and Others: Secrecy, Concealment and Revelation in Elijah 
Muhammad’s Nation of  Islam (1934–1975),” in ibid., 138–51), Sun Ra (Marques Redd, “Astro-
Black Mythology: The Poetry of  Sun Ra,” in ibid., 227–45.), or Ishmael Reed (Marques Redd, 
“Those Mysteries, Our Mysteries: Ishmael Reed and the Construction of  a Black Esoteric 
Tradition,” in ibid., 277–94).
22 Finley, Simon Guillory & Page, Esotericism in African American Religious Experience. On 
a theoretical and definitional level I find this volume’s understanding of  “esotericism” 
extremely problematic (for instance, in a section about “Reinscribing the Boundaries of  
Western Esotericism” [Stephen C. Finley, Margarita S. Guillory and Hugh R. Page, “The 
Continuing Quest to Map Secrecy, Concealment, and Revelatory Experiences in Africana 
Esoteric Discourse,” in ibid., 349–52], the authors ignore twenty years of  theoretical debate); 
but again, the important point is that such arguments are presently being made.
23 E.g. Jean Pablo Bubello, Historia del esoterismo en la Argentina: Prácticas, representaciones y 
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not yet have a study of  Western esotericism on the North Pole region and 
Antarctica, but surely that is only a matter of  time! 
Cycling from Western to Global and Back
What should we think of  this trend towards a globalization of  the notion of  
esotericism? Do we want to go along with the suggestion that “esotericism” 
could be seen as a global phenomenon? Or are there reasons to insist that it is 
something specific to Western culture alone? In my opinion, both options are 
problematic in the extreme. Consider the following string of  questions. 
If  we see esotericism as something global, then does this mean that 
“it” is universal and remains always the same regardless of  context? → Or 
do we assume, rather, that “it” manifests differently in different cultural 
environments? → If  we assume the latter, then by what criteria do we want 
to distinguish those supposedly universal features of  “esotericism” from its 
local or culture-specific manifestations? → In either case, does it really make 
sense to distinguish between an “Eastern” and a “Western” variant of  this 
one single thing called “esotericism” (whatever it might be)? → If  we feel that 
it does make sense to make such a distinction, then where do we draw the 
boundary, and why? → But then again, why insist on “East” versus “West”? 
Why not differentiate between “Northern” and “Southern” forms instead, or 
split the whole thing up into more specific regional variants? → On the other 
hand, if  we look at esotericism as something specifically “Western,” then 
what is it that makes it so unique and different from all the rest? And where 
or how then do we draw the boundaries of  its “Western” identity? → Isn’t 
it true that the very adjective “Western” implies logically that there must be 
an “Eastern” esotericism as well?24 → Do we understand it as “Western” in 
a geographical or in a cultural sense? → What happens if  “Western” esoteric 
ideas or practices travel to non-Western cultures, for instance to India? Do 
we assume that they will behave like Western “tourists” there, so to speak? 
→ Or will they come to stay, and eventually merge with Indian culture to 
such an extent that the result is something new: a cross-cultural mutation of  
persecuciones de curanderos, espiritistas, astrólogos y otros esoteristas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos, 
2010); and the Center for the Study of  Western Esotericism of  the Union of  South American 
Nations (CEEO-UNASUR; see information on www.esswe.org, under “Affiliated Networks”).
24 Marco Pasi, “The Modernity of  Occultism: Reflections on Some Crucial Aspects,” in Hermes 
in the Academy: Ten Years’ Study of  Western Esotericism at the University of  Amsterdam, eds. Wouter J. 
Hanegraaff  and Joyce Pijnenburg (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 153.
Hanegraaff  / Correspondences 3 (2015) 55–91 63
Western esotericism that can no longer be called just “Western” anymore but 
is now “Eastern” as well? → Or should it be seen, rather, as an “Eastern” 
development inspired by Western influence? → Do such distinctions make any 
sense at all, if  we wish to understand such new phenomena? → Or do they 
merely create misunderstandings based on essentialist notions of  “East versus 
West”: a legacy of  Western domination in the colonial era based on Orientalist 
stereotypes grounded in ideologies of  Western superiority? → If  so, are we 
not obliged to get rid of  the very notion of  “Western” esotericism and start 
speaking of  a global esotericism instead?
As one can see, this series of  questions finally leads us full circle. All of  them 
are perfectly legitimate, but we could continue the inquiry forever, without ever 
resolving the problem or getting closer to a final conclusion. It is not hard to 
see that the two options (esotericism as something “global”; esotericism as 
something “Western”) are both very hard to maintain in a consistent manner, 
once we start questioning the assumptions on which they are based and the 
implications that follow from them. If  so, it would seem that we are stuck. 
How do we escape from this circle?
Historicizing the Problem
In my experience, what keeps us from resolving a theoretical dilemma is usually 
not so much the dilemma itself  but the fact that we keep looking at it from 
an exclusively theoretical angle. The best recipe then consists of  historicizing 
the problem, by asking ourselves who were the first to encounter it, and why. 
This means that we move our dilemma out of  the timeless mental realm of  
theoretical abstractions and into our concrete life-world of  embodied human 
beings operating in time and space.25 The world of  theory is a logical world, 
a world of  “either/or,” whereas the world in which all of  us are living is 
an empirical world, a world of  “both/and.” In the messy reality where we 
actually find ourselves, we do not encounter theories. All we encounter is people 
very much like ourselves: human beings of  flesh and blood who have been 
struggling with certain theoretical problems, sometimes for highly personal 
25 See Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, 366 (where I suggest that historiography 
should ultimately trump theory/metatheory); and further discussion in Bernd-Christian Otto, 
“Discourse Theory trumps Discourse Theory: Wouter Hanegraaff ’s Esotericism and the Academy,” 
Religion 43, no. 2 (2013): 231–40; and Wouter J. Hanegraaff,  “The Power of  Ideas: Esotericism, 
Historicism, and the Limits of  Discourse,” Religion 43, no. 2 (2013): 253–55, with notes 2 and 6. 
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and emotionally charged reasons, and who came up with proposals and ideas 
that (if  truth be told) are seldom wholly consistent from a theoretical point of  
view but have sometimes proven so powerful that they keep deeply influencing 
our own. In some cases, our predecessors have succeeded in creating the very 
discursive framework, paradigm, or grand narrative within which we ourselves 
are still moving today – often without realizing it. As a result, as scholars we 
often end up playing our parts in someone else’s story, on their conditions, and 
within the storylines that they have set up for us. The task then is to take a step 
backward, try to become aware of  those stories, and see whether we might be 
able to begin writing a different and perhaps a better one.
A Global Dustbin of  Rejected Knowledge
At what point in history, then, do we first encounter the idea of  “esotericism” 
as a Western or a more-than-Western and possibly global phenomenon? In my 
recent work, I have tried to trace the genealogy of  Western esotericism, and 
reached the conclusion that this notion is grounded (perhaps surprisingly) in 
the virulent polemics of  early modern Protestant thinkers around what many 
of  them saw as a continuous tradition of  pagan heresy that had begun in very 
ancient times and continued until the present.26 These Protestant polemics 
were adopted by Enlightenment thinkers, who used them for their own ends to 
present their own worldview as “rational” and “scientific” by contrasting it with 
what they perceived as the perennial temptation of  “superstition” and “the 
irrational.”27 This idea of  a sharp dualism between “science and superstition,” 
or “reason and unreason,” is essential to our concerns. We are often told that 
it goes back all the way to the Greeks, but I believe this to be a mistake. Of  
course, there is no doubt that in antiquity we find our share of  rationalists who 
sharply critiqued or ridiculed a variety of  popular or traditional practices and 
beliefs; but we do not yet find the dramatic notion of  two monolithic “worlds” 
or mentalities, one defined by the light of  reason and one defined by its dark 
opposite that is in need of  illumination. That is a modern idea. In fact, I would 
go so far as to call it the very idea of modernity.
In any case, it is an idea with a history, a genealogy. It could not have 
emerged without a long and complicated previous history of  Christian 
polemics against the alleged dangers of  “paganism.” A classic and obvious 
reference is St Augustine, who imagined the world of  Christianity as the City 
26 Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, 77–152.
27 Ibid., 153–256.
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of  God opposed to the dark city of  pagan error.28 Such models of  light versus 
darkness speak to the imagination and easily lend themselves to powerful and 
dramatic narratives of  battle and conquest. As a result, imaginary scenarios of  
a momentous struggle between the forces of  light (the light of  the gospel, the 
light of  reason) and the forces of  darkness (demon-inspired cults, savagery, 
ignorance, superstition) have played a major role in the history of  globalization, 
beginning with the discovery of  the Americas and the Far East, and culminating 
in the era of  imperialism and colonialism. 
When explorers and missionaries arrived in Mexico, Peru, India, the 
various regions of  Africa, and so on, they brought their Western models of  
“paganism” and “idolatry” with them.29 When Westerners had to try and make 
sense of  native beliefs and practices, they naturally did so by comparing them 
to prototypes that they knew from their own culture and history. As a result, the 
various religions of  colonialized peoples were perceived as similar to Judaism, 
Christianity, Islam, ancient Egyptian religion, and so on.30 Some degree of  
positive appreciation for non-Western beliefs and practices was possible in so 
far as they were somewhat reminiscent of  monotheist religion; for instance, 
the Renaissance model of  a prisca theologia, based upon a positive idea of  “pagan 
wisdom,” could be used as an interpretative grid or “intellectual filter,”31 as 
when Fernando de Alva Ixtlilxochitl described the ruler Nezahualcoyotl (1402–
1472) as “a sage even wiser than the divine Plato, who alone has managed to 
raise himself  up to the knowledge of  a single ‘creator of  visible and invisible 
things’.”32 But no such appreciation was possible or even imaginable if  pagan 
beliefs or practices were seen as instances of  pagan idolatry. The worship of  
divinities embodied in material objects or images was seen as the unforgivable 
sin from a monotheist perspective: this was the very “heart of  darkness” 
that defined the essence of  the false religion of  heathens or pagans.33 This 
28 Augustine, The City of  God against the Pagans, ed./trans. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998).
29 For a useful introduction to the discourse on “idolatry” in early modern Europe and its 
relevance to missionary and colonial discourse, see Carina L. Johnson, “Idolatrous Cultures 
and the Practice of  Religion,” Journal of  the History of  Ideas 67, no. 4 (2006): 597–621.  
30 For Mexico and Peru, see Carmen Bernand and Serge Gruzinski, De l’idolâtrie: Une archéologie 
des sciences religieuses (Paris: Seuil, 1988); and cf. my blogpost “Exterminate all the Idols,” www.
wouterjhanegraaff.blogspot.nl. For Southern Africa, see Chidester, Savage Systems. 
31 Ildikó Sz. Kristóf, “The Uses of  Demonology: European Missionaries and Native 
Americans in the American Southwest (17–18th Centuries),” in Centers and Peripheries in 
European Renaissance Culture: Essays by East-Central European Fellow, eds. György E. Szönyi and 
Casaba Maczelka (JATE Press: Szeged, 2012), 167.
32 Alva Ixtlilxochitl, Obras históricas, vol. I, 405; see Bernand and Gruzinski, De l’idolâtrie, 136.
33 For the concept of  idolatry in its original Jewish context, see Moshe Halbertal and Avishai 
Margalit, Idolatry (Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 1992). For very striking 
Hanegraaff  / Correspondences 3 (2015) 55–9166
perennial error of  pagan idolatry is precisely what the missionaries and 
colonizers believed they encountered all over the world.
I would suggest that these early forms of  “comparative religion” are at 
the heart of  our problem of  Western versus global esotericism. In describing 
Western esotericism as “rejected knowledge,” my argument is that Enlightenment 
thinkers began to imagine a kind of  cultural “waste basket” or reservoir 
of  practices and beliefs that used to be seen as pagan idolatry by previous 
generations and were now re-described as dangerous or ridiculous nonsense 
that deserved no recognition or respect. Its remains should be destroyed and 
its memories forgotten.34 The crucial point for our concerns is that the entire 
traditional amalgam of  “pagan superstition, irrational belief, and idolatrous 
practice” that had been known since Hellenistic antiquity now appeared to 
be a worldwide phenomenon: the explorers and missionaries discovered that it 
was not just Western but global. In traditional Christian terms, all the religions 
of  the world turned out to be forms of  “pagan superstition” inspired by the 
devil – or at the very least they were thoroughly infected by it. In more modern 
Enlightenment terms, it all amounted to so many forms of  irrational magic 
and occult prejudice. 
It is here, then, that we have our first instance of  the globalization of  
“esotericism” – although that particular term was not yet used at the time,35 
and the valuation was still wholly negative.
instances of  the diabolization of  American Indians as pagan idolaters, as visualized in the 
literature read by Jesuit missionaries during the 17th and 18th centuries, see Ildikó Sz. Kristóf, 
“Missionaries, Monsters, and the Demon Show: Diabolized Representations of  American 
Indians in Jesuit Libraries of  Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Upper Hungary,” in Exploring 
the Cultural History of  Continental European Freak Shows and “Enfreakment,” eds. Anna Kérchy and 
Andreas Zittlau (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), 38–73.
34 A paradigmatic request for erasing the very memory of  “superstitious folly” and destroying 
its archival remains is Christoph August Heumann, “Von denen Kennzeichen der falschen 
und unächten Philosophie,” Acta Philosophorum 2 (1715): 209–11 (see Hanegraaff, Esotericism 
and the Academy, 132–33). On the language of  “extermination” as applied to the “idolatrous” 
culture of  native peoples, cf. Hanegraaff, “Exterminate all the Idols.”
35 Contrary to Monica Neugebauer-Wölk and apparently many of  her German colleagues (see 
Monika Neugebauer-Wölk, “Historische Esoterikforschung, oder: Der lange Weg der Esoterik 
zur Moderne,” in Aufklärung und Esoterik: Wege in die Moderne, eds. Monika Neugebauer-Wölk, 
Renko Geffarth and Markus Meumann (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2013, esp. 37), it seems 
to me that the historical genealogy of  the term “esotericism” (resp. Esoterik, l’ésotérisme, etc.), 
while extremely interesting in itself, is not of  any decisive importance regarding its validity as 
an etic scholarly concept. Much more important than the question of  which particular term 
happened to be used (emically) at any time is the imaginative formations to which it was meant to 
refer (but which might well be referred to by various terms next to “esotericism”). For my 
understanding of  “imaginative formations,” see Hanegraaff, “Reconstructing ‘Religion’ from 
the Bottom Up” (forthcoming).
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From Rejection to Fascination
This situation did not last. As noted by Gerd Baumann in a brilliant discussion 
of  identity politics,36 binary oppositions of  “good” versus “bad” are always 
subject to reversal, and the result is a sophisticated dialectics of  rejection and 
desire. The very alterity of  the excluded “Other” can turn it into an object 
of  attraction; and once it has been constructed as an “alternative option” in 
the collective imagination, people who do not like the dominant narrative 
can easily shift their allegiance to its suppressed counterpart. In this manner, 
what Enlightenment thinkers rejected as bad could be embraced as good by 
their opponents, who could use it to construct their own identity in conscious 
opposition against what they saw as empty rationalism or soulless science. 
This is exactly what happened: the entire reservoir of  “rejected knowledge” 
became an object of  intense fascination for Romantics and other critics of  
the Enlightenment during the 19th century, precisely because of  its perceived 
alterity vis-à-vis socially dominant models of  science and rationality. 
This reservoir of  “rejected knowledge,” whether valued positively or 
negatively, was (again) perceived as not just Western but global. As far as one 
could tell, it was everywhere and had always been there. The terminology was still 
very fluid, with many different words and concepts floating around, including 
“paganism,” “heathenism,” “idolatry,” “superstition,” “fetishism,” “magic,” 
“mysticism,” “occult science,” “occult philosophy,” “unreason,” or even simply 
“craziness” or “stupidity.” Some of  these terms (such as “superstition”) were 
too inherently negative to be eligible for neutral let alone positive usage,37 
others (such as “fetishism”) were just a bit too specific to work as a general 
umbrella term. But a few of  the common terms turned out to be both general 
enough and suitable as more or less neutral or even positive concepts. The 
chief  examples were “magic,”38 “occult science,” “occult philosophy”39 and 
36 Gerd Baumann, “Grammars of  Identity/Alterity: A Structural Approach,” in Grammars of  
Identity/Alterity: A Structural Approach, eds. Gerd Baumann and Andre Gingrich (New York/
Oxford: Berghahn, 2004), 20; cf. Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, 374.
37 For the genealogy of  “superstition,” see Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, 156–64.
38 For the genealogy and theoretical problems of  “magic,” in relation to the study of  
Western esotericism, see Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, 164–77; idem, “Magic,” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Western Mysticism and Esotericism, ed. Glenn A. Magee (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016). The definitive study on the category “magic” in the study 
of  religion is now Bernd-Christian Otto, Magie: Rezeptions- und diskursgeschichtliche Analysen von 
der Antike bis zur Neuzeit (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2011), 1–132.
39 For the genealogy of  “occult science(s)” and “occult philosophy,” see Wouter J. Hanegraaff, 
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(eventually, in a later period) “paganism.”40 During the 19th century, these 
terms now entered into the common vocabulary of  both scholars and a new 
class of  enthusiasts and practitioners. Scholars were studying the “beliefs and 
practices of  mankind, from primitive to civilized man,” usually in terms of  an 
evolutionary narrative with magic at the bottom and science at the top. As for 
the new class of  amateur scholars and practitioners: eventually, many of  them 
began calling themselves “occultists,” and they were proud to speak of  “magic” 
or “occult science” as a force for progress, superior not just to conventional 
Christian religion but also to positivist science.41 About one thing, at least, 
they were all in agreement: “magic” or “the occult” could be encountered 
everywhere around the globe and had been around since time immemorial. 
As recently emphasized by Kennet Granholm, a particularly important and 
fascinating dimension of  the occultists’ perspective was their embrace of  a 
“positive Orientalism.”42 The Protestant polemics against “paganism,” picked 
up and continued by Enlightenment thinkers, had been directed against the 
dominant Renaissance model of  a prisca theologia or philosophia perennis and its 
belief  in a supreme ancient wisdom that had originated somewhere in the Orient 
and had been transmitted through the Platonic tradition. This perspective 
of  “Platonic Orientalism,”43 with its positive appreciation of  Wisdom from 
the East, had been thoroughly discredited by Protestant and Enlightenment 
“The Notion of  ‘Occult Sciences’ in the Wake of  the Enlightenment,” in Aufklärung und 
Esoterik: Wege in die Moderne, eds. Monika Neugebauer-Wölk, Renko Geffarth and Markus 
Meumann (Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2013), 73–95 (based in large part upon 
Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, 177–91).
40 For the genealogy of  “paganism,” from the perspective of  its relevance to contemporary 
neo-pagan discourse, see the earlier chapters of  Ronald Hutton, The Triumph of  the Moon: A 
History of  Modern Pagan Witchcraft (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
41 For some of  these scholars of  the occult in “the age of  the amateur,” see Hanegraaff, 
Esotericism and the Academy, ch. 3. For the relation of  occultism to science, see Egil Asprem, 
The Problem of  Disenchantment: Scientific Naturalism and Esoteric Discourse, 1900–1939 (Leiden/
Boston: Brill, 2014); for its relation to Enlightenment agendas of  social progress, see Joscelyn 
Godwin, The Theosophical Enlightenment (Albany: State University of  New York Press, 1994), and 
cf. Pasi, “Modernity of  Occultism”; and for its previously ignored relation to Socialism, in the 
context of  Romanticism and Neo-Catholicism, see Julian Strube, Sozialismus, Katholizismus und 
Okkultismus im Frankreich des 19. Jahrhunderts: Die Genealogie der Schriften von Eliphas Lévi (Ph.D. 
Dissertation: University of  Heidelberg, 2015). 
42 Granholm, “Locating the West,” 22–24; cf. Christopher Partridge, “Lost Horizon: H.P. 
Blavatsky and Theosophical Orientalism” in Handbook of  the Theosophical Current, eds. Olav 
Hammer and Mikael Rothstein (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013), 309–33.
43 Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, 12–17ff.
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thinkers,44 and its place taken by negative valuations of  the Orient as a place 
of  mystical decadence, luxurious superstitions, blind despotism, and social 
stagnation. It is this perspective, of  course, that Edward Said had in mind in 
his famous critique of  “Orientalist” discourse.45 But Said ignored its positive 
counterpart, represented by Romantic and occultist thinkers and much more 
influential than has long been assumed.46 These thinkers kept building upon 
the Renaissance models of  Platonic Orientalism, while developing them into 
new directions informed by the masses of  newly available information about 
Far Eastern cultures such as India or Tibet. 
In short, occultism was seen as something global, and its spiritual center 
or origin was widely believed to be somewhere in the Far East.47 How then 
do we get from here to our current notions of  “Western esotericism”? Marco 
Pasi has convincingly argued that its origins are in the late 19th and early 20th 
century “Hermetic reaction” against the increasing emphasis among occultists 
on Eastern wisdom:
With the “Hermetic Reaction” that develops in occultism as a response to 
Blavatsky’s emphasis on the “Eastern” sources of  esoteric wisdom, the idea of  
a specifically “Western” esoteric tradition takes shape. Jewish kabbalah plays a 
crucial role in this process. Whereas Mme. Blavatsky tended to devaluate Jewish 
kabbalah by considering it an inferior form of  older “Oriental” traditions …, 
later “Hermetic” occultists come to perceive it as one of  the pillars of  a distinctly 
“Western” esoteric tradition, together with phenomena such as Rosicrucianism, 
alchemy, and the tarot.48
Groups such as Anna Kingsford’s Hermetic Society, the Hermetic Order of  
the Golden Dawn, or Rudolf  Steiner’s Anthroposophical Society, all insisted on 
44 Ibid., ch. 2.
45 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
46 On the relation between Romanticism and occultism, illustrated by the central case of  
Eliphas Lévi, see Strube, Sozialismus, Katholizismus und Okkultismus. 
47 Geographically, occultists were looking towards the Far East, notably India and Tibet; but 
historically, Theosophists in the wake of  Blavatsky’s Secret Doctrine (1888) began looking further 
back than the roots of  Oriental civilization, towards the sunken continents of  Lemuria and 
Atlantis, believed to be the home of  the third and fourth “root races” (Joscelyn Godwin, 
Atlantis and the Cycles of  Time: Prophecies, Traditions, and Occult Revelations (Rochester/Toronto: 
Inner Traditions, 2011), 64–116).
48 Marco Pasi, “Oriental Kabbalah and the Parting of  East and West in the Early Theosophical 
Society,” in Kabbalah and Modernity: Interpretations, Transformations, Adaptations, eds. Boaz Huss, 
Marco Pasi and Kocku von Stuckrad (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010), 162.
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the specificity of  Western spiritual traditions. Oriental mysticism was considered 
too alien to the mentality of  Western peoples, who should better stick to their 
own venerable traditions, notably the Kabbalah and Hermetic Philosophy. This 
argument was still based on the notion of  occultism as a global phenomenon, 
but it was supposed to have developed differently in Eastern and Western 
cultures: “the Western Mind” was believed to be inherently different from 
“the Oriental Mind.” Within such a framework, it was certainly possible to 
see Eastern and Western occultism as equal and mutually complementary 
counterparts, each with their own occult tradition. But in practice, since the 
discourse just happened to be dominated by European and American occultists 
in the colonial era, it often carried subtle or less subtle suggestions of  Western 
superiority – even in the work of  authors who honestly believed that they were 
doing the opposite.49
By the time we reach the 20th century, we therefore have a situation of  
intense and widespread curiosity about the entire global reservoir of  beliefs 
and practices that the Enlightenment had tried to reject as irrational super-
stition. The terminology was still not fixed. “Esotericism” was just one of  
the many terms that were now floating around, next to a family of  concepts 
with the word “occult” in it (occult science, occult philosophy, occultism, the 
occult). “Magic” remained a particularly popular umbrella term, although some 
occultists (e.g. A.E. Waite) now insisted on a superior “mystical” interpretation. 
Be that as it may, as far as I can see, nobody believed that the domain in question 
was exclusively Western. 
Two Ways of  Thinking
This entire domain of  thought and practice seemed to be grounded in very 
basic assumptions, mental practices, or “mentalities,” that were hard or 
impossible to reconcile with some of  the most central tenets of  Enlightenment 
rationalism and positivist science. This is, of  course, why they were dumped 
into the dustbin of  “rejected knowledge” in the first place. How could such 
evidently false beliefs have acquired such a hold over the human mind? Was 
49 On Theosophical appropriations of  Orientalist discourse, and the ironies involved in this 
phenomenon, see Partridge, “Lost Horizon,” and cf. idem, “Orientalism and the Occult,” in 
The Occult World, ed. Christopher Partridge (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015). It would be interesting 
to compare the perspectives of  Western Theosophists who travelled to India with those of  
Westerners already well integrated in Indian society and Indians who embraced Theosophy in 
the context of  their agendas of  emancipation and liberation from British colonial rule.
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there perhaps something about them that rationalists and scientists failed to 
see? If  so, what was it? Intellectual reflection about the nature of  “rejected 
knowledge” worldwide (its deep structure, its underlying assumptions, its 
mental habits, and so on, plus of  course the question of  how it was related 
to science and rationality) led to the formulation of  popular and extremely 
influential theories that, as I hope to show, are ultimately at the bottom of  
current debates about the nature of  “esotericism.” We are dealing here with 
an enormously complicated and multifaceted discourse about Das Andere der 
Vernunft,50 and in what follows I will concentrate on just a few central authors 
and lines of  argument.51
One of  the most influential voices in the debate was the founder of  
cultural anthropology Edward Burnett Tylor, who argued that “magic” or 
“occult science” (he did not differentiate between the two terms) differs from 
genuine science in being based upon an elementary error of  logic, i.e. the false 
assumption that things or events that we connect in our minds must therefore 
be connected in the outside world:
The principal key to the understanding of  Occult Science is to consider it as based 
on the Association of  Ideas, a faculty which lies at the very foundation of  human 
reason, but in no small degree of  human unreason also. Man, as yet in a low in-
tellectual condition, having come to associate in thought those things which he 
found by experience to be connected in fact, proceeded erroneously to invert this 
action, and to conclude that association in thought must involve similar connexion 
in reality. He thus attempted to discover, to foretell, and to cause events by means 
of  processes which we can now see to have only an ideal significance. By a vast 
mass of  evidence from savage, barbaric, and civilized life, magic arts which have 
resulted from thus mistaking an ideal for a real connexion may be clearly traced from 
the lower culture which they are of, to the higher culture which they are in.52
Based on this understanding of  “magic” or “occult science,” it all came down to 
a simple question of  education: if  one just teaches people to make correct use 
of  their rational faculties, they will cease to believe in magic. Essentially this is 
still the position of  hardline skeptics and new atheists such as Richard Dawkins 
or Daniel Dennett today. But Tylor was a subtle thinker and eventually realized 
50 Hartmut Böhme and Gernot Böhme, Das Andere der Vernunft: Zur Entwicklung von 
Rationalitätsstrukturen am Beispiel Kants (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1983).
51 A very important strand that will not be discussed here is based upon Max Weber’s thesis 
of  “disenchantment.” See Asprem, Problem of  Disenchantment. 
52 Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of  Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, 
Language, Art, and Custom, vol 1, 1871 (London: John Murray, 1913), 115–16 (emphasis added).
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that things were more complex. He tried to keep “magic” or “occult science” 
apart from the more respectable domain of  “religion” (based on “animism,” 
defined as the belief  in spiritual beings), but discovered to his chagrin that he 
was unable to do so: the categories just kept blending into one another, both 
empirically and theoretically.53 At least as worrying was the fact that both magic 
and religion were deeply involved in yet another phenomenon that puzzled the 
rationalists: that of  mythology. How could even such reasonable people as the 
ancient Greeks have believed in those wildly irrational stories about the gods? 
This issue was connected in Tylor’s mind with another universal phenomenon 
of  “primitive culture” that he referred to as “the great doctrine of  analogy.”54 
It referred to the tendency of  human beings to engage in correlative thinking, 
so that they perceive reality in terms of  non-causal correspondences instead 
of  causal relations that can be empirically proven and logically understood. 
Analogical thinking was closely interwoven with mythology, and Tylor believed 
that both were now “dying” under the impact of  science:
The myths shaped out of  those endless analogies between man and nature which 
are the soul of  all poetry, into those half-human stories still so full to us of  unfad-
ing life and beauty, are the masterpieces of  an art belonging rather to the past than 
to the present. The growth of  myth has been checked by science, and is dying of  
weights and measurement, of  proportions and specimens – it is not only dying, 
but half  dead, and students are anatomising it. In this world one must do what one 
can, and if  the moderns cannot feel myth as their forefathers did, at least they can 
analyse it. There is a kind of  intellectual frontier within which he must be who will 
sympathise with myth, while he must be without who will investigate it, and it is 
our fortune that we live near this frontier-line, and can go in and out.55
One can see that Tylor felt somewhat conflicted about the phenomenon, and 
some part of  him regretted the fact that myth, analogy, and even magic were 
things of  the past. Be that as it may, this staunch rationalist and positivist spent 
his career trying to somehow make sense of  all those “weird” beliefs and 
practices that the Enlightenment had been fighting as superstitious nonsense. 
53 Detailed analysis in Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “The Emergence of  the Academic Science of  
Magic: The Occult Philosophy in Tylor and Frazer,” in Religion in the Making: The Emergence 
of  the Sciences of  Religion, eds. Arie L. Molendijk and Peter Pels (Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill, 
1998), 254–65, with special reference to Tylor’s neglected article “Magic.” It should come as 
no surprise that precisely the category of  “idolatry” was responsible for blurring the boundary 
between “magic” (occult science) and “religion” (animism). 
54 Tylor, Primitive Culture, vol. 1, 296–97.
55 Ibid., 317.
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Implicit in his work is the discovery that he was not just dealing with one thing, 
but with many: science and rationality did not just have a problem with “magic,” 
but also with “animism,” with “myth,” with “analogical” or correlative think-
ing and, as a result, with “symbols” (as opposed to discursive language and 
logic). With hindsight, we can see that all these categories had just one thing 
in common, namely the simple fact that none of  them fit the requirements 
of  Enlightenment reason and its brand-new ideal of  a “scientific worldview.” 
We seem to be faced with a situation where one single warrior – the modern 
Scientist or Man of  Reason – is fighting a multitude of  “irrational” enemies. 
There have been many attempts to reduce the contents of  this global 
reservoir of  “rejected knowledge” to essentially one single thing (or, to put 
it more bluntly, to define the essence of  the irrational). Among the most 
important and influential examples is the French philosopher Lucien Lévy-
Bruhl.56 His lasting contribution lies in a very simple idea that, however, seems 
to have been surprisingly hard to entertain for intellectuals at the time when 
he was writing: that there are two basic and irreducible “mentalities” or “ways 
of  thinking” available to the human mind. The first one could be referred to 
as “instrumental causality” and works with demonstrable chains of  cause-
and-effect that can be precisely described and logically understood;57 the other 
was referred to as “participation” and works according to different principles. 
These principles were not so easy to define and describe, however, precisely 
because they do not satisfy the requirements of  logic and instrumental causality 
on which scholars just happen to rely in their normal discursive speech. For 
instance Stanley Tambiah makes a serious attempt to define “participation,” 
but with questionable success: it supposedly signifies “the association between 
persons and things … to the point of  identity and consubstantiality,” it is 
“indifferent to ‘secondary’ causes (or intervening mechanisms)” because “the 
connection between cause and effect is immediate and intermediate links 
are not recognized.”58 In the end, such formulations do not tell us much 
more than that “participation” (like the equally incomprehensible doctrine 
56 For my take on Lévy-Bruhl, see Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “How Magic Survived the 
Disenchantment of  the World,” Religion 33 (2003): 371–78. For a useful short overview of  
the “rationality debate” in relation to Lévy-Bruhl’s theory, see Tanya M. Luhrmann, Persuasions 
of  the Witch’s Craft: Ritual Magic in Contemporary England (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1989), 345–56. For a critique, see G.E.R. Lloyd, Demystifying Mentalities (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990).
57 Cf. Hanegraaff, Western Esotericism, 124–25.
58 Stanley J. Tambiah, Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of  Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 86.
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of  “consubstantiality” basic to Trinitarian and Eucharistic theology) is not 
instrumental causality. What it is remains as mysterious as ever. Because 
participation was so clearly opposed to “modern” notions of  instrumental 
causality, Lévy-Bruhl first assumed that it was typical only of  “primitive” 
thought; but by the end of  his life, he had concluded that this could not 
be correct. Both “mentalities,” he concluded, were universal to the human 
mind and could be found everywhere, not just among the “primitives” but in 
modern society as well.
Lévy-Bruhl was among the most important early influences on the 
psychologist Carl Gustav Jung. Jung deserves special attention in the present 
context, because there is probably no other 20th century thinker whose work 
has been more important and influential with respect to the idea of  a “Western” 
versus a “global” esotericism. Not only did he concentrate on many central 
aspects of  what we now call Western esotericism, 59 but he tried to expand its 
horizon by exploring its parallels in Eastern cultures and other parts of  the 
world. Jung’s pivotal study Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido  (Transformations 
and Symbols of  the Libido, 1911–12) was grounded in the concept of  “two 
ways of  thinking.”60 This idea was crucially indebted to Lévy-Bruhl’s Les 
fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures published one year earlier, but also to a 
theory that had emerged in German Romantic Mesmerism with authors such 
as Justinus Kerner and Gotthilf  Heinrich von Schubert.61 They pioneered 
the idea of  two complementary types of  consciousness associated with night 
and day, the heart and the brain, dream and reason, symbolism and discursive 
language, nature and society.62 As far as Jung was concerned, Lévy Bruhl and 
the Romantic mesmerists were talking about one and the same thing.
Jung’s Wandlungen led to the break with Sigmund Freud, which became final 
in early January 1913;63 and toward the end of  that same year, Jung entered a 
59 For Jung’s importance to the study of  Western esotericism, see Hanegraaff, Esotericism 
and the Academy, 277–95. Although he did not yet use the term “esotericism,” its centrality to 
Jung’s work is evident from the sheer list of  his research topics: the “occult phenomena” of  
somnambulism and spiritualist mediumship (in his dissertation), ancient gnosticism, Hellenistic 
mystery cults, alchemy, the various manifestations of  what he called “synchronicity” (astrology, 
correspondences, natural magic), quantum mysticism, UFO phenomena, and the Aquarian Age.
60 Carl Gustav Jung, Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido: Beiträge zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des 
Denkens, 1911–12 (Leipzig/Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1925), 7–35.
61 Cf. Sonu Shamdasani, C.G. Jung: A Biography in Books (New York/London: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 2012), 31–32, 53–55.
62 Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, 262–66. 
63 Deirdre Bair, Jung: A Biography (Boston/New York/London: Little, Brown and Company, 
2003), 238.
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deep mental and spiritual crisis. In an attempt at self-therapy, he began filling 
notebooks (the so-called Black Books) with accounts of  the intense dreams, 
visions, and fantasies that began to overwhelm him, and these led eventually 
to a unique manuscript in calligraphic script on parchment that has become 
known as Liber Novus or The Red Book. It was kept under lock and key for many 
years but was finally published in 2009.64 It shows Jung’s existential struggle 
with the two radically opposed and mutually exclusive “ways of  thinking,” 
mentalities, or types of  consciousness that Lévy-Bruhl had been talking about. 
Jung introduces them as the Geist dieser Zeit (Spirit of  This Time), which uses 
logic and discursive language and believes in science, and its opponent, the 
Geist der Tiefe (Spirit of  the Depth), which uses images and myths to speak 
about the deeper truths of  the soul. It is perfectly clear that this Geist der 
Tiefe represented the suppressed voices of  everything that had been dumped 
into the reservoir of  “rejected knowledge” and was now widely seen as 
incompatible with science and reason: primitive magic, myth, paganism, the 
occult, symbolism, analogical thinking, and so on. In a real sense, Liber Novus 
documents the return of  the repressed.
Throughout his Red Book we see Jung struggling with his fear of  ridicule 
and public humiliation. Wasn’t all this “irrational” stuff  just the bottomless 
reservoir of  human stupidity and silly superstitions? Wouldn’t he himself, an 
internationally respected psychiatrist, be dismissed as a fool or an idiot for 
paying any serious attention to such topics? Or worse, wasn’t this “Spirit of  
the Depth” really the spirit of  unreason and madness? Wouldn’t listening to 
it drive him literally insane?65 In the end, he decided to accept the risk: rather 
than rejecting all these visions and fantasies as crazy nonsense, he would take 
them seriously and try to understand what they had to tell him. The entirety of  
his later oeuvre is based on that decision, to an extent that we can only begin 
to understand now that The Red Book has become available. 
Jung eventually concluded that the various traditions of  “rejected 
knowledge” could be studied and understood historically,66 as a continuous 
stream that went back at least as far as the mystery religions of  Hellenistic 
antiquity and the gnostic heresies of  the first centuries. He thought they lived 
64 Carl Gustav Jung, The Red Book: Liber Novus, edited and introduced by Sonu Shamdasani 
(New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009).
65 On the role of  madness in Jung’s Red Book, see Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “The Great War of  
the Soul: Divine and Human Madness in Carl Gustav Jung’s Liber Novus,” in Krise und religiöser 
Wahn-Sinn, ed. Sebastian Schüler (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2016).
66 Cf. Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, 286–89.
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on in the “Hermetic” science of  alchemy through the Middle Ages, were picked 
up by thinkers such as Paracelsus during the Renaissance, and finally emerged 
once more in modern “occult” currents such as Mesmerism, Somnambulism, 
and Spiritualism. To make it all relevant again, and applicable to the needs of  
“modern man” after the Death of  God – the struggle with Nietzsche’s legacy 
is absolutely central to Jung’s personal struggle documented in The Red Book – 
the tradition of  rejected knowledge must now be transformed into a science. 
However, the scientific Geist dieser Zeit had almost killed the human soul by 
reducing it to reason alone. The new science based upon the Geist der Tiefe 
must therefore be a science of the soul: in other words – and quite literally – a 
scientific psychology.
If  occultists in the final decades of  the 19th century were the first to 
speak of  a “Western occult tradition” (a “Hermetic” counterpart to Oriental 
Theosophy), then Jung seems to have been its second major pioneer. He 
disliked the Theosophists and tried to keep his distance from “occultists” 
in general, but his outline of  a suppressed “Western” tradition was in fact 
quite similar to theirs, and it became enormously influential after World War 
II. But Jung’s ambitions went further than the West alone. The worldviews 
represented by the Geist der Tiefe could not be just cultural artefacts unique to 
Europeans or Americans, but must ultimately have their basis in the human 
mind as such. The decisive switch in Jung’s thinking seems to have come 
in 1928, when the Sinologist Richard Wilhelm sent him his translation of  a 
Chinese text of  Taoist alchemy, the Tai I Gin Hua Dsung Dschï or “Secret of  
the Golden Flower.”67 After reading it, Jung decided to stop working on his 
Red Book, presumably because he realized that this Chinese text was based 
upon the very same premises as his own visions.68 Since “The Secret of  the 
Golden Flower” and his own Red Book were completely independent products 
of  different cultures, and the previously unknown Chinese manuscript could 
not possibly have influenced his own work, Jung saw this as decisive proof  
that (in his own words) “beyond all differences of  culture and consciousness, 
the psyche has a common substrate” that manifests itself  in the form of  
“latent dispositions towards certain identical reactions.”69 In terms that sound 
remarkably like modern cognitive science, he insisted that this “collective 
67 Das Geheimnis der goldenen Blüte: Ein chinesisches Lebensbuch, Übersetzt und erläutert von 
Richard Wilhelm, mit einem europäischen Kommentar von C.G. Jung (München: Dornverlag 
Grete Ullmann, 1929).
68 Jung, Red Book, 360 (epilogue written in 1959).
69 Carl Gustav Jung, “Einführung,” in Das Geheimnis der goldenen Blüte, 16.
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unconscious” common to all human beings is “simply the expression in the 
psyche of  identical neurological structures” that produce “common instincts 
of  representation (Imagination) and action.”70   
What we see here is yet a further development of  the basic idea of  “two 
ways of  thinking”: next to the rational perspective of  daytime rationality 
(now conceptualized as the world of  “consciousness”), there is the deeper 
non-rational perspective of  the soul (now conceptualized as the world of  
“the unconscious”). The crucial point for our present concerns is that the 
historical and empirical manifestations of  what Jung henceforth referred to 
as the collective unconscious happen to cover precisely the entire traditional 
reservoir of  “rejected knowledge.” We are still dealing with everything 
that Enlightenment science and rationality found difficult or impossible to 
understand, to accept, and to accommodate. 
Antoine Faivre and Rejected Knowledge
In 1933 (just five years after Wilhelm’s text convinced him of  the universal 
or global relevance of  his personal visionary experiences and his studies 
of  Western traditions of  “rejected knowledge”), Jung became involved in 
the famous series of  annual conferences known as the Eranos meetings in 
Switzerland. Due to his personal charisma and the force of  his ideas, he 
became the dominant figure in that context until far after World War II, when 
other famous celebrities joined the scene, notably Mircea Eliade, Gershom 
Scholem, and Henry Corbin.71 In this context, Eliade most clearly represented 
the continuing concern of  Eranos with global comparative perspectives in 
the study of  religion, while Scholem focused more specifically on Jewish 
“mystical” traditions and Corbin on their Islamic “esoteric” counterparts. 
Thanks to Corbin, more than anyone else, the term “esotericism” began to 
play a significant role at Eranos and in related scholarly circles, notably the 
French Université de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem.72 This terminology was adopted and 
promoted inter alia by another Eranos scholar, Corbin’s younger colleague and 
friend Antoine Faivre.
Faivre, of  course, would become the pioneering scholar who succeeded in 
70 Ibid., 16–17.
71 Hakl, Eranos; Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, 277–314.
72 Hakl, Eranos, 275–76 (English ed.)/521–24 (German 2nd ed.); Hanegraaff, Esotericism and 
the Academy, 341–43ff.
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putting “Western esotericism” on the map of  academic research.73 Thanks to 
his influence, the adjective “Western” became firmly established – although, 
admittedly, Faivre’s central concern was not with the West in all its variety 
but rather with the specifically Christian counterpart to Scholem’s Jewish and 
Corbin’s Islamic traditions. Faivre clearly understood “the West” in cultural 
rather than strictly geographical terms, as a domain dominated by Christian 
culture, although occasionally “‘visited’ by some Jewish, Islamic, or even 
far-Eastern religious traditions.74 In this context, he famously presented 
“Western esotericism” as a “form of  thought” (forme de pensée) characterized 
by four intrinsic characteristics: correspondences, living nature, imagination/
mediations, and transmutation.
Faivre derived his notion of  a forme de pensée from his colleague Emile Poulat, 
and it is important to be precise about what the term meant to them. Both 
scholars insisted that it referred not to a theoretical concept residing in some 
kind of  abstract mental space: a “form of  thought” could exist only as the 
product of  specific historical and cultural conditions.75 In other words: there is 
no such thing as “esotericism” unless it is incarnated76 in time and space – in 
this case as Western esotericism or, even more specifically (for both Faivre 
and Poulat) as modern Western esotericism beginning in the Renaissance.77 It 
follows that if  one were to conceive of  an “Eastern esotericism” (however 
defined), this would necessarily be something else. By making comparisons between 
the two, one might discover both differences and similarities, but one should 
not expect to find different manifestations of  sameness. This simple point is 
often overlooked, but is crucial: that two things are similar does not mean that 
they are identical. On the contrary, it means that they are different!78
73 Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, 334–55.
74 Antoine Faivre, L’ésotérisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), 8 (cf. slightly 
different variations of  the passage in later editions and translations; cf. Pasi, “Oriental 
Kabbalah,” 152 with note 4). 
75 Antoine Faivre, “Émile Poulat et notre domaine,” in Un objet de science, le catholicisme: 
Réflexions autour de l’oeuvre d’Émile Poulat (en Sorbonne, 22–23 octobre 1999), ed. Valentine Zuber 
(Paris: Bayard, 2001), 213.
76 On the relevance of  the term “incarnation” in this context, see Hanegraaff, Esotericism and 
the Academy, 350 note 350.
77 “L’ésotérisme n’existe que dans un cadre géo-historique. … Elle se dégage au temps de la 
Renaissance” (Faivre, “Emile Poulat et notre domaine,” 213)
78 Similarity implies difference: two different things may be similar to a certain extent, but they 
can never be the same (for then they are no longer different, and there is no longer anything 
to compare). This is where we find the exact dividing line between scholarly comparison and 
religious or esoteric belief: scholarly comparativists may note multiple similarities between 
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To find out what is really going on in Faivre’s famous definition, I believe 
we should ask ourselves a simple question: what, according to his four 
characteristics, would not be considered esoteric? The answer I believe to be 
crystal clear once one sees it: Faivre’s “esoteric” form of  thought is in fact 
the logical counterpart, the rhetorical “Other,” of  what we might refer to as 
the “Enlightenment” form of  thought!79 Correspondences are non-causal 
connections, in sharp contrast with the instrumental causality (cause-and-
effect) basic to Newtonian science. Living nature means that the world is not 
a dead mechanism or clockwork, as strict materialism would have it. That the 
imagination is an organ of  perception and knowledge is the direct antithesis 
of  Enlightenment (and positivist) empiricism, which typically dismissed the 
imagination as mere deceptive fantasy, a faculty of  illusion. Faivre’s notion of  
mediation means that there are multiple subtle levels of  reality intermediary 
between pure spirit and pure matter – again in contrast to the one-level 
(monistic) world of  materialism and positivism. Transmutation, finally, 
means that human beings may go through an interior process of  spiritual 
rebirth and purification modeled after alchemy, in contrast with the putative 
“rational subject” of  Enlightenment philosophy (which must, of  course, 
reject the language of  interiority or practices of  “spiritual alchemy” as Pietist 
obscurantism and pseudoscientific nonsense). 
The conclusion will perhaps be surprising to some readers, but all of  this 
means that Faivre’s “Western esotericism” is perfectly equivalent to what I have 
referred to as the Enlightenment’s reservoir of  “rejected knowledge.”80 This 
East and West, but only believers in some religious or esoteric truth will go a step further and 
claim that these are all the reflection of  one and the same true, unchanging, universal, hidden, 
spiritual reality. 
79 Cf. Hanegraaff, Western Esotericism, 5.
80 To avoid any misunderstandings, this does not mean that I would return to the classic 
Faivrean approach. If  Faivre’s definition can be deconstructed as an attempt (perhaps 
unconscious or unintentional) to capture the structural counterpart of  the “Enlightenment 
form of  thought,” this strengthens my thesis that what we mean by “esotericism” is in fact 
nothing but the reservoir of  rejected knowledge: a mental category created by Enlightenment 
ideologies as the polemical “Other” that they needed to define and demarcate their own 
identity. The problem with Faivre’s definition lies in its debt to the phenomenological 
perspectives (broadly understood) that are associated with the Eranos tradition, which have 
an inherent tendency towards the reification of  scholarly constructs and therefore make it 
hard to avoid essentialist interpretations. In short, if  esotericism is presented as a specific 
form of  thought defined by four intrinsic (i.e. necessary) characteristics, it will inevitably 
be perceived as a “thing” that somehow “exists” in the world out there. By contrast to such 
a “realist” understanding, grounded in the reification of  imaginal concepts, my approach 
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becomes even clearer if  we just slightly reformulate the four criteria: they are 
really all about analogy and occult correspondences, animism, worlds of  the 
imagination, higher spiritual dimensions, and interior rebirth. By means of  his 
four “intrinsic characteristics,” Faivre in fact defined what the radical counter-
part of  Enlightenment ideology would look like if  one were to systematize it. 






From a point of  view that is understood as “esoteric” in the Faivrean sense, 
it is the Enlightenment form of  thought that becomes “rejected knowledge.” 
In short, once again, we are dealing with “two ways of  thinking” based on 
mutually exclusive premises.
Not Theory but Method
Now what are the implications for our dilemma of  “Western” versus “global” 
esotericism? I have been arguing that, ever since the eighteenth century, the 
contentious reservoir of  “rejected knowledge” had been understood as not 
just Western but global: in Enlightenment terms, not just Europe but indeed 
the whole world was full of  “magic” and “superstition,” full of  “irrational-
ity” and “occult nonsense” (while according to the Romantic and Occultist 
counter-perspective, of  course, this meant that the whole world was full of  
wonderful, delightful, thrilling mysteries!) If  this is the case, then should we 
not follow Granholm’s suggestion and forego the term “Western”? 
As far as I can tell, there is precisely one good reason to resist that 
suggestion, and this reason is not theoretical but methodological in nature. From a 
theoretical perspective, it is perfectly possible indeed – perhaps even necessary 
– to conceive of  a global field of  human ideas and practices that display a 
sufficient degree of  similarity to study it as one complex whole. As recently 
suggested by Egil Asprem, it should be possible to study such a field by means 
of  standard methods of  cross-cultural comparison, with careful attention to the 
remains “nominalist” (Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, 368ff).
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relation between culturally determined differences and structural similarities.81 
Scholars who point out that those theoretical features deemed most typical 
of  “Western esotericism” are not just Western but can also be found in many 
places elsewhere in the world have a strong point: for instance, we might think 
here of  Faivre’s four characteristics, but also of  von Stuckrad’s emphasis on 
hidden, secret, or higher knowledge, or, for that matter, my own emphasis 
on gnosis, ecstatic or altered states of  consciousness, cosmotheism, and so 
on. All these features can clearly be found all over the world, thereby inviting 
cross-cultural comparison of  their various manifestations. In short, from a 
theoretical perspective based on the search for structural components that lend 
themselves to comparison, the attempt to keep “esotericism” confined strictly 
to the West seems a “mission impossible.” 
And yet, I believe it makes sense to continue speaking of  “Western 
esotericism.” Not, to be sure, for theoretical reasons, but strictly for reasons of  
method – and more specifically, of  historical method. As formulated by Bruce 
Lincoln in his Theses on Method, to practice history of  religions “in a fashion 
consistent with the discipline’s claim of  title” means
to insist on discussing the temporal, contextual, situated, interested, human, and 
material dimensions of  those discourses, practices, communities, and institutions 
that characteristically represent themselves as eternal, transcendent, spiritual, and 
divine.82 
If  we apply historical method consistently, then our object of  study is never 
“esotericism” in any strict theoretical sense, for such an object exists only as a 
theoretical construct in our own heads and not as a historical or empirical reality 
“out there.” What we should really forego is the illusion that we are studying 
some kind of  “phenomenon out there,” called “esotericism”!83 Rather, our task 
81 Asprem, “Beyond the West.” 
82 Bruce Lincoln, “Theses on Method,” in Gods and Demons, Priests and Scholars: Critical Explora-
tions in the History of  Religions (Chicago and London: The University of  Chicago Press, 2012), 1.
83 At this point I have to take issue with some formulations by Egil Asprem, who writes 
that the various “historicist programmes in the study of  esotericism … revolve around the 
same hard core: that esotericism is a specific historical phenomenon, grounded in specific historical events 
and processes” (“Beyond the West,” 12; emphasis in original), and states that my historicist 
perspective looks at esotericism as “an object to be discursively analyzed” (ibid., 19). My 
perspective is indeed radically historicist (cf. Hanegraaff, “Power of  Ideas,” 266–67, with note 
29; cf. Michael Stausberg, “What is It All About? Some Reflections on Wouter Hanegraaff ’s 
Esotericism and the Academy,” Religion 43, no. 2 (2013): 227; Olav Hammer, “Deconstructing 
‘Western Esotericism’: On Wouter Hanegraaff ’s Esotericism and the Academy,” Religion 43, no. 
Hanegraaff  / Correspondences 3 (2015) 55–9182
consists of  studying a wide range of  quite specific and different, historically 
situated personalities, currents, ideas, practices, discourses, communities, or 
institutions, the representatives of  which may or may not happen to think of  
themselves as “esotericists,”84 or of  their perspectives as “esoteric” (or any 
equivalent term, in any relevant language). If  we choose to categorize all these 
different materials under the heading of  “esotericism,” we do so simply because 
it is helpful to our research agendas to highlight certain things that they have in 
common and that make them stand out for us as somewhat “similar.”85 If  we 
categorize them, more specifically, as Western esotericism, this is not in order 
to suggest that they are Western manifestations of  “esotericism” in general 
(that would be the theoretical perspective again!), but simply because the only 
way in which they appear to us at all is as specific products of  Western culture. 
This means that the adjective “Western” is not understood as a qualifier within 
a larger field (“esotericism”), but is used to highlight the specificity of  this 
particular domain of  research.
Seen from such a perspective, the theoretical baggage of  “Western 
esotericism” is in fact quite light. What makes it heavy is the added weight 
of  specific assumptions about the nature of  “the West,” with all their far-
reaching ideological and political implications. I do not mean to imply that 
2 (2013): 242), but explicitly rejects any understanding of  esotericism as “a specific historical 
phenomenon” or “object” (see Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, 368–79; cf. “Power 
of  Ideas,” 268–69). In a private communication (24 June 2015), Asprem agreed that these 
formulations are somewhat ambiguous and should be adapted to avoid misunderstandings.
84 It is a common misunderstanding that if  person X is being discussed within the category 
of  “esotericism,” that automatically makes him/her “an esotericist.” In my opinion, it makes 
a lot of  sense to discuss e.g. Marsilio Ficino as an important figure in the study of  esotericism, 
but it makes little sense to describe him as an “esotericist”: that label did not become available 
before the 19th century and should not be applied retrospectively. To clarify this point, it might 
be useful to draw a comparison with the study of  homosexuality, again using Ficino as an 
example. It is clear from his work that he was erotically attracted to males, and this makes him 
relevant to the history of  homoeroticism and homosexuality, but labels of  self-identification 
such as “homosexual” or “gay” were not yet available to him, and it would be anachronistic 
to describe him as such (see Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “Under the Mantle of  Love: The Mystical 
Eroticisms of  Marsilio Ficino and Giordano Bruno,” in Hidden Intercourse: Eros and Sexuality 
in the History of  Western Esotericism, eds. Wouter J. Hanegraaff  and Jeffrey J. Kripal (Leiden/
Boston: Brill, 2008 + New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 184–94, with note 42).
85 Similarities do not need to be “features” or “characteristics” of  “phenomena” or “objects.” 
From my particular perspective, which is informed by an interest in polemical discourse and 
identity politics, what they have in common (and therefore makes them similar at least in that 
particular respect) is simply their acquired status as “rejected knowledge” since the period of  
the Enlightenment.  
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by speaking of  “Western esotericism” in a strictly methodological sense, we 
can escape from those burdens – on the contrary, I am sure that we cannot. 
What I do mean to suggest is that these theoretical assumptions themselves 
can and should be historicized. Where did they come from, how, and why? As 
I hope to make clear in the final section of  this article, the study of  “Western 
esotericism” is uniquely qualified to push these questions forward into new 
directions that have not been explored before.
Comparing the West to the Rest
From my argument so far, it should be clear that I emphatically disagree with 
the notion that a historical or historicist perspective discourages or excludes 
comparative approaches.86 On the contrary, historicism is perfectly compatible 
with comparative methods and larger theoretical questions: it excludes only 
those specific theoretical and comparative perspectives that are grounded in 
the denial of  historicity. 
One important way of  making the historical study of  Western esotericism 
fruitful to larger agendas of  cross-cultural comparison on a global scale, I 
would suggest, is by focusing on the recurring idea of  “two ways of  thinking” 
to which I have been calling attention above. As we have seen, Tylor thought 
in terms of  “magic” versus “science”; Lévy-Bruhl of  “participation” versus 
“instrumental causality”; German Romantic mesmerists of  the “nightside 
of  nature” versus “daytime rationality”; Carl Gustav Jung of  the “collective 
unconscious” versus “rational consciousness”; and this short list could easily be 
expanded further (for instance, think of  Max Weber’s notion of  “enchantment” 
versus “disenchantment”87). Obviously these theories are far from identical. 
For all their differences, however, they are structurally similar in at least one 
respect: they all try to respond to a specific problem88 that was caused directly 
by the remarkable success of  modern science and Enlightenment rationality, 
and its subsequent spread all over the globe. This problem, as perceived by 
86 As noted by Asprem, “historicists have commonly viewed the comparative method with 
suspicion.” He correctly interprets this as an unfortunate legacy of  the battle against “religionist,” 
perennialist, or Traditionalist assumptions in the study of  religion, and concludes that “[w]hile 
the rejection of  these untenable projects was understandable, a regrettable long-term side effect 
has been a suspicion of  all comparativist projects” (“Beyond the West,” 5–6, and cf. 20).
87 See now Asprem, Problem of  Disenchantment.
88 For the concept of  Problemgeschichte that is implicit in my analysis here, see Asprem, Problem 
of  Disenchantment, 5 and passim; Hanegraaff, “Power of  Ideas,” 256. 
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Western thinkers ever since the 17th/18th centuries, consisted in the simple 
fact that human beings so often did not act rationally but kept holding on to 
worldviews, ideas and practices that seemed to conflict with the new ideas 
of  science. Even more worrying was the fact that even if  the arguments of  
science and rationality were clearly explained to them, this often did not seem 
to make much of  a difference. On the contrary, one could even observe the 
phenomenon of  deliberately anti-rational and anti-scientific reactions, not just 
among the uneducated but among highly trained intellectuals as well. How 
could it be that such “superstitious nonsense” was and remained so attractive 
to so many people? What did it offer them that science and rationality could 
not? Whence came its power and its appeal? Was there perhaps some kind of  
mystery about it, something that rationalists just failed to see? 
Such questions are at the bottom of  all those theories about “two ways of  
thinking” referred to above. What made them possible and, indeed, inevitable 
was the momentous confrontation between the new ideologies of  rational/
scientific modernity and everything else. This point cannot be emphasized 
strongly enough: the confrontation pinned a very recent newcomer, modern 
Western intellectual culture, against all the cultures of  the rest of  the world 
and against the whole history of  humanity roughly prior to the seventeenth 
century. From a broader perspective of  world history, the phenomenon of  
Enlightenment science and rationality is clearly an anomaly: it appeared just very 
recently, in a relatively small part of  the world, although it has been spreading 
like a virus ever since. Because modern academics are themselves products of  
this anomalous phenomenon, they are tempted to see it as the norm or the 
rule against which everything else should be measured. 89 But from a historical 
perspective, I would argue, it is exactly the other way around. Enlightenment 
rationality and modern science are the exception; its opponents represent the 
default. 
This fundamental fact keeps being obscured by the influence of  extremely 
influential “presentist” narratives in the history of  philosophy and science, all of  
them rooted in the idea of  a “natural,” organic and teleological development of  
reason from the supposed “birth of  philosophy in ancient Greece” to its final 
triumph in modern science. In fact, I would argue, such historiographies are 
ideological tools for promoting the project of  modernity: grounded in eclectic 
method,90 they are designed to “demonstrate” the self-evident superiority and 
89 T.G. Ashplant and Andrian Wilson, “Present-Centred History and the Problem of  
Historical Knowledge,” The Historical Journal 31, no. 2 (1988), 253–74.
90 For the crucial phenomenon of  “eclectic historiography” on Enlightenment foundations, 
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historical necessity of  the particular worldviews, perspectives, and personal 
preferences of  those who invented them. With Hegel as a particularly obvious 
example, whenever some thinker has designed (and therefore controls) such a 
historical narrative, one invariably finds that he himself  is situated comfortably 
at the very summit of  the hierarchy and represents the very culmination of  
world history.91
If  we are consistent in rejecting such narratives of  evolutionary progress 
as misleading ideologies, we end up with a radical historicism (or rather, 
historism92) that thoroughly relativizes the very idea that “reason” can be 
the normative yardstick for comparing beliefs, worldviews, practices, or 
mentalities. By necessity, its place will then be taken by an empirical approach 
that seeks to compare the global reservoir of  beliefs, worldviews, practices, or 
mentalities as objectively as possible on the basis strictly of  their observable 
features. If  we apply such a global empirical perspective, we should not be 
surprised to find (for instance) that Antoine Faivre’s four characteristics of  
“Western esotericism” have such close equivalents elsewhere in the world. 
On the contrary: how could it possibly be otherwise? What Faivre’s definition 
really tried to capture – whether intentionally or not, and successfully or not 
– was the structure of  a form of  thought, a mentality, a way of  looking at the 
world, or of  participating in the world, that has been perfectly natural to the 
human mind all over the globe and for as long back as we can tell. I suggest 
that there is much we need to learn about it (for instance, it would seem to 
be a natural topic for the Cognitive Study of  Religion), but we hardly need 
to account for its existence. It is the default. The really surprising and puzzling 
phenomenon (that we do need to understand and account for, even explain) 
is that, after so many centuries, the human species has quite recently begun 
to reject, deny, or suppress some of  its most natural forms of  cognition and 
experience in favour of  a strict, almost ascetic discipline or regime of  reason: 
one that does not come so naturally to us at all, but only artificially and at the 
cost of  great mental effort.
leading to deliberately selective and biased narratives, see Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the 
Academy, 129–30, 136, 140, 146, 148–52. 
91 Cf. Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “‘Everybody is Right’: Frank Visser’s Analysis of  Ken Wilber,” 
www.integralworld.net.
92 For this distinction, see Hanegraaff, “Power of  Ideas,” 266 with note 29.
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Concluding Remarks
Would it make sense to refer to the many expressions of  such “non-rational” 
ways of  thinking, in all parts of  the world, by the term “esotericism”? 
Frankly I do not think so. “Western esotericism” has emerged as a convenient 
label for the various beliefs, practices, and traditions of  knowledge that the 
Enlightenment has rejected in its own backyard, so to speak. Why would 
people in Africa, Japan, India, Latin America, or Antarctica, feel any need 
to import this specifically Western category of  “esotericism” to speak about 
their own traditional beliefs and practices – as if  Western Europe were still the 
prototype to which everything else must be compared? In my opinion, it would 
be yet another form of  terminological imperialism if  we now tried to project 
this terminology on to the rest of  the world. 
To prevent any misunderstandings: the fact that originally European 
esoteric or occultist ideas and practices have now spread all over the globe93 
is a different matter entirely. That it results in surprising new mutations that 
are eventually not just Western anymore is yet another matter. Many of  those 
mutations have traveled back to the West, only to be (mis)understood there as 
the “authentic” voices of  non-Western spiritualities, and this is an important 
and fascinating phenomenon as well. And it does not stop there either, for 
the dominance of  Western popular media ensures that further mutations of  
those hybrid mixtures are continually fed back to the rest of  the globe in turn. 
All of  this is important to consider in depth. The globalization of  Western (!) 
esotericism is indeed a major direction for future research, and not least for 
reasons of  linguistic competence it will require intensive collaboration between 
Western and non-Western scholars. However, all of  this falls within the purview of  
history, not theory. On a more theoretical and comparative level, next to the study 
of  Western esotericism (including the globalization of  its beliefs and practices) 
we obviously need to compare beliefs, practices, forms of  experience, and so 
on, wherever we find them.  But such research is simply the core business of  
the comparative study of  religion: it already exists, and I do not see that the 
category of  “esotericism” contributes anything new to it.
In sum, my recommendations are as follows. We should (1) hold on to 
the category of  “Western esotericism,” but (2) give very serious attention 
to the “globalization of  Western esotericism,” and (3) promote comparative 
studies that focus on both similarity and difference. The first two concerns are 
central to the study of  Western Esotericism, whereas the third one pertains 
93 Bogdan and Djurdjevic, Occultism in a Global Perspective.
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to the study of  religion more generally. With respect to global comparative 
perspectives, I suggest it is important to try and improve our understanding of  
those specific “ways of  thinking” that Enlightenment science and rationality 
find so hard to understand, because they resist discursive language and logical 
analysis. This is perhaps the most difficult part of  our task, but it might be the 
most fascinating too. 
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Rudolf  Steiner. Rudolf  Steiner : Schriften über Mystik, Mysterienwesen und 
Religionsgeschichte. Edited, introduced and commentated by Christian Clement. 
Vol. 5 of  Rudolf  Steiner: Schriften – Kritische Ausgabe, edited by Christian Clement. 
Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog, 2013. lxxx + 377 pp. ISBN 978-3-7728-2635-1.
Rudolf  Steiner. Rudolf  Steiner: Schriften zur Erkenntnisschulung. Edited, introduced 
and commentated by Christian Clement. Vol. 7 of  Rudolf  Steiner: Schriften – 
Kritische Ausgabe, edited by Christian Clement. Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog, 
2015. cxxx + 498 pp. ISBN 978-3-7274-5807-1.
When Rudolf  Steiner died in 1925, he was a prominent public figure in 
Germany. Whether celebrated or castigated – or, more often, puzzled over 
– Steiner was somebody who called for comment. Obituaries and memorials 
appeared across the spectrum of  the German press, from the Börsenzeitung, 
the Wall Street Journal of  the Weimar Republic, to the Socialist newspaper 
Vorwärts, from the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung to the Frankfurter Zeitung to the 
Münchener Neueste Nachrichten. Even the New York Times saw fit to mark the 
passing of  “Dr. Rudolf  Steiner, Theosophist.”1 
1 “Dr. Rudolf  Steiner, Theosophist, Dies – Leader of  Anthroposophical Movement 
Succumbs in Berne at 65 Years,” New York Times (March 31, 1925). Copies of  obituaries from 
the German press can be found in the files of  the German Federal Archives: Bundesarchiv 
Berlin NS5/VI/40345. I would like to thank Christian Clement, Helmut Zander, Egil Asprem, 
© 2015 Peter Staudenmaier.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of  the 
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
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This degree of  public attention at the time of  Steiner’s death stands in 
conspicuous contrast to his somewhat obscure origins. Born in 1861 on 
the periphery of  the Habsburg Empire, even his exact date of  birth is a 
point of  some contention. By the time he became well-known to a larger 
audience, Steiner was viewed above all as an esoteric teacher and the founder 
of  the Anthroposophist movement, an attempt to renew and expand the 
Theosophical tradition in Germany and abroad. The London Daily Express 
captured the typical image of  the time, referring to him as “Dr. Rudolf  Steiner, 
the mystic occultist.”2
But Steiner’s early career followed a different path. After studying at the 
Technical College in Vienna, he established himself  in the 1880s and 1890s 
not as an occult thinker but as a journalist and editor with literary, scientific, 
and philosophical interests. The “Dr.” in his name referred to a doctorate in 
philosophy received in 1891. Steiner worked for years at the Goethe archive in 
Weimar, editing Goethe’s texts on the natural sciences. In 1897 he moved to 
Berlin to edit the Magazin für Litteratur. He made several unsuccessful attempts 
to find an academic position. Shortly after the turn of  the century, Steiner found 
his way to well-heeled Theosophical circles in Berlin, joining the Theosophical 
Society at the beginning of  1902. Within a few months he was named General 
Secretary of  the German branch of  the Theosophical Society, an office he held 
until breaking away ten years later to found the Anthroposophical Society.3 
Steiner’s swift transition from independent free-thinker to esoteric leader 
has never been easy to explain, one of  many details about his intellectual 
development that have proved challenging for scholars studying Theosophy 
and Anthroposophy. That is one reason why the new critical edition of  selected 
Steiner texts, arranged and edited by Christian Clement, carries so much 
promise. By offering careful textual comparisons between the various editions 
Alicia Hamberg, Michael Eggert, and Ansgar Martins for critical discussion of  the issues 
examined here.
2 London Daily Express, April 11, 1921. The brief  article, filed from Berlin by an unnamed 
“Daily Express correspondent,” claims that “Steiner’s followers for the most part belong to 
the richest and most important families” in Germany. Other contemporary sources observed 
that Anthroposophy “seems to have attracted its following largely from the cultured middle-
classes, young intelligentsia, physicians, students, artists, and officials, those classes most 
directly affected by the cultural crisis of  post-war Europe.” Paul Means, Things that are Caesar’s: 
The Genesis of  the German Church Conflict (New York: Round Table Press, 1935), 112. 
3 Thorough biographical information is available in Heiner Ullrich, Rudolf  Steiner: Leben und 
Lehre (Munich: Beck, 2011), Miriam Gebhardt, Rudolf  Steiner: Ein moderner Prophet (Munich: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2011), and Helmut Zander, Rudolf  Steiner: Die Biografie (Munich: 
Piper, 2011).
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of  Steiner’s major published works, Clement’s project marks a significant step 
forward in scholarly engagement with Anthroposophy and its ideological 
origins. It also highlights the ongoing difficulties inherent in any attempt to 
bridge the gap between esoteric and academic standpoints. 
Clement is a former Waldorf  school teacher who left his native Germany 
for an academic career in the United States. After earning his PhD in German 
Literature at the University of  Utah, he is currently associate professor of  
German Studies at Brigham Young University. The new Steiner edition 
arose out of  Clement’s work creating and maintaining the Rudolf  Steiner 
Online Archive, a German-language website designed to make Steiner’s texts 
accessible to a broader readership. In interviews with Anthroposophist media, 
Clement – who is not an Anthroposophist himself  – has forthrightly discussed 
his sympathetic approach to Steiner. This places him in a productive but 
conflicted position on the boundary between esoteric and scholarly discourses, 
an ambivalence reflected in the editorial project itself. 
The series of  Steiner texts in the projected eight volumes of  the Rudolf  Steiner 
Kritische Ausgabe include works from Steiner’s pre-1900 philosophical period 
as well as central titles from his mature Theosophical and Anthroposophical 
teachings. The two volumes under review here are the first to appear; eventually 
they will form volumes 5 and 7 of  the overall set. Each features a distinct pair 
of  works: volume 5 consists of  Steiner’s 1901 book Mysticism at the Dawn of  the 
Modern Age and its 1902 successor Christianity as Mystical Fact, while volume 7 
centers on Steiner’s seminal esoteric text Knowledge of  the Higher Worlds, originally 
published in 1904, as well as its lesser-known sequel The Stages of  Higher Knowledge 
from 1905. The edition as a whole is being published in cooperation between 
the Rudolf  Steiner Verlag, the official Anthroposophist custodian of  Steiner’s 
collected works, and the distinguished Frommann-Holzboog publishing house, 
whose origins date to the early eighteenth century. This fact alone is a sign of  
the new edition’s pioneering character; it indicates both a novel openness in 
parts of  the Anthroposophist leadership, and a willingness within established 
German philosophical circles to engage with Steiner’s works. Clement’s ability 
to bring these two worlds together is no small achievement. 
Reactions from within the Anthroposophical milieu have been decidedly 
mixed. Some Anthroposophists have denounced Clement as the agent of  
an anti-Steiner conspiracy, while others have praised the project for bringing 
Steiner’s writings to a new generation of  readers in a textually reliable format. 
Scholarly responses, though sparse so far, have been equally equivocal, 
commending Clement’s impressive editorial labors while questioning some of  
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his interpretive assumptions.4 In his role as initiator and coordinator of  the 
project, Clement has been admirably straightforward in dialogues with critics 
and supporters alike, depicting his efforts as an attempt to respect Steiner’s 
self-conception while making his work more palatable to modern philosophical 
readers. At times, this involves a desire to vindicate Steiner philosophically. 
How well does this approach work? From a historical as well as a philosophical 
perspective, the results are uneven. The edition itself  is handsomely produced 
and eminently practical. For each selected text, Clement has gone to the trouble 
of  assembling every version published during Steiner’s lifetime, clearly marking 
all textual variations in the manner of  a standard critical edition. This makes 
the volumes extremely useful for any philosophically informed and historically 
attentive engagement with Steiner’s ideas and their development over time. 
Moreover, Clement has attempted to track down the original source for every 
passage Steiner quotes from other authors – a formidable task in light of  Steiner’s 
frequent failure to identify his sources – as well as passages where Steiner appears 
to paraphrase earlier publications. This procedure reveals just how much Steiner 
borrowed from previous authors, often without attribution. It also underscores 
a contentious question raised in prior research by other scholars: did Steiner 
plagiarize from existing texts? Was he trying to pass off  others’ work as his own, 
or was he careless and hurried, or was he stitching together disparate elements 
in ways that weren’t meant to be deliberately deceptive? 
Though it is true that Steiner’s practice was not compatible with the scholarly 
norms of  the time, Clement points out that this was not really his aim in the 
texts in question.5 The post-1900 Steiner, in transition to full-fledged occultist, 
had little incentive to follow academic conventions. His books on mysticism 
from 1901 and 1902 grew out of  invited presentations to Theosophical groups. 
He did not present those works as scholarly treatises, but saw his role basically 
as a synthesizer, drawing together a range of  sources in order to provide an 
accessible narrative to his new-found Theosophical audience. Clement shows 
that the sources Steiner borrowed from were often secondary works offering 
broad overviews of  large philosophical and historical fields.6 Steiner’s method 
does not expose him as an inveterate plagiarist; it reveals him as an eager speaker 
and writer looking to put his stamp on the fin de siècle interest in mysticism.
4 Clement has collected more than two dozen reviews of  the first two volumes at the website 
he has created to accompany the project: www.steinerkritischeausgabe.com. The next volume 
is scheduled to appear in late 2015.
5 Schriften über Mystik, xxx–xxxii.
6 See Schriften über Mystik, xxxi, as well as Clement’s thorough Stellenkommentare, 234–339. 
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In addition to providing a rich textual basis and thoroughly researched 
annotations, the new edition includes extensive introductory and contextual 
material framing Steiner’s works. These sections constitute a substantial 
portion of  the edition; Clement’s introduction to volume 7, for example, is 
nearly as long as the entire text of  Knowledge of  the Higher Worlds itself. It is 
here that Clement’s own perspective plays a crucial role. His combination of  
sympathy and critical acumen works relatively well with Steiner’s texts from the 
transitional period just after 1900, when the future esoteric leader was moving 
toward Theosophy; the two books collected in volume 5 document this shift. 
But the same volume also includes a number of  notable missteps. Perhaps 
the most striking is Clement’s reliance on a set of  ostensible transcripts of  
Steiner’s original 1901–02 lectures to Theosophists that formed the basis 
for Christianity as Mystical Fact.7 The documents Clement cites are not in fact 
transcripts of  Steiner’s original lectures, but ex post facto constructs assembled 
out of  fragmentary notes taken by a Theosophist who was present at the 
lectures. Though Clement does not mention it, the documents in question 
were evidently composed several decades after Steiner’s death.
The issue at stake here is not merely one of  textual integrity – Clement 
invokes the dubious source in his introduction and commentary, not in the 
apparatus accompanying Steiner’s published text – but one of  conceptual 
and historical accuracy. In the published version of  Christianity as Mystical Fact, 
Steiner makes no mention of  central Theosophical concepts such as karma 
and reincarnation. This is not surprising, since Steiner at this stage was still in 
the process of  familiarizing himself  with Theosophy’s teachings. According to 
Clement, however, the supposed ‘transcripts’ refer continually to reincarnation 
and thus show that Steiner was thoroughly immersed in Theosophical concepts 
at the time. This claim is unfounded. What the ‘transcripts’ reveal are the 
esoteric preoccupations of  the Theosophist who compiled the notes; they are 
not a reliable indication of  Steiner’s own views in late 1901 and early 1902, 
which are instead spelled out in book form in Christianity as Mystical Fact. 
Why does this matter? Clement’s ill-considered references to the purported 
‘transcripts’ form part of  a larger argument: Like many Anthroposophists, 
Clement posits a fundamental continuity between Steiner’s pre-1900 
philosophical works and his post-1900 esoteric teachings. Clement’s underlying 
argument represents a more sophisticated version of  a longstanding trope in 
Anthroposophical discourse, one that presents Steiner as the inheritor and 
7 Schriften über Mystik, xxx, xxxiv, xli–xlii, xliv, xlix–li, lviii–lix, lxiv–lxviii, 288, 296–98, 299–
302, 309, 316–18, 329, 332–34, etc.
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fulfillment of  the legacy of  German Idealism. This notion, though often 
overblown, is not inherently implausible; Steiner’s early philosophical works 
were indeed steeped in the traditions of  German Idealism, and a number of  
classical Idealist thinkers gave serious attention to esoteric themes. Hartmut 
Traub’s monumental 2011 study Philosophie und Anthroposophie examines these 
connections in great detail and offers illuminating insight into the development 
of  Steiner’s early thought. Other scholars, such as historian Helmut Zander, 
have emphasized the discontinuities in Steiner’s work before and after the 
turn of  the century.8 The continuity thesis faces several significant obstacles. 
Aside from the strikingly divergent character of  Steiner’s works from different 
points in his life, his published comments on Theosophy during the 1890s – 
the decade immediately before his embrace of  Theosophical precepts – were 
unremittingly negative.9 
Nonetheless, the ongoing scholarly debates over Steiner’s intellectual 
development address a challenging question that does not accommodate 
easy answers but calls for sustained and careful interdisciplinary analysis. 
Proponents of  the continuity thesis will eventually have to confront the 
pronounced discrepancies between Steiner’s early philosophical writings and 
his later esoteric teachings. Those discrepancies are essential to understanding 
the formation of  Steiner’s ideas and the changes in his worldview over time. 
Attempts to discount or downplay the differences between the earlier and 
later Steiner, in the hope of  harmonizing those differences into one putatively 
integrated whole, fail to reflect the complexity of  his thought. They do not 
do justice either to Steiner’s early philosophical project or to his later esoteric 
cosmology, and consequently misjudge the relationship between the two. 
Clement’s edition makes it possible for readers to put together a detailed 
chronological account of  these shifts and changes across Steiner’s works, even 
if  some of  Clement’s own conclusions are open to question. 
8 Hartmut Traub, Philosophie und Anthroposophie: Die philosophische Weltanschauung Rudolf  Steiners 
– Grundlegung und Kritik (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2011); Helmut Zander, Anthroposophie in 
Deutschland: Theosophische Weltanschauung und gesellschaftliche Praxis 1884–1945 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007). Ulrich Linse offers an original interpretation which departs 
from both Traub’s and Zander’s perspectives; cf. Linse, “Libertäre und theosophische 
Strömungen,” in Handbuch Fin de Siècle, eds. Sabine Haupt and Stefan Würffel (Stuttgart: 
Kröner, 2008), 218–37. For an Anthroposophist account see Robin Schmidt, Rudolf  Steiner 
und die Anfänge der Theosophie (Dornach: Rudolf  Steiner Verlag, 2010).
9 See e.g. Steiner’s scathing critique, “Theosophen,” published in his Magazin für Litteratur in 
1897 and reprinted in Steiner, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Literatur 1884–1902 (Dornach: Rudolf  
Steiner Verlag, 1971), 194–96.
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The two books that make up volume 5 show Steiner’s initial foray into 
mysticism, but they are not mystical texts themselves. They hint at an author 
working his way from Haeckel toward Blavatsky, and exhibit Steiner’s customary 
combination of  the occult and the scientific. The centerpiece of  volume 7, 
on the other hand, is Steiner’s foundational esoteric tract Knowledge of  Higher 
Worlds, a manual for students of  the occult seeking access to the Higher Worlds 
promised by esoteric doctrine. According to Steiner, the path he outlined 
offered verifiable knowledge of  these Higher Worlds, available to anyone 
willing to follow his stages of  initiation. The book’s opening lines declare: 
There slumber in every human being faculties by means of  which he can acquire 
for himself  a knowledge of  higher worlds. Mystics, Gnostics, Theosophists – all 
speak of  a world of  soul and spirit which for them is just as real as the world we 
see with our physical eyes and touch with our physical hands. At every moment the 
listener may say to himself: that, of  which they speak, I too can learn, if  I develop 
within myself  certain powers which today still slumber within me.10
While Steiner’s transitional texts from 1901 and 1902 are often well suited 
to Clement’s sympathetic approach, his reading of  Knowledge of  Higher Worlds 
is much less persuasive. The latter book represents the first full-fledged 
presentation of  Steiner’s mature esoteric epistemology and is one of  the 
canonical works of  Anthroposophy. In later editions of  the book, Steiner 
went to considerable lengths to distance his message from his Theosophical 
predecessors. Much of  Clement’s interpretation follows this line, even though 
the material collected in volume 7 abundantly demonstrates the extent to 
which Steiner drew on previous Theosophical works. In his introduction and 
commentary, Clement is particularly concerned to dissociate Steiner from 
Blavatsky. Thus, large stretches of  the volume read like an attempt to rescue 
Steiner from himself, to salvage a philosophically respectable variant of  
German Idealism from his bold explorations of  the Higher Worlds.
Part of  this strategy appears to be anchored in a basic misconception 
about the nature of  Western esotericism and the origins of  Theosophy. 
Clement strongly underscores the modern and Western character of  Steiner’s 
esoteric form of  meditative self-knowledge, something that is unremarkable 
from a historical point of  view. But Clement’s assessment in several places 
suggests a naïve understanding of  allegedly Eastern models and their Western 
10 Rudolf  Steiner, Knowledge of  the Higher Worlds and its Attainment (New York: Anthroposophic 
Press, 1961), 5.
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proponents.11 This is a point that has bedeviled other commentators keen to 
distinguish Steiner from his Theosophical precursors and contemporaries; the 
argument often depends on the notion that there was something genuinely 
‘Eastern’ about Blavatsky’s syncretic project in the first place. It overlooks the 
fact that Theosophy itself  was already thoroughly modern and Western before 
Steiner came along.
This point indicates the most remarkable omission in a volume of  more than 
600 pages: the lack of  any sustained engagement with the ample scholarship 
on Western esotericism. Aside from Zander’s historical research, which largely 
serves as a foil for Clement’s own arguments, and the excellent studies by 
Traub and Baier, Clement does not discuss any of  the extensive literature on 
these topics. There is no mention of  the highly relevant research from Wouter 
Hanegraaff  or Olav Hammer, to choose two of  the more significant examples, 
or even the specific studies of  Steiner’s esoteric epistemology by Wolfgang 
Schneider, Heiner Barz, Alfred Treml, Julia Iwersen, or Heiner Ullrich.12 
11 Clement does draw on the pioneering research by Karl Baier, and frequently cites Baier’s 
Meditation und Moderne: Zur Genese eines Kernbereichs moderner Spiritualität in der Wechselwirkung 
zwischen Westeuropa, Nordamerika und Asien (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009), but 
seems to have neglected the broader scholarship on this topic. Relevant studies include Jörg 
Wichmann, “Das theosophische Menschenbild und seine indischen Wurzeln,” Zeitschrift für 
Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 35 (1983): 12–33; Christine Maillard, “Ex oriente lux. Zur Funktion 
Indiens in der Konstruktion der abendländischen esoterischen Tradition im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert,” in Constructing Tradition: Means and Myths of  Transmission in Western Esotericism, 
ed. Andreas Kilcher (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 395–412; Kennet Granholm, “Locating the West: 
Problematizing the Western in Western Esotericism and Occultism,” in Occultism in a Global 
Perspective, eds. Henrik Bogdan and Gordan Djurdjevic (Durham: Acumen, 2013), 17–36; 
Christopher Partridge, “Orientalism and the Occult,” in The Occult World, ed.Christopher 
Partridge (New York: Routledge, 2015), 611–25.
12 Compare Wouter Hanegraaff, New Age Religion and Western Culture: Esotericism in the 
Mirror of  Secular Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1996); Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected 
Knowledge in Western Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Olav Hammer, 
Claiming Knowledge: Strategies of  Epistemology from Theosophy to the New Age (Leiden: Brill, 2001); 
Siegfried Oppolzer, “Anthropologie und Pädagogik bei Rudolf  Steiner,” Paedagogica Historica 2 
(1962): 287–350; Alfred Treml, “Träume eines Geistersehers oder Geisteswissenschaft? Die 
Erkenntnistheorie Rudolf  Steiners,” Zeitschrift für Entwicklungspädagogik 10 (1987): 17–24; Heiner 
Ullrich, “Wissenschaft als rationalisierte Mystik: Eine problemgeschichtliche Untersuchung 
der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen der Anthroposophie,” Neue Sammlung 28 (1988): 
168–94; Wolfgang Schneider, Das Menschenbild der Waldorfpädagogik (Freiburg: Herder, 1991); 
Heiner Barz, Anthroposophie im Spiegel von Wissenschaftstheorie und Lebensweltforschung (Weinheim: 
Deutscher Studien Verlag, 1994); Julia Iwersen, “Epistemological Foundations of  Esoteric 
Thought and Practice,” Journal of  Alternative Spiritualities and New Age Studies 3 (2007): 3–44; 
Tore Ahlbäck, “Rudolf  Steiner as a Religious Authority,” in Western Esotericism, ed. Tore 
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This is an unfortunate missed opportunity to relate discussion of  Steiner’s 
work to the growing body of  scholarship on esoteric and occult currents 
more generally, and it has important consequences for Clement’s reading of  
Steiner. Paradoxically, many of  Clement’s annotations to Steiner’s text seem 
fundamentally at odds with Clement’s stated conclusions.13 
Similar dynamics arise at other points in volume 7, sometimes in reaction 
against standard textual procedures. An otherwise minor example illustrates 
the problem. Discussing Steiner’s appropriation of  the fictional figure of  
the “Guardian of  the Threshold,” introduced in an 1842 novel by Edward 
Bulwer-Lytton, Clement writes that “critics” of  Anthroposophy have raised 
the “accusation” that Steiner adopted this figure from Bulwer-Lytton’s literary 
work.14 But this has nothing to do with criticism, much less with accusations; it 
is a simple statement of  Steiner’s source. Bulwer-Lytton used a variety of  names 
for the figure – “Dweller of  the Threshold,” “Haunter of  the Threshold,” 
and so forth – and in German translations the phrase “Hüter der Schwelle” 
soon established itself, sometimes in feminine grammatical form.15 The phrase 
appeared in references to Bulwer-Lytton in German occult periodicals in the 
1880s, and Steiner himself  explicitly cited Bulwer-Lytton’s novel in Knowledge 
of  Higher Worlds,16 where the phrase is used to describe two important beings 
encountered in the course of  the occult pupil’s path of  initiation.17 
Ahlbäck (Åbo: Donner Institute for Research in Religious and Cultural History, 2008), 9–16; 
Andreas Kilcher, “Seven Epistemological Theses on Esotericism,” in Hermes in the Academy, ed. 
Wouter Hanegraaff  and Joyce Pijnenburg (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 
143–48; Katharina Brandt and Olav Hammer, “Rudolf  Steiner and Theosophy,” Handbook 
of  the Theosophical Current, ed. Olav Hammer and Mikael Rothstein (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 
113–33. Clement also does not cite Egil Asprem’s study The Problem of  Disenchantment: Scientific 
Naturalism and Esoteric Discourse, 1900–1939 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), which includes a detailed and 
incisive treatment of  Steiner’s Knowledge of  Higher Worlds, but Asprem’s book appeared just a 
year before Clement’s volume.
13 See, for example, Schriften zur Erkenntnisschulung, xxix, xxxiii, cxi, cxiv–cxv, 241, etc. 
14 Schriften zur Erkenntnisschulung, 319.
15 Edward Bulwer-Lytton, Zanoni (London: Saunders & Otley, 1842); Zanoni: Ein Roman 
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 1842); the current Anthroposophist edition is Zanoni: A Rosicrucian Tale 
(SteinerBooks, 1989).
16 See Schriften zur Erkenntnisschulung, 145
17 German Theosophist Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden referred to Bulwer-Lytton’s “Hüter der 
Schwelle,” in Hübbe-Schleiden’s journal Sphinx, an important early esoteric periodical, in 1887: 
Hübbe-Schleiden, “Zöllners Zurechnungsfähigkeit und die Seybert-Kommission,” Sphinx: 
Monatsschrift für die geschichtliche und experimentale Begründung der übersinnlichen Weltanschauung auf  
monistischer Grundlage (November 1887): 321–28. Steiner readily acknowledged the link between 
his own references to the Guardian of  the Threshold and its earlier literary instantiation, 
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Contrary to Clement’s claim that Bulwer-Lytton’s fictional creation and 
Steiner’s esoteric figure have “virtually nothing in common,”18 the parallels 
are unmistakable. Joscelyn Godwin describes Bulwer-Lytton’s “Dweller of  
the Threshold” as “a hideous personification of  one’s past thoughts and evil 
tendencies, which even if  not perceived lures the aspirant towards disaster.”19 
These parallels are unsurprising in light of  Bulwer-Lytton’s involvement in 
proto-Theosophical milieus and the novel’s overt Rosicrucian references. 
Godwin characterizes Bulwer-Lytton as a “pivotal figure of  nineteenth-century 
occultism.”20 Steiner borrowed other elements from the Victorian novelist, 
such as the notion of  “Vril” as an occult force. As Julian Strube has shown in 
his thorough study of  the Vril myth, Steiner played a key role in promoting 
this idea in Germany.21
Clement’s discussion overlooks this crucial context. Detailed research by 
Theodore Ziolkowski and others has established the importance of  such lit-
erary borrowings for modern esoteric thought.22 The re-purposing of  literary 
sources for devotional and meditative functions, as well as their refashioning as 
forms of  scripture, testament, and doctrine, has been a prominent feature of  
writing that “Bulwer Lytton’s Zanoni contains in novel form a description of  the Guardian of  
the Threshold.” (Knowledge of  Higher Worlds, 159) 
18 Schriften zur Erkenntnisschulung, 320
19 Joscelyn Godwin, The Theosophical Enlightenment (Albany: State University of  New York 
Press, 1994), 128.
20 Godwin, The Theosophical Enlightenment, 195. See also Bruce Campbell, Ancient Wisdom Revived: 
A History of  the Theosophical Movement (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1980), 12, 26, 
56; Alex Owen, The Place of  Enchantment: British Occultism and the Culture of  the Modern (Chicago: 
University of  Chicago Press, 2004), 44, 54, 133, 267; Antoine Faivre, Western Esotericism: A 
Concise History (Albany: State University of  New York Press, 2010), 76, 84, 88; Jeffrey Franklin, 
“The Evolution of  Occult Spirituality in Victorian England and the Representative Case of  
Edward Bulwer-Lytton,” in Tatiana Kontou and Sarah Willburn, eds., The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Nineteenth-Century Spiritualism and the Occult (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 123–41. 
21 Julian Strube, Vril. Eine okkulte Urkraft in Theosophie und esoterischem Neonazismus (Munich: 
Fink, 2013), 77–79, 94–95.
22 Theodore Ziolkowski, Lure of  the Arcane: The Literature of  Cult and Conspiracy (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013); see the discussion of  Bulwer-Lytton’s Zanoni on 116–20. 
Cf. James Webb, The Occult Establishment (La Salle: Open Court, 1976), 497–515; Bettina Gruber, 
ed., Erfahrung und System: Mystik und Esoterik in der Literatur der Moderne (Opladen: Westdeutscher 
Verlag, 1997); Priska Pytlik, Okkultismus und Moderne: Ein kulturhistorisches Phänomen und seine 
Bedeutung für die Literatur um 1900 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005); Jeffrey Kripal, Mutants and 
Mystics: Science Fiction, Superhero Comics, and the Paranormal (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 
2011); Michael Novian, Von Ariern und Aliens: Völkische Weltanschauung in der Science-Fiction-
Literatur vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Marburg: Tectum, 2013); Jan Stottmeister, Der George-Kreis 
und die Theosophie (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2014).
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emergent spiritual approaches for a long time. It was an especially important 
element in the modern occult revival out of  which Anthroposophy emerged. 
By ignoring this background, Clement misses another significant way in which 
Steiner helped shape the contours of  Western esotericism in the modern era. 
These lapses notwithstanding, volume 7 does provide important material 
on the Theosophical origins of  Steiner’s esoteric work, against the grain of  
Clement’s own interpretation. He acknowledges Annie Besant and Charles 
Webster Leadbeater as sources for Knowledge of  Higher Worlds and devotes pages 
to tracing Steiner’s gradual appropriation of  Theosophist concepts.23 He also 
offers insight into the shift in tone from Steiner’s turn-of-the-century works to 
his mature esoteric pronouncements.24 What is missing is a broader sense of  
the fin de siècle intellectual atmosphere, in Germany as elsewhere, which left 
such a deep impression on Steiner’s subsequent writings.25
Steiner was hardly a unique figure around the turn of  the twentieth 
century; there were many others searching for ‘higher worlds’ in various 
ways, whether through science or through initiation or through contemplative 
practice. Understanding Steiner’s specific contributions to this search means 
23 Schriften zur Erkenntnisschulung, xxxvi–xxxvii and xlvi–xlvii.
24 Contrasting Knowledge of  Higher Worlds to the 1901/02 texts from volume 5, Clement writes: 
“Hier spricht nicht mehr eine Stimme, die ein kritisches Publikum durch Argumentation 
von der eigenen Position zu überzeugen versucht, sondern eine solche, welche die Autorität 
eines Wissenden für sich in Anspruch nimmt und als Lehrer zu Schülern spricht, d.h. zu 
Menschen, die den ‘Pfad der Erkenntnis’ schon beschreiten und insofern bereits für sich 
eine Vorentscheidung über die Validität des Vorgebrachten getroffen haben” (Schriften zur 
Erkenntnisschulung, xxvii). Steiner’s contemporary Hans Freimark was more blunt, offering a 
vivid first-hand description of  his speaking style: “Steiner liebt die hohenpriesterliche Gebärde, 
in seinen Vorträgen und in seinen Schriften. Es ist nicht ohne Eindruck, wenn auf  der 
Rednerbühne der hagere Mann die dunkelglühenden Augen zur Decke richtet, das strähnige 
schwarze, in die Stirn fallende Haar mit einer ruckenden Kopfbewegung zurückschleudert 
und die gelblichen schlanken Hände wie segnend hebt. Diese Pose hat Stil. Und ihr entspricht 
seine Stimme, die von suggestiver Eindringlichkeit ist und die die wunderbaren Tatsachen, die 
er erwähnt, seinen Zuhörern in einer Weise nahebringt, die man nicht überzeugend nennen 
kann, wohl aber als überredend bezeichnen muß.” Hans Freimark, Moderne Theosophen und ihre 
Theosophie (Leipzig: Heims, 1912), 40.
25 For context see Helmut Zander, “Der Himmel auf  Erden? ‘Jenseits’-Konzepte um 
1900 und die Traditionen einer monistischen Eschatologie,” in Das Jenseits: Facetten eines 
religiösen Begriffs in der Neuzeit, ed. Lucian Hölscher, (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007), 138–51; 
Renko Geffarth, “Äther, Urlicht, Relativität: Weltformel und ‘wahre Erkenntnis’ um 1900,” 
in Aufklärung und Esoterik: Wege in die Moderne, ed. Monika Neugebauer-Wölk, (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2013), 440–60; Bernhard Kleeberg, “Gedankenexperimente, Kontrafaktizität und 
das Selbstverständnis der Wissenschaften um 1900,” Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 38 (2015), 
7–14.
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assessing his work not just in relation to earlier generations of  German 
Idealist philosophy but also in the context of  comparable esoteric endeavors 
in the years immediately prior to Steiner’s Theosophical turn – figures such 
as Franz Hartmann or Carl Du Prel, who anticipated central components of  
Steiner’s mature esoteric outlook.26 Without taking this context into account, 
sympathetic readings of  Steiner run the risk of  wishful thinking, in a fruitless 
effort to re-cast Steiner’s later esoteric teachings as an extension of  his early 
philosophical works. That sort of  reading will only appeal to those already 
committed to Steiner’s principles. 
In an odd way, Clement’s comments sometimes seem to sense this 
restricted audience, even as his project strives to transcend it. Though he 
does not make use of  the rich scholarship on modern occultism, he regularly 
draws on Anthroposophical secondary literature. He is particularly indulgent 
toward the work of  Lorenzo Ravagli, a prominent Anthroposophist and editor 
of  Erziehungskunst, the chief  journal of  the Waldorf  movement. Ravagli’s 
writings are typical of  the effort by Steiner’s followers to defend their esoteric 
worldview against external scrutiny.27 His publications are Anthroposophical 
apologias marked by an aggravated tone toward scholars who study Steiner, 
above all Zander. Astonishingly, Clement at times places Ravagli’s polemics 
against Zander on the same level as Zander’s scholarship.28 Indeed Clement 
himself  often has a notably difficult time taking Zander’s research seriously, 
and frequently portrays Zander as a critic of  Steiner rather than a historian 
of  Anthroposophy.29 This fundamental misconstrual runs throughout both 
volumes, and significantly vitiates Clement’s analysis. 
Despite the insights that Clement brings to Steiner’s Knowledge of  Higher 
Worlds, his overall interpretation remains unconvincing. His approach is too 
imbued with Anthroposophical assumptions and his conclusions fit too 
26 See e.g. Franz Hartmann, Ein Abenteuer unter den Rosenkreuzern (Leipzig: Theosophisches 
Verlagshaus, 1899); Hartmann, Unter den Adepten. Vertrauliche Mittheilungen aus den Kreisen 
der indischen Adepten und Christlichen Mystiker (Leipzig: Lotus Verlag, 1901); Carl du Prel, Die 
Philosophie der Mystik (Leipzig: Günther, 1885); du Prel, Die monistische Seelenlehre: Ein Beitrag zur 
Lösung des Menschenrätsels (Leipzig: Günther, 1888). 
27 Lorenzo Ravagli, “Zander und die Anthroposophie,” Erziehungskunst (December 2007): 
1373–76; Ravagli, Zanders Erzählungen (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2009); Ravagli, 
“Polemischer Diskurs: Die Anthroposophie und ihre Kritiker,” in Rudolf  Steiner: Seine Bedeutung 
für Wissenschaft und Leben heute, ed. Peter Heusser (Stuttgart: Schattauer, 2014), 332–52.
28 E.g. Schriften über Mystik, xxxiv, or Schriften zur Erkenntnisschulung, lxxii
29 Examples include Schriften über Mystik, lxv, and Schriften zur Erkenntnisschulung, lxxiii, lxxx, 
and 319.
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neatly with Anthroposophical expectations. But it has also exposed a rift 
within the Anthroposophist movement, with Steiner’s more conspiratorially 
inclined followers convinced that Clement’s project forms part of  a nefarious 
plot to sacrifice Anthroposophy’s esoteric truths at the altar of  academic 
respectability. Less myopic admirers of  Steiner, meanwhile, have greeted the 
edition with enthusiasm, appreciating its potential for widening the appeal 
of  Anthroposophist ideas. If  the former fear that Steiner will be neutralized 
by scholarly niceties, the latter understand the promise of  a refurbished and 
reinvigorated Steiner clad in the prosaic garb of  philosophical Idealism.30
A historical approach yields a different story. The search for greater forms 
of  knowledge and spiritual experience beyond the confines of  established 
religion and academic science was a fundamental element of  the modern 
German occult revival. Many of  the people drawn to this milieu were highly 
educated and steeped in German cultural traditions, including the classics 
of  Idealist thought. A large proportion of  them came from the ranks of  the 
Bildungsbürgertum, the educated bourgeoisie. Steiner’s background in Idealist 
philosophy facilitated his remarkably rapid transition to a leading role within 
the German Theosophist movement. He offered, in effect, exactly what his 
audience wanted to hear: familiar Theosophical themes presented in the idiom 
of  German high culture, with ample invocation of  figures like Fichte and 
Schelling and Goethe. What Theosophy promised was a “synthesis of  science, 
religion, and philosophy,” in Blavatsky’s famous phrase, and Steiner was well 
positioned to provide just that, packaged in ways that appealed to German 
Theosophists in particular.31
After his post-1900 esoteric turn, Steiner emphasized the traditions of  
German Idealism in a wide range of  contexts, such as enlisting them for patri-
otic purposes in the early years of  World War I. Facing this historical situation 
need not detract from what was innovative in Steiner’s thinking. But it is a 
useful reminder that grand narratives about the unfolding of  Spirit in the mode 
of  German Idealism were by no means unique to Steiner, whether before or 
after his Theosophical turn. This is another reason to pay attention to the 
30 Recent signs from mainstream Anthroposophist publishers indicate that the anti-Clement 
faction enjoys considerable support among Steiner’s English-speaking followers; see e.g. 
the new translation of  one of  the more scurrilous attacks on Clement by Pietro Archiati, 
a prominent Anthroposophist in German-speaking Europe: Archiati, Spiritual Science in the 
Third Millennium: Intellectuality versus Anthroposophy (Forest Row: Temple Lodge Press, 2015), 
distributed by SteinerBooks. 
31 H. P. Blavatsky, The Secret Doctrine: The Synthesis of  Science, Religion, and Philosophy (London: 
Theosophical Publishing Company, 1888).
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specific features of  Steiner’s individual texts and heed the particular arguments 
they make. Thus, for all its flaws, it is essential to recognize the enormous 
service that Clement has done for all scholars studying Steiner, whatever their 
interpretive orientation. 
The critical edition provides a new basis for future research on Theos-
ophy and Anthroposophy. At its best moments, Clement’s familiarity with 
the philosophical context raises the quality of  his analysis far above the level 
typically found among Steiner’s followers themselves. For that very reason, it 
merits critical attention and debate. And its most debatable aspects go to the 
heart of  Clement’s project as a whole. The approach he adopts in the first two 
volumes all too often reduces the later Steiner to an extension of  the earlier 
Steiner. It cannot account for the fantastic profusion of  new ideas that defined 
Steiner’s public pronouncements after his embrace of  esotericism in 1902. The 
explosion of  creativity that marks Steiner’s post-1900 esoteric works has no 
precedent in his earlier works. It is not just a sudden shift in tone and style and 
format, but a profound innovation in content. The fluidity of  his categories, 
the imaginative range of  his ideas, the willingness to flaunt established modes 
of  knowledge and challenge conventional conceptions of  the world – includ-
ing recognized philosophical models and existing intellectual frameworks – all 
signal a fundamental departure from his previous approach to understanding 
reality. The esoteric Steiner after 1900 was engaged in a daring new project, one 
that diverged in the most elemental ways from what came before. 
For any academic with a sympathetic attitude toward Steiner, it is appeal-
ing to re-cast his mature esoteric years as a smooth continuation of  his early 
philosophical explorations. That version of  Steiner is comforting and familiar, 
readily compatible with the premises of  the modern academic world. It assimi-
lates Steiner’s esoteric teachings into recognizable academic categories. But this 
approach does not let Steiner’s esoteric texts speak for themselves. It does not 
allow his mature thinking to unfold according to its own categories and its own 
promises, which were quite different from conventional academic standards. 
It does not give Steiner’s esoteric ideas the breathing room they deserve, the 
chance to develop on their own terms, to follow their own path. It renders 
these ideas docile and reassuring rather than provocative and unsettling.
In trying to make Steiner more agreeable to a twenty-first century academic 
readership, Clement has hollowed out the most challenging and most difficult 
parts of  Steiner’s teachings. But it is these very parts that make Steiner such an 
interesting historical figure. The Steiner we are left with, in Clement’s version, 
is flattened and tamed. The historical Steiner was much more disruptive and 
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much more ambitious. To lose sight of  that unruly side of  Steiner, in the hope 
of  streamlining and updating his message, does not do justice to the acute 
ambiguities in his thinking. Even sympathetic observers must at some point 
acknowledge this dimension. Though the sanitized Steiner makes a more at-
tractive candidate for admission to the academy, he is scarcely recognizable in 
an esoteric setting. 
For better or worse, that is the Steiner we need to understand. Rather than 
rehabilitating or legitimating Steiner, the proper starting point for scholarly 
engagement is the more demanding project of  comprehending Steiner. What-
ever its interpretive shortcomings, the painstaking textual work that Clement 
has put in to this new edition make it an invaluable resource for any scholar 
studying Steiner. It is also a sign of  how far scholarship on Steiner still has to 
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Rudolf  Steiner. Rudolf  Steiner: Schriften zur Erkenntnisschulung. Edited, introduced 
and commentated by Christian Clement. Vol. 7 of  Rudolf  Steiner: Schriften – 
Kritische Ausgabe, edited by Christian Clement. Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog, 
2015. cxxx + 498 pp. ISBN 978-3-7274-5807-1.
1. Introduction: SKA Volume 7 
Volume 7 of  the Critical Edition of  Rudolf  Steiner’s Writings, Schriften – 
Kritische Ausgabe (SKA), contains Steiner’s two main texts on the spiritual path 
of  knowledge, both of  which originally appeared in the journal Lucifer-Gnosis 
in the years 1904–1908. The first of  Steiner’s texts is entitled Wie erlangt man 
Erkenntnisse der höheren Welten? (How does one Attain Knowledge of  the Higher 
Worlds?),1 and the second Die Stufen der höheren Erkenntnis (The Stages of  
1 Steiner’s text Wie erlangt man Erkenntnisse der höheren Welten? originally appeared in installments 
in the journal Lucifer-Gnosis (edited by R. Steiner) from June 1904–September 1905, in issues 
13–28. It was first reprinted in a special edition of  the journal in 1907/08, and then published 
in book form in 1909, with further main editions in 1910, 1914, 1918, 1919, 1920, and the 
final “Ausgabe letzter Hand” edition of  1922. (For details of  the history of  the editions, cf. 
C. Clement’s introduction, SKA 7, pp. civ–cxxiv). The book is volume 10 in the Rudolf  Steiner 
Gesamtausgabe (GA). In English, the text is available in various translations, including: Knowledge 
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Higher Knowledge), which was conceived as a continuation or “intermediate 
reflection” on the former text.2 
Chronologically, volume 7 is actually the second volume overall to appear 
in the Critical Edition, and again it is competently introduced and commen-
tated by Christian Clement, and published in a fine and attractive edition by 
the German academic publisher Frommann-Holzboog. Volume 7 begins with 
a foreword (vii–xvi) by the late Gerhard Wehr, who argues that Steiner’s aim 
in these writings was to furnish a Western path of  knowledge that led to spir-
itual independence on the part of  the student. Wehr sees parallels between 
Steiner’s views and those of  Jacob Böhme and J.W. von Goethe, as well as an 
inherent connection with the concept of  devotion in the Christian mystics of  
the middle ages. Next follows Clement’s consistently illuminating 120-page 
introduction (xix–cxxx) in which he carefully outlines the general character 
of  the theosophical-anthroposophical path of  knowledge, and the historical 
context, genesis, content and reception of  the two texts in question. 
As mentioned above, the heart of  the volume is Steiner’s two works Wie erlangt 
man Erkenntnisse der höheren Welten (3–163), and Die Stufen der höheren Erkenntnis 
(165–209), presented for the first time in a scholarly critical edition, that is to 
say, where all the textual variations, additions, omissions and modifications 
have been noted. The schooling outlined by Steiner in these writings is that 
of  the knowledge and spiritual awakening of  the higher self, or the “birth” 
of  the “higher human being.” (32) The practical means for reaching this goal 
primarily consists in meditation, in a strengthening of  one’s cognitive abilities 
and moral qualities. In Steiner’s sense, there is nothing obscure or nebulous 
about meditative activity, much less is it related to any kind of  spiritualism or 
mediumistic lowering of  consciousness, rather it is based on fully wide-awake 
and conscious thinking: “One has to construct one’s thoughts in a clear, lucid 
and definite manner.” (34) The student commences the spiritual path by first 
cultivating a specific and basic mood of  soul – that of  a genuine “devotion 
of  the Higher Worlds: How is it Achieved? trans. D.S. Osmond and C. Davy (London: Rudolf  
Steiner Press, 1976). All translations from the German in the current article are my own.    
2 The text Die Stufen der höheren Erkenntnis was published by Steiner in the journal Lucifer-
Gnosis in five installments in issues 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, from October 1905–1908, and originally 
termed as an “Zwischenbetrachtung zu dem Artikel ‘Wie erlangt man Erkenntnisse höherer 
Welten?’” (SKA 7, 167). The first book edition appeared posthumously in 1931, edited by 
Marie Steiner (cf. C. Clement’s introduction to SKA 7, cxxiv–cxxv, for further details). It 
is volume 12 in the Rudolf  Steiner Gesamtausgabe (GA). Among others, the text is available 
in English under the title: The Stages of  Higher Knowledge, trans. Lisa D. Monges and Floyd 
McKnight (Spring Valley/New York: Anthroposophic Press, 1974).
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to truth and knowledge.” (21) In contrast to certain theosophical conventions of  
the time, in which knowledge was based on the reverence for and dogmatic 
authority of  a spiritual leader,3 Steiner stresses the inviolable principles of  
the freedom and autonomy of  the student on the path of  knowledge: “It 
must be emphasized that with regard to higher cognition it is not a matter of  
reverence for people, but of  reverence for truth and knowledge.”4 The activity 
of  meditation and a dedication to the ideals of  truth and knowledge should 
be accompanied by a number of  preparatory exercises, including: learning 
to distinguish “the essential from the inessential” in all things (28), an exact 
and accurate observation of  the world of  nature (38–44), a heightening of  
one’s own ethical behavior (54), and the cultivation of  personal characteristics 
such as patience, humbleness, modesty, respect, empathy, understanding, 
fearlessness and gratefulness (70–86). It is crucial for the student not to waver 
from the highest principles of  “truthfulness, sincerity and honesty,” (92) to 
retain healthy, “logical and rational thinking” (93) at all times, and to unfold 
a confidence in and love of  one’s fellow human beings: “And this love of  
humanity has to gradually extend to a love of  all beings, indeed, to a love of  
all existence.” (84) The third stage after those of  preparation (Vorbereitung) and 
enlightenment (Erleuchtung) is that of  initiation (Einweihung/Initiation), in which 
the “true names” of  things become revealed that are the “keys” to higher 
knowledge (59). According to Steiner, this stage is characterized by the greatest 
possible cognitive discernment in one’s judgments: one possesses an ever 
sounder and healthier capacity to distinguish between mere personal illusion, 
fantasy, preconceptions and prejudices, and true reality (65–68). 
The second text, Die Stufen der höheren Erkenntnis, presents one of  
Steiner’s most detailed expositions on the relationship between ordinary 
sense cognition and his further tripartite classification of  knowledge into 
“imagination,” “inspiration” and “intuition.” Steiner calls his presentation 
here the “epistemology of  esoteric science.”5 The general four elements of  
knowledge corresponding to Steiner’s fourfold classification are i) the object 
(Gegenstand); ii) the representation (Vorstellung), also called the image or picture 
(Bild); iii) the concept (Begriff); and iv) the I (Ich). Each of  these four elements 
may form the starting point of  a new mode of  cognition, and this is to be 
conceived in a hierarchical sense, passing from the ‘lower’ cognitive mode of  
3 Cf. Clement’s analysis of  these important points, among others, in SKA 7, CV, 215, 224. 
4 “Betont muß werden, daß es sich beim höheren Wissen nicht um Verehrung von Menschen, 
sondern um eine solche gegenüber Wahrheit und Erkenntnis handelt.” (SKA 7, 23).
5 “Erkenntnislehre der Geheimwissenschaft” (SKA 7, 167). 
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outer sense impressions and material objects, through to pictorial and then 
conceptual knowledge, and finally to the ‘highest’ form of  I-based knowledge 
(167–73). As Steiner says of  the latter: “The perception of  one’s own ‘I’ is the 
model for all intuitive knowledge.”6 
Stimulating too is Clement’s 140-page commentary directly following the 
two texts (213–353). His remarks here make a substantial contribution to the 
research by not only locating many of  Steiner’s references, but also correctly 
pointing out various related historical, religious, artistic, philosophical and 
mythological conceptions. The volume is supplemented by a selection of  
documents pertaining to the ritual aspects of  Steiner’s esoteric school (355–
441), a bibliography (443–64), and an index of  topics (465–97).
As is natural for any work of  nearly 630 pages, SKA 7 contains a small 
number of  minor factual errors and lacunae, and it is possible to disagree with 
certain of  the editor’s decisions and interpretations. For instance, the unat-
tributed poem “Wenn die Rose selbst sich schmückt…” cited by Steiner, is by 
the poet Friedrich Rückert and not Angelus Silesius (110, 297). Steiner’s sharp 
distinctions between illusion, image consciousness, artistic productions, and 
spiritual reality could have been more forcefully insisted upon at times by the 
editor (e.g. 322); and I disagree with Clement’s contention that Steiner’s con-
ception of  the “Meister” (Masters) was taken over from theosophical literature 
(222–23). Among others, the idea is found in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, just as 
Steiner personally spoke of  Goethe as one of  the “greatest German Masters” 
already in a letter of  1889,7 as well as publicly stating in 1900: “[I]f  I have had a 
Hermes [on the journey to Hades], it was not Nietzsche, but Goethe.”8 In the 
chapter on “Control of  Thoughts and Feelings,” when Steiner speaks of  the 
“purification” (Lauterkeit) of  one’s moral character (57) and intimates a relation 
to the virtues of  “courage and fearlessness” (62, 255), it might have been worth 
pointing to the related conception of  katharsis in the 1904 essay “Aristoteles 
über das Mysteriendrama” in the journal Lucifer-Gnosis. In this regard, instead 
of/or in addition to the ritual documents in the appendix, perhaps other pub-
lished texts from Lucifer-Gnosis could have been included that directly relate to 
Steiner’s path of  schooling, such as his essays “Einweihung und Mysterien,” 
6 “Die Wahrnehmung des eigenen ‘Ich’ ist das Vorbild für alle intuitive Erkenntnis.” (SKA 
7, 172).
7 Letter of  R. Steiner to R. Specht, Weimar, 9 August 1889, Briefe I: 1881–1890 (Dornach/
Switzerland, 1985), 204.  
8 R. Steiner, “Goethe-Studien. Moral und Christentum” (1900), in Methodische Grundlagen der 
Anthroposophie, 1884–1901 (Dornach/Switzerland, 1989), 208.  
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“Okkulte Geschichtsforschung” and “Von der Aura des Menschen.” Other rel-
evant inclusions from around the same years might have been Steiner’s reviews 
of  books by Mabel Collins, Annie Besant and Edouard Schuré, which could 
have perhaps better underscored the parallels and divergences between Steiner’s 
path and the theosophical literature of  the time. A person index to complement 
the subject index would also have been helpful.
Notwithstanding these points, one has to admit that the editor has for the 
most part subjected these texts to a nuanced, balanced and comprehensive 
textual analysis that has been hitherto lacking in academic studies of  Steiner. 
The considerable contribution that this volume makes to current Steiner schol-
arship may be further illustrated by means of  a number of  specific examples. 
 
 
2. Metamorphosis as Meditation
  
Volume 7 of  the Critical Edition is a further confirmation of  the importance 
of  first examining Steiner’s Goethean natural-scientific work in order to better 
comprehend his later published writings on spiritual topics. To take a concrete 
case: in 1790 the poet and scientist Johann Wolfgang von Goethe published 
a scientific essay on the metamorphosis of  plants. Here Goethe set forth the 
organic unity of  the plant: despite the differences between the separate “exter-
nal” parts such as the stem and the petal, they were united into a living whole 
by means of  certain laws and modifications. He called this principal law the 
“metamorphosis” of  the plant. According to Goethe, a correct understanding 
of  this law allows one to grasp the “secret relationship (geheime Verwandtschaft) 
among the various external parts of  the plant, such as the leaves, calyx, corolla, 
and stamens, in which they successively develop out of  one another as it 
were.”9 In other words, the goal of  the researcher is to scientifically study and 
explain this hidden interaction: how an invisible law is related to the revealed 
external or sensible parts. Goethe furthermore expressed this law and the aims 
of  the researcher in poetic form, in a poem also entitled “The Metamorpho-
sis of  Plants.” One should strive to grasp this “secret law” (geheimes Gesetz) or 
“sacred riddle” (heiliges Rätsel), and once this is done, one will find oneself  in 
a “higher world” (höhere Welt), that is to say, in a world completely different 
from the outer or lower sense world.10 Despite Goethe’s treatise and poem 
9 J.W. Goethe, Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären (Gotha: Ettingersche Buchhan-
dlung, 1790), 2.  
10 J.W. Goethe, “Schicksal der Druckschrift”, Goethes Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften, vol. 1, ed. 
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being couched in the mystery language of  sacred riddles and higher worlds, the 
cognitive path in this domain is still a wholly scientific one. There is nothing 
mystical or unclear about it. In fact, this path of  cognition is not unlike that 
of  the mathematician: 
We have to learn from mathematicians, and even there, where we require no 
calculation, we should proceed as though we were accountable to the most 
stringent geometer. For on account of  its deliberation and purity the mathematical 
method immediately exposes every jump in an assertion.11 
 
Turning to Steiner, one sees that his earliest scientific writings of  1884 concern 
precisely this Goethean conception of  how to understand the “living concept” 
and higher laws of  plant metamorphosis, the organic transformation of  the 
seed into a plant, and then into a new seed, expressed in the visible-sensible 
process of  plant expansion and contraction.12 In his Introduction to SKA 7, 
Clement insightfully recalls how the meditative image of  the metamorphosis of  
seed and plant is also a key example in Steiner’s 1894 chief  philosophical work, 
Die Philosophie der Freiheit (The Philosophy of  Freedom).13 Steiner’s main point 
in this philosophical text is that human beings are also given the possibility of  
undergoing a metamorphosis. However, in the human being this has to occur 
in freedom and out of  their own forces of  perception and cognition: “In the 
object of  perception, man is given the possibility of  transforming himself, 
just as there lies in the plant seed the possibility of  becoming a whole plant.”14 
In a subsequent passage of  Die Philosophie der Freiheit Steiner immanently links 
these ideas of  human freedom, metamorphosis and monistic knowledge with 
the striking image of  a rose seed and plant: “Everyone of  us is called upon 
to become a free spirit, just as every rose seed is called upon to become a rose. 
In the domain of  genuine ethical acting, monism is therefore a philosophy of  
freedom.”15
R. Steiner (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1884), 97–99. 
11 J.W. Goethe, “Das Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt” (1793), in Goethes 
Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften, vol. 1, ed. R. Steiner (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1887), 19. 
12 Cf. R. Steiner, Einleitung, Goethes Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften, vol. 1, ed. R. Steiner 
(Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1884), xvii-xxxiv. 
13 SKA 7, XLIV. 
14 “Es ist in dem Wahrnehmungsobjekt Mensch die Möglichkeit gegeben, sich umzubilden, 
wie im Pflanzenkeim die Möglichkeit liegt, zur ganzen Pflanze zu werden.” R. Steiner, Die 
Philosophie der Freiheit (Berlin: Verlag von Emil Felber, 1894), 158. 
15 “Jeder von uns ist berufen zum freien Geiste, wie jeder Rosenkeim berufen ist, Rose zu 
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What was scientifically and philosophically presented by Steiner in 1884 
and 1894 respectively as the organic process of  metamorphosis in the plant 
and human being, reappears in 1904 in Wie erlangt man Erkenntnisse der höheren 
Welten? as one of  the central meditations on the theosophical-anthroposoph-
ical path of  knowledge: “You place a small plant seed before yourself. […] 
Picture to yourself: what is invisible [in the seed] will later become transformed 
into the visible plant, which I have before me in form and color. One dwells 
on the thought: the invisible will become visible.” (50) According to Steiner, actively 
and consciously meditating on ideas such as these, in conjunction with the 
other practical exercises, ultimately leads to the birth and knowledge of  the 
higher self: “Thus, meditation is the way that also leads the human being to the 
knowledge and intuition of  the eternal, indestructible core of  his being.” (35) 
This path and experience was not new to Steiner in 1904; he was convinced 
he had already discovered the faculty in himself  for intuiting his own eternal 
being decades earlier in January 1881 while a 19 year-old science student at 
the Technical College of  Vienna.16 And like Goethe, on account of  its rigor 
and transparency Steiner too considers mathematical thinking as one of  the 
best cognitive models for the student on the spiritual path: “Mathematics is 
therefore the most easily acquired preparatory training for the occultist who 
seeks to rise to bright and radiant clarity in the higher worlds, and not to a dim 
sentient form of  ecstasy or dreamy premonitions.”17 Steiner links the different 
fields of  the Goethean theory of  metamorphosis, mathematics and anthropo-
sophical meditation, because for him all three lead to a similar goal: they assist 
the student in developing sense-free or “pure thinking” (reines Denken), i.e. the 
ability to pass from sensible perceptions and intuitions to supersensible ones.18 
Hence, one can only agree with Clement in his commentary when he 
likewise points out the necessity of  understanding this later seed and plant 
meditation in the light of  Goethe’s morphological conceptions, and where 
the idea of  “intuitive judgment” (anschauende Urteilskraft) may be viewed as 
werden. Der Monismus ist also im Gebiete des wahrhaft sittlichen Handelns Freiheitsphiloso-
phie.” R. Steiner, Die Philosophie der Freiheit (Berlin: Verlag von Emil Felber, 1894), 168. 
16 Cf. R. Steiner to Josef  Köck, 13 January 1881, Briefe I (GA 38, 13). 
17 R. Steiner, “Mathematics and Occultism” (Mathematik und Okkultismus), a 1904 text 
reprinted in: Philosophie und Anthroposophie 1904–1923 (Dornach/Switzerland, 1984), 7–18. 
Clement has also included some of  the ritual texts in SKA 7, in which mathematics – the 
example of  an ideal circle for instance – is also presented as a solid preparatory path of  knowl-
edge (cf. SKA 7, 387-88).  
18 On “reines Denken” (pure thinking), or a new higher kind of  thinking, cf. Clement’s com-
mentary, 220–21, 335–36. 
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the “immediate model of  Steiner’s concept of  imagination, as the first super-
sensible stage of  knowledge.”19 As Clement puts it: “Thus, already here [in 
Die Philosophie der Freiheit] we find clearly expressed the basic conception of  
anthroposophical meditation, the idea of  a methodically executed metamor-
phosis of  the ordinary human faculties of  perception and thought.”20 There 
are naturally considerable differences in the formats, content, and arguments 
of  Steiner’s early and later writings, yet one of  the aims of  historical-critical 
Steiner research should be to objectively explore precisely these divergences 
and correspondences between works like Die Philosophie der Freiheit and the 
texts in SKA 7. 
3. Goethean Esotericism  
As we saw, according to Goethe, in the sphere of  science the scientist should 
aim to understand how a “geheimes” (secret), i.e. invisible but open principle 
of  nature such as the law of  metamorphosis is expressed in the visible world 
of  nature. Here we have a twofold process: the outer, sensible parts of  nature, 
and the initially hidden higher law that only appears to the scientist once they 
have brought the outer parts together into an organic whole. The law of  plant 
metamorphosis can be clearly “seen” as it were, and therefore may be termed 
an open secret (offenbares Geheimnis) of  nature. Goethe’s conception is a form of  
active and open scientific esotericism because these laws are ultimately visible 
for anyone who makes the intellectual effort, who is able to scientifically har-
monize the sensible and spiritual aspects of  nature. Here the abstracted part 
is the exoteric element, whereas the living whole is esoteric, and dangers and 
errors arise when one confuses the two.21   
Commentating on Goethe’s scientific writings in 1897, Steiner linked onto 
and expanded this Goethean thought.22 Steiner likewise classifies a consider-
19 SKA 7, 248. In a similar vein, see Clement’s introduction, lxvii. Cf. Clement’s further reflec-
tions on this point in his commentary, 248–52. 
20 SKA 7, xliv–xlv. 
21 Cf. J.W. von Goethe, Sprüche in Prosa: “Man tut nicht wohl, sich allzu lange im Abstrak-
ten aufzuhalten. Das Esoterische schadet nur, indem es exoterisch zu werden trachtet. Leben 
wird am besten durch’s Lebendige belehrt.” (It is not good for a person to dwell too long in 
abstractions. The esoteric is only harmful to the extent it seeks to become exoteric. Life is best 
instructed by means of  the living) in: R. Steiner, ed., Goethes Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften, vol. 
5 (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1897), 377.
22 For an overview of  Steiner’s comments on esotericism prior to 1900, see Robin Schmidt, 
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ation of  the single, abstracted parts as exoteric, while the view of  the whole 
as an organic totality, which is won from the phenomena themselves, is to be 
considered as an esoteric concept: “A concept is esoteric when it is viewed in 
relation with the phenomena, and from out of  which it is obtained. [A concept 
is] exoteric when it is viewed as an abstraction, isolated in itself.”23 Thus, con-
fining one’s vision to the single parts is merely an exoteric form of  cognition, 
compared with knowledge of  the esoteric whole: 
Truths that belong to an entire system of  views, can for the most part only be 
correctly understood and valued in this connection. One then calls their deeper 
sense, which they cannot have in isolation, the esoteric sense. The latter will only 
be familiar to someone who knows the entire corresponding circle of  conceptions, 
to which the single elements belong. Truths that are immediately understandable in 
themselves apart from all their connections, are termed exoteric truths. The super-
ficial manner of  tearing esoteric truths out of  their connections and immediately 
treating them in an exoteric manner can lead to the gravest errors.24  
This public 1897 discussion of  Goethe’s conception of  esotericism was not 
a recent interest for Steiner; seven years earlier Steiner had already privately 
communicated to the renowned Vienna theosophist Friedrich Eckstein his 
conviction that “Goethe was an esotericist in the best sense of  the word,”25 
discussing in relative detail with him the “open mysteries” and “esoteric” 
secrets of  Goethe’s poetry.
It could also be argued that Steiner’s pre-1900 Goethean-inspired concep-
tion of  active and open esotericism is a key principle in the post-1900 text 
Wie erlangt man Erkenntnisse der höheren Welten?. In the preface to the 1910 book 
edition Steiner says that the text requires active and comprehensive readers, clearly 
stressing that its most essential truths are not to be found in a single part or 
Rudolf  Steiner und die Anfänge der Theosophie (Dornach: Rudolf  Steiner Verlag, 2010), especially 
chapter V, 107–22.
23 Original German: “Esoterisch ist ein Begriff, wenn er im Zusammenhange mit den 
Erscheinungen betrachtet wird, aus denen er gewonnen ist. Exoterisch, wenn er als Abstraktion 
abgesondert für sich betrachtet wird.” In: Goethes Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften, vol. 5, ed. R. 
Steiner (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1897), 377, footnote. 
24 Steiner’s remarks are a commentary on the section “Lust am Geheimnis” in the chapter 
“Materialien zur Geschichte der Farbenlehre” of  Goethe’s Farbenlehre (Theory of  Colour) 
in: R. Steiner, ed., Goethes Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1897), 127, footnote. 
25 “Goethe ein Esoteriker in des Wortes bester Bedeutung war”; letter of  R. Steiner to F. 
Eckstein, Weimar, November 1890, Briefe II (GA 39: 54).  
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passage, but in a close and wide-ranging understanding of  the whole: “An 
intimate and living familiarity with the book is necessary; the presupposition 
is to be made that one thing is not solely to be grasped merely through what 
is said about this thing as such, but also by what is said about something else. 
One will then obtain the conception that the essence is not to be found in one 
truth, but in the harmonization of  them all” (16).
In terms of  esoteric traditions, Die Stufen der höheren Erkenntnis lists three 
main methods of  spiritual schooling, the Eastern, the Christian and the Ros-
icrucian, and characterizes them with regard to the level of  the student’s 
dependence on the teacher. For Steiner, the Eastern is the most dependent, 
the Christian is in the middle, and there is absolute independence and freedom 
between the student and teacher in a true Rosicrucian schooling (190). With 
regard to his own scientific methodology and cultural and artistic presen-
tations, and to the extent he did not make appeals to authority, even to the 
authority of  the name of  this tradition, Steiner saw his own path as following 
the Western Rosicrucian one.26 More detailed academic studies are required to 
determine whether Steiner was here linking onto the oldest historical Rosicru-
cian documents, or certain later conceptions found in Goethe (for example in 
his Rosicrucian poem Die Geheimnisse), or more contemporary principles and 
works connected with the Theosophical Society. She may be wrong in her as-
sessment, but it is still interesting to note that at the same time as Steiner was 
making these distinctions in Die Stufen der höheren Erkenntnis, Annie Besant saw 
the essential divergences between her path and Steiner’s in precisely these Ros-
icrucian terms, as she explained in a 1907 letter to Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden: 
Dr. Steiner’s occult training is very different from ours. He does not know the 
eastern way, so cannot, of  course, teach it. He teaches the Christian and Rosicru-
cian way, and this is very helpful to some, but is different from ours. He has his 
own School, on his own responsibility. I regard him as a very fine teacher on his 
own lines, and a man of  real knowledge. He and I work in thorough friendship 
and harmony, but along different lines.27    
26 In the 1910 work Die Geheimwissenschaft im Umriss Steiner explains that he did not call the 
contents of  the book ‘Rosicrucian’, even though it contains a rose-cross meditation, because it 
would be appealing to the authority of  an ancient name. He wished to appeal only to the truth 
of  the presentation itself. Cf. R. Steiner, Die Geheimwissenschaft im Umriss (Dornach: Rudolf  
Steiner Verlag, 1989), 22–23, 359.  
27 Letter of  Annie Besant to Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden, 7 June 1907; cited in Steward C. 
Easton, Rudolf  Steiner: Herald of  a New Epoch (Hudson: Anthroposophic Press, 1980), 169. 
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4. Ideological or Immanent?
Many of  the misunderstandings and disputes associated with this Kritische 
Ausgabe concern Clement’s editorial work in trying to accurately determine 
the most essential and influential textual sources in Steiner’s writings. This 
is exactly the right approach for a critical edition. In my opinion the reason 
why Clement has had such success in ascertaining Steiner’s philosophical and 
literary sources is due to his essentially immanent reading of  the texts. In a 
correct application of  the immanent textual method one does not approach an 
author’s works with preconceptions and ready-made theories as to their cultur-
al significance and spiritual traditions, but firstly one tries to allow the writings 
themselves to guide this determination and to critically understand them on 
their own merits. Subsequently one of  course moves outside of  the texts and 
then compares them with other historical writings, documents and figures. 
This valid and important scholarly method seems to have been misunderstood 
by a number of  Clement’s critics. 
Clement’s precise work so far on the SKA reveals that a sizable portion of  
the content of  Steiner’s post-1900 texts is closely interlinked with the philo-
sophical, cultural and religious traditions of  Goethe and the German idealists. 
This fact has now had radical consequences for contemporary Steiner research. 
Here his findings partly agree with those of  Hartmut Traub in his 2011 mono-
graph Philosophie und Anthroposophie (xxxix) and a number of  other researchers, 
yet often appear to be in conflict with the conclusions of  scholars like Helmut 
Zander (xxx, 252, 320, etc.). Naturally, after 1900 Steiner’s writings continue 
to discuss the conceptions of  other late 19th century figures, such as Ernst 
Haeckel or the philosophers Nietzsche and Friedrich Theodor Vischer. And 
this is not to forget that the first audiences of  Steiner texts were predominantly 
theosophically-schooled readers, hence there are references to some of  the 
standard theosophical works of  the period. What is notable about Clement’s 
findings is that whereas many of  Steiner’s lectures from around 1902–1908 
are replete with conventional theosophical ideas, structures and terminology, 
Steiner’s written published works are much less so. And if  Steiner engages with 
the theosophical literature in his published writings, he frequently transforms 
or enlarges upon it, so that the reader has to actively penetrate through the 
outer linguistic layers and composition to the inner concepts, otherwise the 
reader runs the risk of  misunderstanding them, of  taking the letter or image 
to be the spirit. 
At this point it is worth concluding with a brief  examination of  a highly 
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disputed example of  this in the research literature: Steiner’s narrative 
presentation of  the two “Guardians of  the Threshold” in Wie erlangt man 
Erkenntnisse der höheren Welten? In my view Clement correctly argues that the 
principal textual sources for Steiner’s two guardians is not the novel Zanoni by 
Bulwer-Lytton, as a number of  commentators seem to think.28 Nor are the 
two guardians any sort of  new invention on Steiner’s part. What then are the 
most essential textual sources for Steiner’s concepts of  the two guardians? The 
encounter with the initially demonic figure of  the “Lesser Guardian” is derived 
from the death-experience and journey to Hades that is portrayed in ancient 
Greek and Roman writings, such as the hound Cerberus guarding Hades, 
or Odysseus’s descent to the underworld in book XI of  Homer’s Odyssey, or 
Proserpina or Isis in Apuleius’s Metamorphoses, or the Zoroastrian tradition in 
Menippus (142–49, 256–58, 319ff.). According to Steiner, after successfully 
traversing the death experience and encounter with the Lesser Guardian, the 
candidate comes to know their own “double-nature”: the shadow sides of  
their life and destiny – and ultimately their higher and eternal self  (153). The 
encounter with the figure of  the “Greater Guardian” is essentially derived 
from the Bible, especially the Christian gospels and the death experience of  
Christ in the “Mystery of  Golgotha” (148, 150–57, 233, 258, 319–31). Steiner’s 
text specifically refers to the “cherub with the flaming sword at the gates of  
paradise” (Genesis 3:24) on the one hand (155), and points to the figure of  
Christ by evoking the image of  the parable of  the ten virgins and their lamps 
on the other (148) that is found in the Gospel of  Matthew (25:1–13). With regard 
to the gospels, I would be even more specific than Clement, and argue that 
Steiner’s Greater Guardian (150–57) is predominantly based on the depiction 
of  Christ as the Good Shepherd in Chapter 10 of  the Gospel of  John. The 
Good Shepherd is at once the gatekeeper and door itself, a guardian who is 
to pass through his own death experience by laying down his life for others, 
and, significantly, is initially also thought to be “demonic” (John 10:1–21). In 
line with the Christian teachings, one can only enter the heavenly worlds and 
receive eternal life by crossing over the threshold attended by this gatekeeper, 
by passing through this door and this door alone (John 10:1–3, 7–9). In this 
28 See, for example, Olav Hammer, who concludes that Steiner appropriated this 1842 lit-
erary fiction in order to stimulate a new belief  system in the reader: Claiming Knowledge: Strate-
gies of  Epistemology from Theosophy to the New Age (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2004), 157–58; and Per 
Faxneld, “Secret Lineages and de Facto Satanists: Anton LaVey’s Use of  Esoteric Tradition,” 
in Contemporary Esotericism, eds. Egil Asprem and Kennet Granholm (London/New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 89. 
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sense, the final two chapters of  Steiner’s 1904/05 text reveal a direct parallel 
with his conception of  esoteric Christianity, particularly its Johannine form, 
in his 1902 Christianity as Mystical Fact. Just as the ancient mystery traditions for 
Steiner lead to and have their culmination in the new and fully open Christian 
mysteries, so the death experience of  the candidate with the Lesser Guardian, 
echoing the ancient literary depictions of  the journey to Hades, leads to and 
culminates in a new understanding and experience of  Christ as the guardian 
to the higher spiritual worlds. Steiner’s textual sources for these two guardians 
are not “covered up”, but are directly cited in other sections of  the 1904/05 
text itself  – when, for example, Steiner specifically recommends The Gospel of  
John and Thomas à Kempis’s Imitation of  Christ as inspired models of  spiritual 
literature (77) – as well as in his earlier 1902 Christianity as Mystical Fact. In line 
with the principle of  open and active esotericism, it is a matter of  the reader 
bringing all these conceptions together.29     
Of  course, Bulwer-Lytton’s “dweller” figure from his 1842 novel Zanoni is 
also definitely cited by Steiner (145); that is not the problem. Indeed, Clement 
here analyzes and compares the dweller figure in Zanoni and Steiner’s two 
guardians at length, acknowledging the role played by the former, but rightfully 
drawing the conclusion that this figure is simply too insufficient, unsubstantial 
and different to be Steiner’s sole and principal textual source (319–24). For 
Steiner, although it relates to an inner experience, Bulwer-Lytton’s dweller is 
essentially a degenerate outer sense image generated out of  material smoke (145). 
Hence, anyone giving chronological priority to this modern novelistic image, 
over the original ancient tradition of  the journey to Hades, would not only be 
subjecting Steiner’s text to an anachronistic reading, but furthermore confus-
ing an external artistic depiction with what is intended to be a profound and 
realistic inner experience.
The unusual presentation of  Steiner is one of  the most original aspects of  
his contribution to the problem of  possible modern experiences of  Hades 
and Christ: Steiner’s description is not a slavish copy of  the ancient reports of  
the descent to the underworld, or of  the Good Shepherd in the Gospel of  John, 
29 Of  course, many of  the different interpretative findings concerning the two guardians of  
the threshold rest on how a scholar answers the question: what are the primary textual sources 
for Steiner, and what are the secondary ones? Adherents of  the Bulwer-Lytton interpretation 
often render subordinate or reject outright the ancient literary and religious references in 
Steiner’s text, as well as ignoring his earlier writings and conception of  esotericism, inverting 
the chronological and experiential order of  the guardians and minimizing the many significant 
differences between the two figures. Starting from these wholly different premises and textual 
sources they not unexpectedly arrive at a wholly different conclusion to mine. 
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rather he artistically transforms and builds on them to present his views in a 
new narrative form. As Clement notes, this narrative form of  presentation is 
similar to Steiner’s 1912 third mystery drama, which is also entitled The Guard-
ian of  the Threshold (lxviii). In both presentations the reader or spectator must 
not remain at the mere artistic images, but must seek to grasp the underlying 
spiritual reality.        
Clement’s assessment that many of  the references in Steiner’s works come 
from Western cultural and esoteric traditions has not been well received in 
certain quarters, especially by scholars who have argued for Eastern theosophical 
sources. If  the general direction of  Clement’s research findings is correct, 
then a number of  influential contemporary interpretations are indeed either 
erroneous or in need of  reevaluation. Instead of  trying to critically refute him, 
however, some critics have attacked Clement’s personal background, academic 
qualifications and institution, and (implicitly or explicitly) accused him of  
ideological motivations. I think that is both unfair and inaccurate. It seems that 
these critics are more often than not confusing Clement’s immanent textual 
approach – which, as mentioned, is a perfectly justified and legitimate scholarly 
method – with someone who places their own personal beliefs into the texts. 
Naturally, every scholar must be continually on guard against the latter, whether 
they are a fervent Kantian, Republican, theosophist, or Protestant theologian. 
A true scientific researcher should of  course never allow his or her personal 
beliefs or political convictions to distort their interpretations.
If  a scholar projects continuity or unity onto a text when there is none, 
this too should be rejected as unscientific. However, the inverse principle also 
holds: if  a researcher is able to competently demonstrate that specific con-
cepts, methods, structures or arguments are carried over by an author from 
his earlier to his later writings, this should not be dogmatically rejected as an 
impossibility, or superficially dismissed as an ‘ideological’ reading. Or to put 
it another way: all theses concerning rupture in Steiner’s work also have to 
be critically demonstrated by means of  the texts themselves, and not naively 
assumed beforehand as something self-evident. It is obvious that Steiner’s 
writings after the turn of  the century are vastly different from his earlier ones 
in many respects. But – to borrow a familiar image from Goethe – the question 
for a validly employed immanent and non-retrospective reading is whether 
the philosophical, scientific and esoteric seeds in Steiner’s early works are 
organically present in, or even give rise to, some of  the flourishing plants of  
his later period.   
Clement’s insightful and generally convincing results seem to speak for the 
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soundness of  his approach. But every academic can make errors, and a critical 
researcher should not simply accept the opinions espoused in the secondary 
literature or by book reviewers. I therefore encourage interested scholars to 
carefully examine both Clement’s commentaries and the original passages of  
Steiner in order to arrive at their own independent judgment of  these issues. 
Or, better still, to critically overturn Clement’s findings if  they are able.  
To conclude: volume 7 of  the SKA furnishes another positive, radical and 
thought-provoking chapter in critical Steiner research. Any scholar genuinely 
interested in close textual and historical-critical readings will be thankful to the 
editor and publisher for making these writings available in such a transparent, 




Steiner, Rudolf. Rudolf  Steiner: Schriften zur Erkenntnisschulung. Edited, introduced and commen-
tated by Christian Clement. Vol. 7 of  Rudolf  Steiner: Schriften – Kritische Ausgabe, edited by 
Christian Clement. Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog, 2015.
References
Easton, Steward C. Rudolf  Steiner: Herald of  a New Epoch. Hudson; Anthroposophic Press, 1980. 
Faxneld, Per. “Secret Lineages and de Facto Satanists: Anton LaVey’s Use of  Esoteric 
Tradition.” In Contemporary Esotericism, edited by Egil Asprem and Kennet Granholm. 
London/New York: Routledge, 2014.
Goethe, J.W. von. Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären. Gotha: Ettingersche Buch-
handlung, 1790. 
———. “Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen” (poem). In idem, “Schicksal der Druckschrift,” 
Goethes Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften, edited by Rudolf  Steiner, vol. 1, 97–99. Stuttgart: 
Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1884.  
———. “Das Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt” (1793). In Goethes 
Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften, edited by Rudolf  Steiner, vol. 2, 10–21. Stuttgart: Union 
Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1887. 
———. “Materialien zur Geschichte der Farbenlehre.” In: Goethes Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften, 
edited by Rudolf  Steiner, vol. 4, 102–128. Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1897.
———. “Sprüche in Prosa.” In Goethes Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften, edited by Rudolf  Steiner, 
vol. 5, 349–540. Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1897.
Hammer, Olav. Claiming Knowledge: Strategies of  Epistemology from Theosophy to the New Age. Leiden/
Boston: Brill, 2004. 
Schmidt, Robin. Rudolf  Steiner und die Anfänge der Theosophie. Dornach: Rudolf  Steiner Verlag, 
2010.
Steiner, Rudolf, ed. Goethes Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften, vol. 1. Stuttgart: Union Deutsche 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1884. 
Wood / Correspondences 3 (2015) 111–126126
 ———. Die Philosophie der Freiheit. Berlin: Verlag von Emil Felber, 1894. 
 ———. ed. Goethes Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften, vols. 4 and 5. Stuttgart: Union Deutsche 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1897. 
———. The Stages of  Higher Knowledge. Translated by Lisa D. Monges and Floyd McKnight. 
Spring Valley/New York: Anthroposophic Press, 1974. 
———. Knowledge of  the Higher Worlds: How is it Achieved? Translated by D.S. Osmond and C. 
Davy. London: Rudolf  Steiner Press, 1976.
———. Philosophie und Anthroposophie 1904–1923. Dornach: Rudolf  Steiner Verlag, 1984.
———. Briefe I: 1881–1890. Dornach: Rudolf  Steiner Verlag, 1985.
———. Briefe II: 1890–1925. Dornach: Rudolf  Steiner Verlag, 1987.
———. Die Geheimwissenschaft im Umriss. Dornach: Rudolf  Steiner Verlag, 1989. 
———. Methodische Grundlagen der Anthroposophie, 1884–1901. Dornach: Rudolf  Steiner Verlag, 
1989.
Traub, Hartmut. Philosophie und Anthroposophie. Die philosophische Weltanschauung Rudolf  Steiners: 
Grundlegung und Kritik. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2011.
Michael Stausberg and Bernd-Christian Otto (eds.). Defining Magic: A Reader. 
Sheffield: Equinox, 2012. xiii + 281 pp.  
Magic, n. An art of  converting superstition into coin. There are other arts serving 
the same high purpose, but the discreet lexicographer does not name them. 
Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary.
Ambrose Bierce’s satirical quip on magic did not make it through editorial 
selection for this anthology of  perspectives on how to define the problematic 
term. Nevertheless, Bierce targets a revealing detail in a deliciously subversive 
way: Definitions of  “magic” are often woefully underdetermined by histor-
ical and ethnographic data, and the use of  the category thus typically relies 
on the (often ideological or theological) discretion and sensibilities of  the 
lexicographer rather than on whether or not the features the term picks out 
belong exclusively to certain clearly defined phenomena. Distinctions between 
“magic” and “religion” tend to conceal the fact that the practices and beliefs 
thus labelled overlap significantly on the ground. Why is praying for the defeat 
of  a military foe part of  “religion,” but casting spells on the same enemy 
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“magic”? Can we uphold distinctions like these without recourse to theology?
This and many other problems in the study of  magic are outlined and 
documented in Defining Magic: A Reader. Bernd-Christian Otto and Michael 
Stausberg have created a reader of  generally influential texts on magic, spanning 
from antiquity to the present, with a focus on classics in the academic struggles 
to define the concept for the sake of  historical and ethno graphic analysis. 
In addition to reprinting twenty previously published texts, the editors have 
also commissioned five new articles from contemporary scholars known for 
their theoretical contributions to the study of  magic. The result is a valuable, 
although not flawless, collection that serves as a useful roadmap to novices 
in the study of  magic. To more established scholars it may serve as a crucial 
reminder of  the confusing state this concept has gotten us into. But it also 
suggests some interesting new pathways to escape that precarious situation.
1. The selection
The composition of  Defining Magic is notable for an unconventional choice of  
starting with ten texts labelled “historical sources,” spanning from Plato and 
Plotinus to Diderot and Blavatsky, before continuing to theoretical texts from 
the nineteenth to twenty-first centuries. There is a good point to doing this, 
which becomes clear by reading the useful editorial material in the book and 
paying attention especially to the most recent theoretical contributions. Several 
patterns of  meanings connected to “magic” and its cognates start taking shape 
in the earlier, mostly Greek, source texts. These patterns trickle through the 
middle ages and eventually feed into the derisive statements on magic in the 
Enlightenment, before getting picked up again in occultist understandings in 
the nineteenth century. 
Eventually, the various permutations of  these words and meanings create 
a broad semantic field which later scholarly attempts to define “magic” draw 
upon. Reconstructing some of  this development through a broader combina-
tion of  texts is thus a major asset. It encourages a parallel reading of  texts that 
automatically historicises the concept.
That is not to say that the particular selection of  texts is beyond reproach. 
For the earlier period, critical eyes will not fail to notice a bias towards Greek 
and Latin sources, to the neglect of  Egyptian, Hebrew, and Arabic material. 
Moreover, there is a predominance of  texts where “magic” and cognates are 
used derogatorily, with the omission of  “pro-magic” authors and theurgists 
such as Iamblichus, Proclus, the hermetic texts or the Chaldean Oracles. This 
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focus on “magic” as a negative label applied to others is entirely in tune with 
some currently dominant theoretical positions, but it might obscure a more 
complicated history of  use.
One notable exception is that the editors include two very interesting 
definitions from the Suda (ca. 970 CE) – the most comprehensive and influential 
surviving encyclopaedic work from the Byzantine Empire. In sharp contrast 
to developments in the Latin west, the Suda distinguishes clearly between 
mageia, goeteia and pharmakeia, and attributes different values to them. While 
goeteia (“sorcery”) and pharmakeia (“witchcraft”) were considered bad and 
depraved practices, mageia (“magic”) was wholly positive: “It is the invocation 
of  beneficent spirits for the production of  something good; like the oracles 
of  Apollonius of  Tyana.” (47) This understanding appears more in line with 
the neoplatonic theurgists. It would in fact resurface in the west, too, during 
the Renaissance rehabilitation of  magic, especially in Agrippa von Nettesheim 
– although in a different text of  Agrippa’s than the one reproduced in this 
volume. The apparent continuity of  this line of  thinking about magic in the 
Byzantine world raises the question of  a strikingly different and completely 
underexplored trajectory in the conceptual history of  magic. As the editors 
ask: “was the term mageia generally used in a positive sense in medieval 
Constantinople?” (46) This appears to require further research.
The neglect of  the renaissance revival of  magic is another notable omis-
sion in the source material, as is the complete absence of  medieval pro-magic 
texts culled from the grimoire tradition. Between Aquinas and Agrippa (both 
included) there is much else that must be explored for a sufficient picture of  
medieval and Renaissance conceptions of  magic to emerge – from Liber Iuratus 
to Ficino, Pico, Lazzarelli, or Dee.1 Finally, to use one minor text by Blavatsky 
as the sole representative of  post-1800 source texts on magic seems thin. After 
all, people have never written more about magic as a positive form of  practice 
than during this period, stretching roughly from the mid nineteenth century 
until today, nor has the practitioner’s literature on magic been more diverse.2 
The poor selection of  modern and contemporary magical texts reinforces an 
unfortunate impression that magic belongs to the past, whereas in fact “it” has 
1 For some of  the complexity of  understandings of  magic in this period, see Wouter J. 
Hanegraaff, “Sympathy or the Devil: Renaissance Magic and the Ambivalence of  Idols,” 
Esoterica 2 (2000): 1–44; Frank Klaassen, The Transformations of  Magic: Illicit Learned Magic in the 
Later Middle Ages and Renaissance (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013).
2 Cf. Egil Asprem, Arguing with Angels: Enochian Magic and Modern Occulture (Albany: State 
University of  New York Press, 2012).
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never been more vital than during modernity.
Moving on to the part of  the volume that seems more central to the aim of  
the book (i.e. to provide readings of  attempts to define the concept for academic 
work), critics may notice other curious omissions. Seminal texts by E. B. 
Tylor, J. G. Frazer, Mauss and Hubert, and Emile Durkheim fill the section on 
“Foundational Works of  the Academic Debate.” The list of  notable absentees, 
however, includes Freud and Weber, who have inspired entire schools of  later 
theorizing. Part three on “Mid-Twentieth Century Approaches” includes 
seminal texts by van der Leeuw, Evans-Pritchard, Malinowski, Horton, Tambiah 
and Leach, but it also omits influential contributions by people such as Lévy-
Bruhl, de Martino, Levi-Strauss, Mary Douglas, or Rodney Stark. Indeed, 
it seems possible to create an entirely parallel anthology with a completely 
different set of  authors and texts.
While some of  these omissions are indeed problematic, I do not think they 
undermine the project too much. The editors Otto and Stausberg are in fact 
very clear on what is missing, and provide helpful and rich discussions of  the 
broader literature in their editorial introductions to the four main parts, and to 
each individual text. This material is extremely helpful, and effectively embeds 
the selected texts in a broader context. Readers who wish to extend their view 
can easily use this as a road map and pursue the references on their own.
One other aspect of  the selection process deserves to be mentioned. In 
the case of  this book, it is clear that the editors are in fact not to blame for 
the omissions. Copyright structures and commercial aspects of  the academic 
publishing industry have clearly put unwanted and artificial restrictions on 
their work. The editors discreetly vent their frustration in the introduction: 
“in several cases there was an unfortunate mismatch between the royalties 
requested by some publishers and the budget at our disposal, so that we were 
unable to reprint some texts we would otherwise have wished to include.” (13) 
It is unfortunate that some publishers have discovered the use of  royalties 
as an extra revenue stream when selling academic work back to the academy 
that produced it. The result is that a well-conceived resource planned by two 
leading specialists is prevented from reaching its full potential. The dissemina-
tion structures that are supposed to further the academic community instead 
become an impediment and an obstacle to the effective development and com-
munication of  knowledge. In the face of  such commercial obstacles, however, 
the editors have done a formidable job in making use of  the material available 
to them and presenting it in a form that takes maximal advantage of  each text.
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2. The introduction
Stausberg and Otto’s introduction to the volume is an excellent example of  
this productive work. More than just an introduction to the various texts of  
the book, this piece is itself  an original contribution to the ongoing discussion 
about what to do with the troubling term “magic.” This contribution consists, 
to begin with, of  an effort to systematise the definitions that are out there. 
For example, Otto and Stausberg present a catalogue of  frequent denotations 
of  the term “magic” as encountered in both practical and scholarly literature, 
consisting of  thirty-five bullet points (9–10). Magic is said to be coercive, 
manipulative, immune to falsification, a non-legitimate way of  dealing with the 
supernatural, egocentric and antisocial, lacking institutional structures, a label 
for marginalizing outsiders, an illocutionary or performative speech act, or an 
art of  creating illusions – to name but a few of  the examples.
What to do with this bewildering set of  features? It is of  course possible to 
divide and classify them in various ways, propose a loosely defined polythetic 
family-resemblance definition, or try to force some key features into an ideal 
or prototypical structure in order to reconstruct an etic category of  “magic.” 
There are serious problems with all of  these approaches, however, and the 
sheer breadth of  the semantic field of  magic is only the first and most practical 
challenge. If  we factor in the various ideological, ethnocentric and theological 
implications involved with most available previous definitions, there is little 
wonder why an increasing number of  scholars over the past few decades have 
opted for eliminating the category altogether: “magic” does not exist as a stable 
phenomenon in the world, and should therefore not exist as a category either.
Stausberg and Otto do not settle for anything quite so simple. Their 
suggestion is in fact rather novel:
Instead of  instinctively interpreting the occurrence of  a limited number of  
features from our catalogue as evidence for the existence of  a family-like concept, 
we suggest splitting the extended tribal family into a number of  nuclear families. 
Instead of  instances of  “magic”, we suggest speaking of  patterns of  magicity (10; 
my emphasis).
What does this shift imply? Essentially, it is a shift away from the endeavour 
of  producing a new definition that would add to the dozens of  existing 
ones, towards a systematic effort of  classifying what various people writing 
about magic have in fact been interested in when using this concept. This 
seems to me a much needed effort that may provide a better ground for 
Asprem / Correspondences 3 (2015) 127–139132
future discussions. More importantly, it may solve the problematic disconnect 
between those eliminativists coming at “magic” from a discursive perspective 
interested in plays of  power and authority, and those historians, ethnographers 
and comparativists who wish to employ the term to study specific features of  
human behaviour. In the words of  the editors:
One might argue that abandoning the term “magic” only risks silencing us by 
depriving scholars of  ways of  addressing these persistent observations; after all, 
amulets, curses, healing procedures and other such things exist and it is easy enough 
to find practices that can be characterized as manipulative or that are typically 
performed on critical occasions … In other words, should we stop speaking of  
“magic” even when we cannot help observing perceived evidence for it? (10–11)
There is “something there,” but is “magic,” given its troubled history and 
semantic fuzziness, the best way to categorize it? Otto and Stausberg think not, 
and this is precisely where “patterns of  magicity” come in as an alternative way 
to construe the debate:
Our point is that even if  such phenomena impose themselves on observers …, 
as scholars we should, indeed, stop treating these observations as evidence for 
“MAGIC”. Instead, we should either just speak of  amulets, curses, etc., or of  
private rites (rather than intuitively and unreflectingly allocate them to a single 
overarching macro-category). … “Patterns of  magicity” do not automatically 
involve “MAGIC” (as the supreme meta-category), nor are they “magic” (as 
referring to ontological features), but they are a way of  dealing with cross-
culturally attested observations. “Magicity” acknowledges the fact that they were 
traditionally assigned to the overall category “MAGIC” in which we have stopped 
believing. As we see it, based on a meta-analysis of  definitions and theories of  
“magic”, and the catalogue of  objects to which that category is applied, future 
work should seek to model such patterns. (11)
For now, Otto and Stausberg propose coding and classifying different 
senses of  “magic,” using short-hand subscripts to distinguish, for example, 
the concept of  magic as “word efficacy”(Mwor) from “magic as signs” (MsIg) 
and “magic as harmful rituals” (Mhar). The idea is that with such coding one 
could identify basic ascriptions and look at their combinations in various real-
life constellations as well as in scholar definitions. I see significant overlaps 
here with the “building-block approach” that Ann Taves has recently been 
developing for tackling complex cultural concepts in general and for “religion” 
in particular.3
3 E.g. Ann Taves, Religious Experience Reconsidered: A Building-Block Approach to the Study of  
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3. Contemporary voices
That we need a systematic approach along the lines of  what Stausberg and 
Otto suggest is in my view confirmed by looking at the five contemporary 
pieces representing the current state of  the debate. The five authors represent 
anything but a consensus. However, through a broader framework of  “pat-
terns of  magicity” we might be able to at least put them in a fruitful dialogue.
Susan Greenwood’s chapter on what she calls “magical consciousness” 
stands out the most from the rest. Drawing on her experience as both an 
anthropologist and a contemporary practitioner of  magic, Greenwood offers 
a view on magic as a mode of  consciousness, a “specific and intrinsic mode 
of  mind” that is universally human (198) and allows one to communicate with 
spirits (208–10). Connecting “magical thinking” to imagination and defining 
it as “creative thinking that goes beyond the immediately apparent” she seems 
to have an extremely broad definition, with some nods to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s 
notion of  “participation.” Ultimately, however, the view is derived straight 
from some contemporary magicians’ self-understanding of  what magic is 
and how it works. Unfortunately, Greenwood also borrows the scientifically 
unsupported notion that the two hemispheres of  the brain are connected with 
two distinct styles of  thought (203-04, 209-10) – apparently nailing “magical 
consciousness” to the right hemisphere. This pop-psychological view is not 
uncommon among contemporary pagans, but it harmonizes badly with 
current science of  the mind/brain.4 In the end, Greenwood’s essay moves 
from defining and theorising “magic” to showing how magic is, in her words, 
a “legitimate source of  knowledge.”(208) After an obligatory overview of  the 
bad “Cartesian” dualistic split that we supposedly still suffer from, she draws 
on Gregory Bateson to make a (considering the circumstances, suspiciously 
Religion and Other Special Things (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009); Taves, 
“Reverse Engineering Complex Concepts: Identifying Building Blocks of  ‘Religion’,” Journal 
of  Cognition and Culture 15.1–2 (2015): 191–216. See also Egil Asprem, “Reverse-Engineering 
‘Esotericism’: How to Prepare a Complex Cultural Concept for the Cognitive Science of  
Religion.” Religion, online 22 Sept. 2015, DOI: 10.1080/0048721X.2015.1072589.
4 Greenwood seeks support for some of  her claims in the book by psychiatrist Ian 
McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of  the Western 
World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), which attempts to revive the notion that 
hemispheric differentiation underpins vast cultural differences. For a short critical review, see 
Owen Flanagan, ”The Vast Left-brain Conspiracy,” CultureLab, 21 December 2009 (URL: 
https://www.newscientist.com/blogs/culturelab/2009/12/the-left-brain-plot-for-world-
domination.php?DCMP=OTC-rss&nsref=online-news).
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dualistic) point about how “spirits are real” when you are in right-brained 
magical consciousness, even though they are not when you use your left-
brained analytical thinking. Two separate worlds, accessible through separate 
forms of  consciousness. 
If  we follow the patterns of  magicity approach, Greenwood’s views on 
magic appear much more closely related to those of  (some) contemporary 
Wiccans than those of  her colleagues. I say this with some reservation, however, 
for Greenwood is not alone in deriving her framework from contemporary 
magicians: rather, she represents a small subculture of  scholars of  magic that 
openly advocate the integration of  scholarship and (magical) practice, often 
under the banner of  “pagan studies.”5 The fact that this text could just as 
well have been included in the contemporary sources of  “magic” rather than 
“contemporary approaches” shows just how difficult it is to separate emic 
from etic, insider from outsider in the academic study of  magic. 
Christopher I. Lehrich, known for his work on Renaissance magic in books 
such as The Language of  Demons and Angels (2003) and The Occult Mind (2007), 
takes us back into the thicket of  theoretical problems involved with establishing 
sound definitions in the academic study of  anything. While no definition of  
magic emerges from his discussion, the key point is that we have to continue 
trying. The definitional pursuit is a process, and challenges do not mean 
we should stop. Thus, borrowing the format of  Clifford Geertz’ influential 
definition of  religion, Lehrich points rather to five criteria that should, in his 
opinion, be fulfilled for definitions of  magic. Perhaps the most valuable among 
these is the point that the conflict over whether magic is particular or universal 
is misguided: instead, definitions of  magic should aim to be generalizable, which 
Lehrich rightly notes is not the same thing as universality. Generalizability 
requires working inductively on some level, but it also appears that it can 
only be achieved against the backdrop of  a theoretical framework that directs 
the empirical effort according to set methodological principles. If  not, the 
endeavour becomes a game of  unfixed associations and correspondences – 
much like what some would call magical thinking. This tendency was also a 
central focus in Lehrich’s Occult Mind.
Kimberly B. Stratton is known for her deconstructionist and largely gender-
focused research on discourses on magic and witchcraft in antiquity.6 In keeping 
5 On this, see Markus Altena Davidsen, “What Is Wrong With Pagan Studies?” Method and 
Theory in the Study of  Religion 24 (2012): 183–99.
6 E.g. Kimberly B. Stratton, Naming the Witch: Magic, Ideology, and Stereotype in the Ancient World 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
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with this previous work, Stratton is primarily interested in labelling practices as 
they take shape in discursive formations that create structures of  alterity with 
real-life social implications. Magic for her has nothing to do with practices, 
rituals, ways of  thinking, special objects, special powers, or anything of  the 
sort. At best, it is a social discourse about such practices. “Magic” denotes 
“culturally specific ideas about illegitimate and dangerous access to numinous 
powers.”(245) This quotation, however, introduces a notable ambiguity about 
the relation between discourse and objects of  discourse: are we talking about 
discourses fixed by a notion of  “illegitimate and dangerous access to numinous 
power”? Or should we listen to the more radical proposal on the following 
page: “What gets labelled magic is arbitrary and depends upon the society in 
question”? (246; my emphasis) These two claims appear to be at odds with each 
other, for if  it is about discourses on access to “numinous power,” then the 
application of  “magic” is not strictly speaking arbitrary, but rather contingent 
on what is considered “numinous” and “powerful.”
The source of  this ambiguity is, perhaps, found in Stratton’s aim to strike a 
balance between two dominant present-day approaches to magic: those who 
want to ditch the overarching second-order concept while focusing solely on 
emic categories, and those who wish to create a better category that can be 
employed for useful comparative research. This agenda is entirely in keeping 
with the aims of  this volume at large. In practice, however, Stratton leans 
closer to the first of  these two trends. One could, for example, conceivably 
use this framework to do comparisons that focus on discursive formations 
of  alterity across different cultures and historical periods, but even this will 
need further calibration before offering a manageable research program. As 
Stratton writes, after emphasising the particularity of  the Western, European 
(or Mediterranean?) discourse on magic:
This is not to say that non-European cultures do not have similar discourses of  
alterity which resemble magic; but it is important to clarify that those discursive 
formations have their own history, social dynamics and local variations that are 
essential to comprehending them as cultural products. (248)
Instead of  comparative research on “magic,” we could envision parallel his-
tories of  alterity across cultures, where “magic” would be one such discourse 
in “the West.”
Interestingly, it becomes clear at the end of  Stratton’s article that she cannot 
do without a consideration of  “what people actually did” in order to make her 
most important point: that the discursive formation of  “magic” in antiquity 
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shifted considerably, whereas the practices remained stable:
In all these cases, from curses to amulets, the practice of  magic … was amazingly 
consistent across the Mediterranean world … Significantly, despite this consistency in 
the material remains of  magic, representations of  magic from different times and places 
diverge in an extraordinary way from the material record … (254; my emphasis)
In other words, the argument rests on an operative distinction between the 
practice of  magic and its material remains on the one hand, and representations 
of  magic on the other. 
Randall Styers’ contribution continues the focus from Stratton’s article. 
Styers is well known for his 2004 book Making Magic: Religion, Magic, and Science 
in the Modern World. It made a persuasive and influential argument that the 
category “magic” reflects the struggle of  moderns to purify the concepts with 
which they describe themselves (e.g. “science,” “reason,” “religion”). Thus 
magic is inseparably connected to Reformation, Enlightenment, imperialist, 
and colonialist projects of  identity formation and ultimately of  domination. 
Styers’ essay in the present collection is a crash-course in this by now rather 
familiar view. Styers is the most direct eliminativist among the theoreticians 
sampled in this volume, and as such it may be valuable to quote one passage 
that again highlights the tension between eliminativism and those who seek to 
do something new with the term. Styers writes:
[I]t appears that there is little value in attempting to formulate a definition of  magic 
as some type of  stable object of  study. The term is too amorphous and shape shifting 
– and its deployment too polemical – ever to offer up any meaningful conceptual 
clarity, particularly in any type of  trans-cultural or trans-historical fashion. (258; 
emphasis added)
The key here, I suggest, is “stable object of  study.” We have to agree with Styers 
that the concept of  “magic” taken on face value is useless for comparative 
research. We also agree that it is inappropriate, if  not impossible from a logical 
point of  view, to try and stabilise it through stipulated definition. In other words, 
if  we insist on seeing all usages of  the term throughout history together, there 
is no doubt that the word is amorphous and shape-shifting (few terms wouldn’t 
be). But singular uses of  the term within this broad semantic field may very 
well point to stable objects of  study. This is precisely what the “patterns of  
magicity” approach would seem to suggest. We could, for example, argue that 
“manipulative ritual practices” constitute a stable object, analytically construed, 
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that can be studied cross-culturally and cross-historically. Whether or not we 
want to call such rituals “magic,” of  course, is another question.
On this note, it seems appropriate to end with some reflections on the 
one essay that does argue for a new, stable definition of  the concept that 
enables broad-scale comparisons. Jesper Sørensen is notable for the book A 
Cognitive Theory of  Magic (2007), based on his doctoral dissertation, and for 
his involvement with a number of  recent studies applying neurocognitive 
and experimental approaches to ritual action.7 Sørensen’s contribution to 
Defining Magic recapitulates the key points of  that work, updated with some 
new experimental results and conceptual developments.
Sørensen provides a useful contrast to both Stratton and Styers: while their 
focus was on discourses that construe certain practices (of  others), Sørensen’s 
is on how to theorize certain stable, pan-human features of  ritual behaviour. 
Thus we have moved from the “representations of  magic” to the “practices 
of  magic,” to use Stratton’s perhaps unintentional, but nevertheless apt, 
distinction.
Sørensen approaches ritual by drawing on tools from the cognitive 
sciences, especially theories on metaphors and conceptual blending coming 
out of  cognitive linguistics. He attempts to refine what he considers to be the 
prototype of  “magic” (that is, its most central features and examples), identify 
cognitive elements required for its operation and thus turn the category into 
a set of  experimentally testable propositions about ritual actions and agent-
level interpretations of  ritual efficacy.  On these grounds he is able to make 
distinctions between different types of  rituals, and even make some predictions 
about the relation between ritual form and notions of  efficacy (235–39). This 
work should be seen in the context of  the long-standing endeavour within the 
cognitive science of  religion to theorise ritual forms.8 
While I am sympathetic to the general thrust of  this approach, there are 
also problems here. First of  all: why continue insisting on a difference between 
religious and magical rituals? Would it not be less confusing to treat “ritual” on 
its own (or better yet: ritualized action), and delineate various types based 
on fine-grained analysis of  bottom-up cognitive processes that account for 
7 See e.g. the overview in Uffe Schjoedt et al., “Cognitive Resource Depletion in Religious 
Interactions,” Religion, Brain, & Behavior 3.1(2013): 29–86.
8 E.g. E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. McCauley, Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition 
and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Harvey Whitehouse, Modes of  
Religiosity: A Cognitive Theory of  Religious Transmission (Oxford: Altamira Press, 2004).
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universal differences, without invoking these higher-level concepts when 
classifying them? Sørensen clearly recognizes the problem, and spends the 
last few pages of  the essay in an apologetic mode (239–41). His proposed 
solution is to abandon classification of  rituals as magical or religious, in favour 
of  a focus on magic as “an interpretive strategy towards ritual actions utilized by 
individuals in particular situations.” (240) But does this resolve the problem? 
Indeed, does Sørensen even need the term “magic” to do the work that he 
does so well? Doesn’t the labelling and juxtaposition of  these two interpretive 
strategies to rituals just perpetuate unnecessary semantic confusion and even 
false disagreement with the important discourse-oriented analyses that occupy 
scholars such as Stratton and Styers? It seems we could avoid some equivocation 
issues by dropping the terminology and use other, more descriptive, terms.
This is precisely the sort of  problem that Stausberg and Otto’s “patterns 
of  magicity” approach – and, I would suggest, the related building-block 
approach – might help us resolve. Sørensen’s cognitive theory could, for 
example, be construed as being specifically about ritual efficacy (Meff) rather 
than “MAGIC” as such. This, it seems to me, would enable us to do several 
forms of  important and complementary work in parallel, without getting into 
fruitless disputes over who has figured out “the right way” to circumscribe 
“MAGIC.” Providing a framework that enables future students and scholars 
to see the compatibility of  different approaches to “magic,” and a language in 
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Damon Zacharias Lycourinos, ed. Occult Traditions. Colac: Numen Books, 2012. 
308 pp. ISBN: 978-0987158130. $29.95. 
To speak with Bruce Lincoln, studying religion means historicizing that which 
often poses as transcendent. The history of  religions critically examines 
religious claims, seeking to uncover the historical and cultural circumstances 
through which they came to be regarded as timeless truths.1 Thus, studying 
religion challenges the mechanisms through which these systems create 
meaning and gain legitimacy. Western esotericism often relies on notions of  
tradition or eternal wisdom passed down through the ages, its timeless essence 
unshaken by the mundanities of  political struggle and sociocultural change. 
However, the ability to distinguish between truth claims and truth; to recognize 
how the historical, cultural, and political have fundamentally shaped that which 
masquerades as transcendent; in essence, to de-mystify the mystical, must be 
the starting point of  all sound research on esotericism. 
Naturally, this does not mean that practitioners cannot conduct sound 
research. Armed with an awareness of  the potential pitfalls and the vital 
differences between emic and etic perspectives, it is undoubtedly possible 
to be an excellent scholar of  one’s own religion or spirituality. Failure in this 
regard results in speculative universalizations, anachronism, and occlusion 
of  power relations. Sadly, Occult Traditions, described on the back cover as the 
collaborative endeavour of  scholars and practitioners alike, provides abundant 
proof  of  this. 
Occult Traditions covers a rich selection of  topics. Three chapters – two by 
1 Bruce Lincoln, “Theses on Method,” Method and Theory in the Study of  Religion 8, no. 3 (1996): 
225–27.
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editor Damon Lycourinos and one by Aaron Cheak – deal with the Greek 
Magical Papyri (PGM). Christopher A. Plaisance bridges the gap between 
antiquity and early modernity with chapters on the legacy of  Neoplatonism 
in occult theology as well as medieval and renaissance angel magic. David 
Rankine, Ioannis Marathakis, and Christopher A. Smith address different 
aspects of  early modern and modern magic books. The volume also treats 
modern occultism, in a chapter on Julius Evola by Lycourinos, and two chapters 
on Wicca by Sorita D’Este and Melissa Harrington respectively. Gwendolyn 
Toynton discusses divinatory practices and Thai Buddhism, respectively, in two 
chapters. In addition, the work includes chapters on ancient Egyptian religion, 
the use of  incense, and a number of  outlines for magical ritual, by Lycourinos, 
Matthew Levi Stephens, Companion Abraxas, and Tess Dawson.
Regrettably, the wide historical and geographical scope comes at the 
expense of  context and coherence. The reader is not offered an intellectually 
satisfactory explanation as to how, for instance, the PGM, Icelandic magic, 
and Buddhism in Thailand fit together as part of  an interconnected “occult 
tradition.” The selection appears arbitrary, and possibly based on what the 
editor and contributors personally find most appealing. Contrary to reigning 
academic standards, Occult Traditions does not treat esotericism or occultism 
as a group of  genealogically linked systems, texts, or ideas, or as a discursive 
field produced through particular historical processes.2 Instead, it appears to 
view its subject matter as a unified tradition based on a set of  loosely defined 
criteria, supposedly constituting its perennial “essence.” This was a common 
view in the early years of  esotericism research, inspired by the ideas of  figures 
such as Mircea Eliade and partly due to the influence of  Traditionalism. More 
recently, this approach has come under criticism as it downplays historical and 
cultural specificity in favour of  an illusory trans-historical coherence.3 More-
over, it hides the role that scholars have played in constructing esotericism as 
an object, as well as the power relations inherent to this process.4 
Occult Traditions draws on a romanticized view of  a sort of  spirituality of  
2 See e.g. Wouter J. Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge in Western Culture 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Kocku von Stuckrad, Western Esoterisicm: A Brief  
History of  Secret Knowledge (London; Oakville: Equinox Publishing, 2005).
3 Egil Asprem and Kennet Granholm, “Constructing Esotericisms: Sociological, Historical 
and Critical Approaches to the Invention of  Tradition,” in Contemporary Esotericism, eds. Asprem 
and Granholm (Sheffield; Bristol: Equinox, 2013); Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy; see 
also Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, The Western Esoteric Traditions: A Historical Introduction (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008) for a more recent example of  this approach.
4 Asprem and Granholm, “Constructing Esotericisms.”
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subversion, manifesting throughout history and offering an alternative to 
hegemonic religious dogma to those brave and curious enough to explore it. 
In her foreword, Toynton waxes lyrical about a time when “both magic and 
religion worked together to contact the divine.” (11) In her view, the anthology 
shows occultism’s authenticity and ancient roots, clearly distinguishing it 
from the “rootless” New Age. Lycourinos in his introduction describes a 
succession of  people throughout history embodying “a visible representation 
of  spiritual virility … aligning themselves purely with the laws of  the pure 
forces of  the cosmos.” (17) He proposes a definition of  occultism as “the 
theory and practice of  specific fields of  discourse involving a particular human 
awareness and performance within a worldview characterized by a resistance 
to the dominance of  either sterile logic or doctrinal faith.” (15)
Ahistorical concepts such as “spiritual virility” and “pure cosmic forces” do 
not explain how or why occultism has developed in such disparate ways over 
time. Moreover, it remains unclear why this supposedly perennial quest for 
hidden wisdom is often conspicuously influenced by contemporary discourses, 
power negotiations, and cultural exchanges. Historical reality also challenges the 
idea of  a coherent, timeless tradition. Lycourinos and Cheak unconvincingly 
try to solve the problem posed by the syncretistic elements of  their subject 
matter by attributing them to a “natural receptivity” in magic. As it is not made 
clear how this supposed receptivity differs from syncretism in actual practice, 
these statements appear to be part of  a strategy to present particular beliefs 
or practices as more enlightened than others, by denigrating those that do not 
comply with a supposedly unified tradition.
Several of  the authors base their distinctions on similarly emic notions. 
Smith, Rankine, Lycourinos, and Cheak regard magic aimed at fulfilling 
material needs as inferior and less worthy of  study than more theurgically 
oriented practices. In his chapter on the Icelandic Galdrabok, Smith dismisses 
spells that involve elements of  Judeo-Christian doctrine as not being examples 
of  “real” magic. This conclusion seems mostly to be based on his personal 
preferences, as Judeo-Christian borrowings are more common than not in 
spellbooks from this time, and are indeed present in parts of  the PGM as 
well as the entire grimoire genre. Toynton disparagingly distinguishes between 
omen divination and what she scathingly refers to as passive “superstition,” in 
contrast to the active seeking out of  portents. Rankine refers to the Faustian 
devil pact detailed in a famous grimoire as something that “only a desperate 
man with no magical experience would consider.” (104) Again, this appears to 
be Rankine’s personal opinion as a magician rather than a scholarly assessment. 
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The supposed inferiority of  magic aimed at personal gain has problematic 
political implications. In early modern Europe, alliances with the Devil were 
often sought by those with limited access to worldly power.5 The eclectic 
magic outlined in the grimoires can partly be seen as a spirituality of  resistance 
through which people could articulate desires outside of  the frameworks of  
church hegemony. Dismissing such practices simply because they are directed 
at material gain misses a crucial point about their subversive power.
While magic practitioners are entitled to their personal preferences, it 
is troublesome when arbitrary value judgments regarding what occultism 
“ought” to be are touted as scholarship. The dichotomies between “pure” 
religiosity and “syncretism,” “superstition,” or “popular belief ” are artificial 
constructs, often invoked by those already in power to solidify religious hege-
mony. The constructed traditions are rarely as coherent, lofty, or pure as their 
advocates would have them, but often involve strong elements of  syncre-
tism and pragmatism based on subjective preference. This is clearly the case 
in Occult Traditions, many of  whose contributors seem to base their ideas of  
what “true” occultism is on personal preferences. This strategy has frequently 
been employed by religious institutions, which establish artificial concepts of  
religious purity in order to suppress subaltern voices.6 One example of  this is 
how the Catholic Church has contributed to the marginalisation of  women, 
the working class, and LGBTQ people by labelling their beliefs and practices 
superstitious or even satanic, simultaneously promoting the viewpoints of  
its male, middle-class leadership as orthodoxy.7 Rather than reproduce such 
dichotomies, scholars should seek to understand the processes through which 
certain forms of  religiosity are classified as purer or nobler than others. Several 
of  the chapters in the anthology constitute fascinating source material for 
future studies in this area.
5 Soili-Maria Olli, Visioner av världen: hädelse och djävulspakt i justitierevisionen 1680–1789 (Umeå: 
Institutionen för historiska studier, Umeå universitet, 2007); Mikael Häll, Skogsrået, näcken 
och djävulen: erotiska naturväsen och demonisk sexualitet i 1600- och 1700-talens Sverige (Stockholm: 
Malört, 2013).
6 Randall Styers, Making Magic: Religion, Magic, and Science in the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); Meredith McGuire, Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in Everyday Life 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Lena Gemzöe, Feminine Matters: Women’s Religious 
Practices in a Portuguese Town (Stockholm: Dept. of  Social Anthropology, Stockholm University, 
2000); Manon Hedenborg-White, “Death as a Woman: Santa Muerte and Religious ’othering’ 
in Mexico,” in Vile Women: Female Evil in Fact, Fiction and Mythology, eds. Anthony Patterson & 
Marilena Zackheos (Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2014).
7 Andrew Chesnut, Devoted to Death: Santa Muerte, the Skeleton Saint (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012); Gemzöe, Feminine Matters; McGuire, Lived Religion.
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Deconstructing truth claims that masquerade as transcendent and apolitical 
is a vital step towards uncovering religious power relations. Failing to do so, 
one instead risks cementing existing hierarchies. A potent example of  this is 
Lycourinos’ chapter on radical-right thinker Julius Evola. Lycourinos writes 
that the popularization of  sexual magic in the late 19th century is based on 
affirmations of  the individual as an “ultimate force in the universe” and the 
tremendous power of  free will (210). This description betrays an uncritical 
stance towards emic understandings of  modern sexual magic, and disregards 
the power negotiations permeating its development. Lycourinos neglects to 
mention that Evola did not view all individuals as supreme universal forces. 
Evola believed women incapable of  spiritual advancement in their own right, 
and saw women as mere helpers and tools for the male magician.8 Analysing 
Evola’s work without taking his misogyny into account has problematic po-
litical implications, as it runs the considerable risk of  normalising these ideas. 
Moreover, the idea of  the sex magical discourse of  the nineteenth and twen-
tieth century being a manifestation of  cosmic truth or eternal human urges is 
challenged by the fact that it is so clearly influenced by contemporary medical 
discourses on sexual difference, the emphasis on gender as complementary in 
society at large, and the elevation of  a heterosexual “ideology of  pleasure” in 
response to the perceived threats of  homosexuality and promiscuity.9 
Despite there being several scholars among its contributors, it is unclear 
whether Occult Traditions is intended to be an academic work. Most of  the 
contributions betray a fundamental ignorance of  the theoretical and meth-
odological advances made in esotericism research in recent decades, and with 
the exception of  Christopher A. Plaisance’s contributions, the chapters are 
clearly coloured by the authors’ spiritual convictions. Large parts of  the book 
are marred by a blurring of  emic and etic perspectives, producing a form of  
normative, occult theology that promotes the authors’ religious views under 
the guise of  scholarship. While this is unlikely to affect academic discourse on 
esotericism at large, scholarly examinations are highly valued in the esoteric 
milieu and are often cited (sometimes contrary to the intentions of  the scholar) 
8 Julius Evola, Revolt Against the Modern World (Rochester: Inner Traditions, 2001), 157–66.
9 Pia Laskar, Ett bidrag till heterosexualitetens historia: kön, sexualitet och njutningsnormer i 
sexhandböcker 1800–1920 (Stockholm: Modernista, 2005); Michel Foucault, The History of  
Sexuality., vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990); Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and 
Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); Hugh B. Urban, 
Magia Sexualis: Sex, Magic and Liberation in Modern Western Esotericism (Berkeley: University of  
California Press, 2006).
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for purposes of  legitimacy and authority.10 This can contribute to cementing 
existing power relations, especially when misogynist or racist views are normal-
ized and treated as politically unproblematic. As the book presents an attractive 
range of  topics, and some of  the chapters are actually adequate introductions 
to their subject matter, the volume may also confuse students or scholars in 
other fields seeking to gain an understanding of  what esotericism research is all 
about. Although the field has come far in recent years and can boast a number 
of  world-class scholars, its position is still somewhat fragile in the broader 
context of  academia. Thus, the discussions surrounding how to do research 
on Western esotericism beyond apologeticism and theology must continue.
Manon Hedenborg-White
manon.hedenborg-white@teol.uu.se
10 Asprem and Granholm, “Constructing Esotericisms.” 
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Frank Klaassen. The Transformations of  Magic: Illicit Learned Magic in the Later 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance. University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2013. x + 280 pp. ISBN: 978-0-271-05626-5. $69.95.
One of  the key questions in the history of  European “learned magic” in 
recent decades has concerned the putative novelty of  the works produced 
by Renaissance magi. Did scholar-magicians like Ficino, Agrippa, and Dee 
constitute a radical break from the magical practices of  the Middle Ages, or 
is the longue durée that binds them more salient? The notion that the humanist 
magicians constituted a distinct break with the past has long been popular 
among Renaissance scholars, especially in the wake of  Frances Yates’ now half  
a century old work. Along with a broader reevaluation and rejection of  the 
Yates paradigm, however, scholars have come to ask how much of  this novelty 
was really in the eye of  the beholder  – a product of  selection and confirmation 
biases on the part of  scholars who needed to see the Renaissance as an age of  
novelty, progressive thought, modern values, and philosophical sophistication, 
contrasted with the “dark ages” and its superstitious “dirty magic.”1
Frank Klaassen belongs to a cast of  historians who not only argue that the 
novelty of  Renaissance magic is greatly overblown, but proceed to excavate 
the manuscript traditions that link medieval and early modern magic through 
meticulous archival research. The Transformations of  Magic presents Klaassen’s 
work in monograph form for the first time. The book is published with 
Pennsylvania State University Press’s “Magic in History” series, where it stands 
in good company with other titles by key scholars in this revisionist current, 
including Claire Fanger, Richard Kieckhefer, Benedek Láng and others. 
One of  the things to commend this useful book is its clearly articulated 
and consistently executed methodology. Instead of  focusing strictly on 
the substantial content of  medieval and early modern magical books and 
manuscripts, Klaassen approaches them from a forensic angle, asking whether 
we can learn something new from considering the physical manuscripts 
themselves: that is, “their mise-en-page, their organization, the works with 
which they were bound together, and how they were recorded in inventories 
and catalogues.” (iv) Paying attention to these material details allows Klaassen 
1 Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (Chicago: University of  Chicago 
Press, 1964), 80–81.
© 2015 Egil Asprem. 
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of  the 
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
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to get at the editorial decisions that were made by scribes, and assess their role 
in shaping the transmission and gradual reinterpretation of  the library of  magic 
texts. Mildly quantitative analyses of  what kinds of  texts were bound together 
with each other at various times also offer important clues to understanding 
the subtle shift in perceptions of  magic (70–75). In fact, it is precisely this sort 
of  analysis that makes it possible for Klaassen to formulate one of  the big 
questions that the book tries to answer: Why is it that, numerically speaking, 
the class of  texts known as “image magic” went into decline around the 16th 
century, while the class of  “ritual magic” persisted? Moreover, why did image 
magical texts stop being transmitted separately and instead become embedded 
in collections primarily concerned with ritual magic? 
The distinction between image magic and ritual magic is thus central to the 
book’s project. By image magic, Klaassen (and others with him) means practices 
that draw upon astrological images and talismans for effecting changes in the 
natural world, whether related to medicine and healing or the acquisition of  
wealth and material success. Drawing on a philosophical framework lifted from 
late Neoplatonism, this type of  “magic” (typically, these texts do not themselves 
use this term) would commonly be seen as a form of  magia naturalis related 
more to disciplines such as natural philosophy and medicine than to theology 
and religion. In terms of  causal mechanisms, the images were thought to be 
effective by correspondences and qualitates occultae rather than the mediation 
of  spirits. By contrast, “ritual magic” denotes magical operations that explicitly 
deal with the summoning of  angels, demons, or other spirit beings, presenting 
techniques for binding, questioning, and entering into conversation with them, 
or receiving visions, prophesies, and higher knowledge.  
As Klaassen shows, these two traditions were almost completely distinct 
throughout the Middle Ages, being transmitted in separate streams. In seeking 
answers for why they transformed and eventually merged, Klaassen moves from 
his forensic analysis of  manuscripts to what is essentially a “problem history” 
of  medieval and early modern magic.2 The transformations of  the two magical 
text traditions – both in terms of  content and patterns of  transmission – are 
linked to quite specific dilemmas faced by authors, scribes and practitioners. 
Through a clever narrative strategy, Klaassen introduces these problems by 
focusing on two concrete practitioners: an unknown apothecary worried about 
his soul after acquiring wealth through the use of  image magic, and the monk 
2 On problem history, see Egil Asprem, The Problem of  Disenchantment: Scientific Naturalism and 
Esoteric Discourse, 1900–1939 (Leiden: Brill, 2014).
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and magician John of  Morigny, the author of  the 14th century Liber florum 
celestis doctrinae and its largely autobiographical prologue, Liber visionum. 
The two dilemmas are succinctly summarized in Klaassen’s introduction:
 
The apothecary must decide whether to believe that an astrological image that 
made him rich derived its power from occult natural properties or from deceptive 
demons. Brother John, by contrast, struggles to reconcile the fact that ritual magic 
was transmitted in books – books that one should assume were corrupt – but 
could only be learned, practiced, and understood through experiences that were 
not really communicable through the written word. (2)
In other words, the problem in image magic is one of  attribution and discernment: 
are the images causally efficient due to natural properties and forces, or 
(presumably demonic) spirits? How can the practitioner tell the difference in 
specific cases? For ritual magic the problem is a different one: how does the 
practitioner know for sure that s/he is learning from a legitimate source, and 
that the experiential knowledge obtained is authentic and genuine?
Klaassen’s argument is that these two problems had a creative effect on the 
transformations of  magic in the late medieval and early modern periods, as 
practitioners tried to solve the dilemmas. For image magic, the predominant 
solution was provided by scholastic rationalism, which offered ways to ensure 
the legitimacy of  images if  they could be given broadly naturalistic explanations. 
Thus, Klaassen demonstrates the influence of  scholastic natural philosophy 
not only on the interpretation of  magical texts, but also on their selection 
and transmission. The vehicle of  this transformation is above all the 13th 
century Speculum astronomiae, which became the foremost authoritative treatise 
on whether astrological images were lawful or contrary to nature (i.e. demonic). 
Late-medieval scribes and collectors had the Speculum at hand when transcribing 
astrological texts, as evidenced by the fact that they were frequently bound 
together. According to Klaassen, the effect of  the Speculum’s editorial influence 
was that, by 1500, the extant set of  image magical manuscripts was drastically 
reduced from about forty to two. Moreover, the two texts that continued to 
be copied and circulated – Thābit ibn Qurra’s De imaginibus and a work on 
astrological images attributed to Ptolemy – were heavily redacted to make sure 
no ritualistic elements were left (28–29). Works that had previously been quite 
popular, such as the Liber lune, had embedded astrological images in elaborate 
practices of  suffumigation and the drawing of  the names and magical squares 
of  planetary spirits. Following the heresiological criteria established by the 
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Speculum, such ceremonial elements were certain signs of  demonic intercession, 
and reason to condemn a manuscript. Scribes largely heeded this call, and 
sought to edit out ceremonial traces from the few texts that were passed on. 
The resolution to Brother John’s dilemma is of  a very different order. While 
image magic could be discerned by reference to an authoritative text, which 
then stabilized the transmission process, the core dynamic driving the textual 
tradition of  ritual magic is an iterative relationship between instructions for 
practice and repeated alterations of  ritual texts based on private, subjectively 
convincing revelatory experiences effected by these ritual techniques. Klaassen 
makes an intriguing, and in my view convincing argument that the development 
we see from the Ars Notoria via works like the Liber florum and the Liber juratus, 
to the famous experiments of  John Dee and other, lesser known transcripts 
of  early modern angel summoning, is driven by author-magicians who cast 
themselves as divinely sanctioned, visionary editors. They treat earlier texts as 
recipes for achieving experiential knowledge, and proceed to modify the texts, 
in a pragmatic fashion, to accord with knowledge obtained from practice and 
experience. This has resulted in an enduring but constantly changing stream 
of  visionary practice texts, which may, in fact, be traced all the way to the 
present day. 
Understanding the dynamic of  this textual tradition, then, it becomes par-
amount to focus on the experiential dimension of  learning to have visions, 
and using these to alter ritual practices. The close reading of  practices involved 
in some of  these texts, and Klaassen’s suggestion that processes of  training, 
attentiveness, and mental disciplining were at work in ritual magic is thus, in 
my view, a significant call for further work. Above all, it cries out for further 
explication in terms of  the cognitive science of  religion. Tanya Luhrmann’s 
work on the role of  inner sense cultivation in so-called kataphatic (i.e., imagery 
oriented) prayer traditions seems an extremely relevant connection.3 Further-
more, Klaassen’s valuable remarks on the autopoiesis of  ritual magical texts 
suggests fruitful lines of  inquiry that similarly require a more interdisciplinary 
methodology and affords comparisons with contemporary magical practice.
The mixed methodology, the insightful analysis of  individual texts, and the 
questions visited in the process are all major strengths of  The Transformations 
of  Magic. Where the book is less successful is in providing clear and satisfying 
conclusions to the main task it sets itself, namely of  explaining why image 
3 E.g. Tanya M. Luhrmann and Rachel Morgain, “Prayer as Inner Sense Cultivation: An 
Attentional Learning Theory of  Spiritual Expereince,” Ethos 40, no. 4 (2012): 359–89.
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magic declined and got incorporated into the ritual magical corpus after 1500. 
While Klaassen provides lucid analysis of  fascinating material, the prose tends 
to get repetitious and summary in places where one would expect concluding 
points. The best example is in the handling of  the why-question after having 
demonstrated that Renaissance magicians (contrary to received opinion) were 
generally more interested in ritual magic than scholastic image magic. While 
a number of  hypotheses are visited at various points throughout the last two 
chapters of  the book – including the anti-scholastic rhetoric of  the humanists, 
the rise of  Protestantism, the secularization of  monasteries and a hypothesized 
demographic shift in magical practitioners – Klaassen never clearly takes a 
stand among the alternatives, or develops a new thesis. Instead, the final con-
clusion (215–16) evades the real issue by stating in somewhat circular fashion 
that “medieval ritual magic and Renaissance magic held similar assumptions, 
sought similar goals, and often employed nearly identical techniques.” But, 
since Klaassen has already explained this commonality in terms of  a direct 
influence from the medieval ritual magical material, the ensuing affinity cannot 
be invoked as explanation for the selection. 
Despite shortcomings of  this type, The Transformations of  Magic is an inspir-
ing and innovative work of  scholarship on illicit learned magic. It sheds new 
light on problems with the transmission and transformation of  magical tradi-
tions in a systematic manner. But more than this, it opens up important new 
vistas of  inquiry for scholars interested in the longue durée of  ritual magical texts, 
and suggests that more work is required on the complex, culturally productive 
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Sheila A. Spector, ed., trans. Francis Mercury van Helmont’s Sketch of  Christian 
Kabbalism. Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2012. viii + 178 pp. ISBN: 9789004226555. 
€99 / $132.
The important scholarship of  Alison Coudert on Franciscus Mercurius Van 
Helmont (1614 –1699) has contributed to a revival of  interest in this intriguing 
figure. Well respected by John Locke, Gottfried Leibniz and Anne Conway, 
F. M. Van Helmont had a complex profile: like his more famous father Jan 
Baptist (1579–1641) he was a passionate alchemist and physician but, unlike 
him, he had a sustained and deep understanding of  Jewish Kabbalah. He was 
also impressively erudite: despite complaining that his father did not teach 
him Latin, F.M. Van Helmont managed not only to master this language, but 
also Hebrew and Syriac. His talent for languages is proven in a book called 
Adumbratio Kabbalae Christianae, where he cites from the Hebrew Kabbalah and 
the Syriac New Testament.
This little work, which first appeared as an anonymous appendix to 
Christian Knorr von Rosenroth’s Kabbala Denudata, is the subject of  an English 
translation by Sheila A. Spector. The Latin title is rendered here as Sketch 
of  Christian Kabbalism, a title which already raises some questions. Why does 
Spector prefer the modern-sounding and unusual word “Kabbalism” to the 
much more customary “Kabbalah” or, as in the original text, “Kabbala”? The 
transformation of  “Kabbalah” into an “-ism” makes it sound like a modern 
religious movement, if  not a separate religion from Judaism. 
The translation in itself  is generally acceptable, though there are some 
issues, mainly caused by Spector’s choice not to translate Biblical passages 
but render them according to the English Standard Version (ESV) of  the 
Bible. This modern version does not always match well with the Latin Vulgate 
Bible Van Helmont used. Consequently, the translation lacks the subtlety of  
Van Helmont’s interpretation of  the Latin text. For instance, at page 42, Van 
Helmont cites Genesis 1:1 as “Per Principium (i.e. Messiam,) creavit Deus coelum & 
terram,” which Spector translates as “In the beginning God (i.e. the Messiah) 
created the heavens and the earth.” (44) The intention of  Franciscus is clearly 
lost here, since what he says is that the Principle (Bereshit) is the Messiah, not 
that God is the Messiah (which makes little sense). At page 46, Spector also 
uses ESV to translate “Primus homo terrenus de terra: Secundus Homo Dominus (sive: 
© 2015 Georgiana D. Hedesan. 
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of  the 
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
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Tetragrammaton) de coelo” as “The first man was from the earth, a man of  dust; 
the second man is from heaven [as the bone of  the Tetragrammaton].” Yet Van 
Helmont’s interpolation on the Tetragrammaton refers to God (“Dominus”) 
not to “heaven.” Calling heaven “the bone of  the Tetragrammaton” is not 
warranted by the text. Other translation choices are also disputable: for 
instance, at page 44, Franciscus calls the first Adam “cogitatio suprema”; this 
should have more appropriately been translated as “supreme thought” rather 
than “supreme knowledge” as Spector renders it (45). Such examples suggest 
that the English translation should always be compared with the original Latin.
In addition to the translation, Spector also provides an introduction, which 
offers a helpful explanation of  Lurianic Kabbalah but can be misleading. First, 
Spector misrepresents Van Helmont as a “theologian” (2); in fact, in the period 
“theology” was a higher degree that was acquired after the liberal arts (three-year) 
degree. Yet Van Helmont never attended university. He was more of  a self-
trained virtuoso that in Adumbratio styled himself  as a “Christian philosopher.”
More problematically, Spector claims that Van Helmont’s primary intention 
in Adumbratio was not to convert Jews to Christianity but “to attract Christians 
to Kabbalism.” (19) Leaving aside for a moment the issue of  what this 
“Kabbalism” might be, F.M. Van Helmont is outspoken that the purpose 
of  his work is to serve for the conversion of  Jews. Why doubt this intent? 
Spector is basing her conclusion on rather questionable speculation: according 
to her, Van Helmont would have been aware that “only those Jews who had 
already decided to convert would initiate a dialogue by inviting a Christian to 
undermine Judaism.” (19) Moreover, she assumes that Van Helmont would 
have equally known that an aggregate of  passages of  the New Testament 
would never have converted a Jew. 
Spector seems to be projecting modern presumptions on Van Helmont. 
First of  all, her assertions are not sufficiently grounded in any in-depth 
understanding of  the Flemish virtuoso’s character. For instance, what makes 
her think that he would have had such a clear perspective on how a conversion 
would or would not be achieved? What evidence supports her argument that 
Franciscus would have been so devious as to write a book that claims to 
convert Jews in order to, in fact, “convert” Christians? Secondly, Spector does 
not seem to have studied the issue of  conversion in the period at any depth. 
In fact, she assumes without any evidence that a Kabbalist would never have 
engaged with Christian arguments in the period.
Apparently unconcerned with historical fact, Spector goes even further with 
her suppositions. Van Helmont, she tells us, rejected organised Christianity, 
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and believed in a form of  gnosis “that obviated the need for intercession by 
any religious institutions.” Not only this, but Van Helmont actually thought 
that the Kabbalistic Zohar “would have at least as much historical authority as 
the Greek New Testament.” (20) All these stark statements culminate with the 
affirmations that Van Helmont wanted to replace Church doctrine with Lurianic 
Kabbalism and that in Adumbratio he deceitfully “superimposes a veneer of  
Christianity over Lurianism.” The evidence for these radical assertions? 
Spector gives no citations; we are supposed to take them at face value. If  we 
did not know Van Helmont lived in the 17th century, we could conceive of  
him as a non-Christian worshipper of  a new religion called “Lurianism” or 
“Kabbalism.” He could be perceived as an early modern Madonna joining the 
New-Age Kabbalah Centre. In reality, historical evidence shows that, while 
proffering unorthodox doctrines such as the transmigration of  souls, Van 
Helmont saw himself  as a Christian thinker. Nominally Catholic, Van Helmont 
did not wish to attach himself  to any Christian sect, but felt closest to the 
Quaker movement.
It is fairly clear that history does not play a role in Spector’s analysis. 
In fact, her arguments depend on purely textual analysis. Yet they too are 
unconvincing because they are grounded in the aforementioned assumptions. 
For instance, Spector claims that the last two lines of  the introductory epigraph 
are “deliberately incoherent” or that the Christian philosopher’s reference to 
“that person we call the Messiah” is an “abstract vocabulary” that can be 
interpreted ambiguously (21–22). This is forcing the text in ways that are not 
warranted at all; for me, as an early modern scholar, there is nothing particularly 
ambiguous or incoherent about Franciscus’s statements. In fact, they strike me 
as much clearer than those of  his father, Jan Baptist, whose Latin is complex 
and abstruse. Yet no one has accused Jan Baptist of  wishing to convert anyone 
away from Catholicism (his proffered religion).
Moreover, a quick examination of  the book shows that it is mainly comprised 
of  an exposition of  the “Christian philosopher,” who is clearly an alter-ego 
of  Franciscus himself. Yet it seems somewhat absurd that Franciscus would 
cast himself  as a “Christian philosopher” without actually identifying as one, 
as Spector suggests. That Franciscus’s statements on behalf  of  Christianity are 
insincere seems an equally far-fetched claim. 
In fact, the tenuous position of  Spector’s argument is such that it leads to 
rather strange and self-contradictory arguments. For instance, she claims that 
in one section “Van Helmont abandons his pretext of  converting Jews,” (23) yet in 
another he “resumes his evangelical pose.” (24) We are not told why he would 
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be so inconsistent. More surprisingly, the last phrases of  the essay seem to 
completely abandon her previous arguments on behalf  of  Van Helmont’s 
“fake conversion intent” and of  his hidden “Lurianism.” Spector now admits 
that Franciscus “insists that Jewish conversion is a necessary component of  
restoration.” She also states that Van Helmont was a Christian “in the sense 
that he believed Jesus Christ to be the Son of  God and the Messiah.” (25) Thus 
an essay on how Van Helmont wished to direct Christians to “Kabbalism” 
ends by admitting that these claims are incorrect. 
Clearly, Franciscus was a heterodox Christian. Yet there is no in-text evidence 
that he wanted to destroy “Church doctrine” and replace it with “Lurianism.” 
After all, the primary Christian doctrine is the New Testament, and Adumbratio 
spends an inordinate amount of  text approvingly discussing its precepts. 
Although Van Helmont’s sympathies leaned toward the Lurianic Kabbalah, 
this did not mean that he did not believe in Christ and the New Testament. 
We can conclude that Van Helmont’s inclination toward the Lurianic Kabbalah 
was not dissimilar to Jacob Boehme’s theosophical speculation. Like Boehme 
and others of  the era, Franciscus looked for esoteric explanations of  Biblical 
truths, seeking to complement the Bible’s exoteric doctrine with what he saw 
as an esoteric complement transmitted by word of  mouth. This was not an 
uncommon belief  at the time, and did not make Franciscus less Christian or 
less intent on converting Jews. Rather, it is more likely that he thought that 
by revealing the concordance between Christianity and Lurianic Kabbalah 
educated Jews would see that the Messiah was really Christ. 
Spector should be commended for bringing Van Helmont’s text on Chris-
tian Kabbalah to a wider audience. The reader is advised to read Spector’s 
book as a primary source, using the English translation as an aid tool for the 
original Latin. Spector’s introduction to Lurianic Kabbalah will also prove 
helpful; however, in order to properly understand the intentions of  the text 
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Angel Millar. The Crescent and the Compass: Islam, Freemasonry, Esotericism, and 
Revolution in the Modern Age. Colac: Numen Books, 2015. 218 pp. ISBN 978-
0994252548. $19.95.
The field of  “Western esotericism” has witnessed a recent and long overdue 
upsurge in studies on global, “non-Western” and/or non-white forms of  
“esotericism.” Such is evidenced, for instance, in the anthologies Occultism in 
Global Perspective (2013) and Esotericism in African American Religious Experience 
(2015), but also in the topics discussed during the most recent conference 
of  the European Society for the Study of  Western Esotericism (ESSWE), 
“Western Esotericism and the East.” In line with these enterprises, the study 
of  the interstices between (Western) esotericism and Islam, and of  Islamic 
forms of  “esotericism,” is gaining ground. Angel Millar’s timely book, The 
Crescent and the Compass: Islam, Freemasonry, Esotericism, and Revolution in the Modern 
Age could be considered part of  this promising new context. It is important to 
note, however, that Millar’s survey is written for a general audience. 
As the title indicates, Millar, a journalist and author, sets out to explore the 
connections between Freemasonry – and affiliated esoteric movements and 
currents – and Islam. With regard to the former, Millar vows to be concerned 
with more “secretive, esoteric, and spiritual forms of  the fraternity” and, 
with regard to Islam, with “spirituality and radical thought,” primarily “over 
the last century and a half.” (13) These vague parameters do not become 
much more concrete, but we cannot dismiss the possibility that this lack of  
clear geographical, historical, or conceptual boundaries is a strategic move on 
Millar’s part, as it offers him ample room to include a very heterogeneous set 
of  subtopics and people. In fact, in describing ideas of  such widely diverse 
figures as Noble Drew Ali, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Anders Behring Breivik, 
and René Guénon, among many others, it seems as if  one of  the main goals 
of  Crescent and the Compass is to provide an overview of  the manifold persons, 
movements, currents, and institutions that in one way or another are grounded 
in, are connected to, or espouse ideas about Islam and Freemasonry, in diverse 
geographical, cultural, social, and historical contexts. 
Millar draws his ambitious web of  historical connections in eleven short 
chapters, complemented by an introduction, conclusion, and afterword. The 
first provides an introduction to Sufism; chapter two then offers a primer 
© 2015 Justine Bakker. 
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to its connections with Freemasonry. It explores many of  the instances in 
which the two “meet,” from the union of  Freemasonry and Sufism in Turkey 
to ostensible parallels in initiation rituals. The remaining nine sections each 
address a different context in which Islam has encountered Freemasonry and 
affiliated organizations, and/or the other way around. Masons, for instance, 
have sought inspiration in Islam, as is the case with those affiliated with the 
Noble Order of  the Mystic Shrine; Muslims, alternately, have joined Masonic 
lodges, as al-Afghani did. Likewise, Millar successfully directs our attention to 
the anti-Masonic tendencies in the Middle East, and to the interplay between 
Masonic influences and anti-Masonic tendencies in Breivik’s manifesto.
We should applaud Millar’s attempt to demonstrate and underscore this wide 
variety, which definitely is the text’s major strength: Millar argues convincingly 
that the historical connections between Muslims and Freemasonry are much 
more abundant, and much more complex, than is usually given credit for. 
Moreover, Millar successfully demonstrates that the relationship between Islam 
and Freemasonry is constantly shifting. For instance, whereas nineteenth-
century Islamic reformers believed in Freemasonry’s revolutionary potential 
to assist in their anti-colonial struggles, contemporary Islamists interpret 
the fraternity as the sinful root of  American culture and society. Likewise, 
Freemasons were drawn to Islam for a variety of  reasons, for instance because 
of  an interest in Islamic “mysticism” or because it offered an alternative to 
Christianity. However, the excess of  case studies is also the text’s foremost 
weakness. Due to the enumeration of  such a large number of  events and 
connections it is difficult not to get lost in the abundance of  details, which are 
sometimes informative and entertaining, but often unnecessary and excessive. 
One would have wished that Millar had been more critical in debating which 
connections to explore. 
One should note that Millar’s text also seems to have a second, underlying 
aim. In addition to exploring the connections between Islam and Freemasonry, 
Millar seeks to push his own spiritual agenda, which he makes explicit towards 
the end of  the text, but that haunts most of  his chapters: all religions, he argues, 
share a mystical core or essence, and the West should venture a quest to discover 
this “gnosis.” (181) This “turn towards the divine” would then not only provide 
solace from the abundance of  secularism, capitalism, materialism, and consumer 
culture in the modern West, but also offer a much-needed, more positive take 
on Islam that goes beyond the empty signifiers of  “multiculturalism.” Such 
an approach to religion, and esotericism more specifically, although popular 
in the heydays of  Mircea Eliade and Traditionalism, is largely dismissed in 
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today’s academy for its trans-historical and even a-historical tendencies. That 
said, Traditionalism does feature frequently as subject matter in Crescent and 
Compass. Millar’s sympathetic attitude towards it could not only explain its 
curious prominent role in the text, but also his ideas on the relationship 
between modernity, religion and spirituality.
To be sure, it seems that for Millar, certain “esoteric” forms of  Islam in 
particular, such as Sufism, are a crystallization of  the “gnosis” that he urges the 
West to find. In other words, Millar seems to suggest that his Western readers 
should take cue from the esoteric forms of  Islam that he claims underly the 
ideas of  many of  his protagonists. Unfortunately, though, Millar occasionally 
interprets their ideas through the prism of  his own spiritual agenda when 
the actual evidence is inconclusive. Take, for instance, the chapter on Shaykh 
Abdullah Quilliam (1856–1932). Quilliam was an early convert to Islam and 
founder of  the UK’s first mosque, but was also heavily involved with “fringe 
masonry.” Miller argues that Quilliam seemed to consider Islam as part of  
the same elite underground spiritual milieu as fringe Masonry, a milieu in 
which people drew “on ancient, and non-Western religions, and that sought to 
discover a secret common thread – either historical or theological – between 
them.” (71) However, as the evidence for the latter claim is largely absent from 
the text, Millar seems to overstate this last point, and does so in light of  his 
own ideological commitments.
The chapter on the role of  conspiracy theory in Islamic fundamentalist 
thought could, on the other hand, be interesting for readers of  this journal, 
not only given the absence of  Islamic voices in standard works on conspiracy 
theory, but also because conspiracy theories in Muslim societies seem to have 
a very different emphasis than their Western counterparts, which today often 
link Masonic lodges to the establishment of  a secret and totalitarian “New 
World Order.” One can construe from Millar’s text that in the Islamic world 
the emphasis often seems to lie on Masonic influences on cultural values. Millar 
conveys that “Islamists” regard the West as fundamentally “freemasonic” in 
nature, and thus see the Craft as the root of  such Western “evils” as women’s 
rights and pornography: a (Judeo-)Masonic conspiracy to corrupt “Muslim 
culture.” (131) Such theories are, according to Millar, part and parcel of  the 
current Islamist anti-Western propaganda, yet have been part of  Islamic 
cultures and societies since the nineteenth century, rooted as they were in 
European conspiracy theories, in particular The Protocols of  the Elders of  Zion. 
The next chapter, “Black Nationalism in the USA,” has the potential to 
be just as informative, given the frequent neglect of  African American voices 
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in these sorts of  texts and the academic study of  (Western) esotericism in 
general. What’s more, we encounter here for the first time instances in which 
Freemasonry played an important role in the actual formation of  what could 
be considered Islamic religions, such as the Moorish Science Temple of  
America and the Nation of  Islam. Millar’s section on Prince Hall Freemasonry 
is indeed instructive, as it conveys the importance of  Freemasonry’s radical and 
transformative potential in nineteenth-century black communities. However, 
his discussion on the influence of  the Order and other esoteric streams in the 
religious thought of  Noble Drew Ali and Elijah Muhammad is considerably 
less illuminating. Millar seems more concerned with simply listing the esoteric 
streams and currents that influenced Ali and Muhammad, and the potential 
(if  highly debated) roots of  their esotericisms, rather than outlining which 
ideas influenced these religious leaders, and the ways in which these ideas 
transformed, altered, or enriched their thought. 
This chapter is therefore one of  the least compelling ones, especially when 
we consider that Millar does display the ability and desire to analyze the content 
of  the connections in a few of  his other chapters, such as the aforementioned 
one on Quilliam and his chapter on the role of  esoteric ideas in the politics 
and thought of  Ayatollah Khomeini. The quality of  the chapters fluctuates too 
much, which amounts to a considerably less compelling read. Yet, we should 
credit the author for bringing such a diverse group of  voices on esotericism, 
Freemasonry, and Islam together in one book. Millar is right: there is a lack of  
scholarship on this topic and if  anything, Crescent and the Compass is evidence of  
the fact that we need more—much more—research. Millar’s text and subject 
therefore offer a glimpse of  the exciting road that lies ahead of  us. 
Justine Bakker
justine.m.bakker@gmail.com
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Giulio Busi and Raphael Ebgi. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Mito, Magia, 
Qabbalah. Milano: Einaudi, 2014. cvi + 454 pp. ISBN: 9788806198381. €80.
The latest work of  Giulio Busi is a wondrous crossover between different 
literary genres and fields of  research: in a bold attempt to blend together 
biography and the staggering variety of  Pico’s intellectual interests with a 
sound critical approach, this book is almost as complex and as multilayered as 
the Count’s personality itself. And it probably couldn’t be done otherwise; the 
book differs from other studies of  Pico’s philosophical work, developing a new 
approach. While drawing from the established critical sources (many of  which 
are previous works by the same authors), Busi and Ebgi take an additional step 
and propose a different point of  view on Pico’s opus. Rather than piecing 
together the Count’s often conflicting ideas and conclusions into an univocal 
interpretation, the authors explore Pico’s works from a specific standpoint: 
Myth, Magic, Kabbalah. From the title it is clear that the main focus of  the analysis 
is centered on mystical and esoteric elements (from Zoroastrian astrology to 
Neoplatonism, from Greek and Roman poetry to magic and Kabbalah), but the 
authors do not impose this point of  view. It naturally emerges from the way 
that the argument is carried out.
Of  course this kind of  approach has its limits and is not indisputable. 
For example, the authors show a clear preference towards Pico’s work of  
the year 1486 (900 theses, Oration on dignity of  man and the Apology) and show 
little interest for later works such as Heptaplus and On being and Unity. But 
it’s difficult to dispute this approach since 1486 is clearly the pivotal point 
in the Count’s life and the 900 theses stands out as one of  the most original 
and challenging philosophical proposals of  the Renaissance. True to his 
philological background, Busi aims to present as much material as possible 
while giving thorough information to support the proposed interpretation. But 
in order to do so he has to make sense of  the chaotic variety of  Pico’s interests 
and provide a point of  view that enables the reader to pierce the shroud of  
darkness surrounding his hermeneutics. In Busi’s own words:
What to do with a guy like this? One option is to state that the confusion of  topics 
is a result of  the confusion of  ideas, thus giving up the attempt to order Pico’s 
universe. Or, and it’s our choice, it’s possible to go by trial and error and to jot 
on paper the few things that appear certain. The major symbolic tropes, the most 
© 2015 Alessandro Vigorelli Porro. 
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of  the 
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
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important images necessary to tread the rest of  Pico’s work and to unearth solitary 
landscapes, the insights hinted at but never explained by the Count. A method 
like this has some obvious limits. Myth, magic, kabbalah cannot glut the Count’s 
omnivorous hunger; they are, nonetheless, the pivot of  his system, and in the scala 
sapientiae that he lays out before our eyes in the 900 theses, these three rungs are 
closely clutched together at the top of  the ladder and lead directly to the hatch of  
the heavens. (xlviii, my translation) 
Unlike Wirszubski’s Pico della Mirandola’s Encounter with Jewish Mysticism  – as 
well as other previous works by the authors – the aim of  this work is not 
to depict the background and the fabric of  this historic encounter between 
Jewish Kabbalah and Renaissance Neoplatonism but rather to expound on 
Pico’s obscure doctrine in light of  the priority he attributes to magic and 
Kabbalah. This book raises a question: what is the meaning of  Pico’s curiosity 
towards Kabbalah? Is it a juvenile infatuation or is it the key to unlock the 
Count’s vision and fully understand the humanistic culture of  the Renaissance? 
While it strongly hints towards the second option this book does not provide 
an unambiguous answer, and the reader must figure out his own approach to 
the problems, symbolical tropes and queries outlined by the authors.
The content and style are a challenge; on almost every page the reader is 
confronted by a different problem – or symbol, or reference to a different author 
– and the linguistic style, instead of  making the reading more fluent, makes it 
more complicated: analogy, metaphor, play on words are all instruments used 
by the authors to bedazzle the reader – almost as if  this highly allusive style 
is intended to mimic Pico’s flamboyant manner. While this can be confusing 
– especially if  the reader does not handle Italian well – I found this linguistic 
imitation helpful to get used to Pico’s style and to comprehend his approach.
The book is divided in two main parts, the first written entirely by Busi and 
the second mostly by Ebgi. The first section is more conventional, serving as 
an introduction that provides the general context of  the life and philosophy 
of  the Count of  Mirandola, as well as the hermeneutical coordinates that will 
be developed. Busi illustrates one of  the cornerstones of  his approach to 
Pico’s thought and to the 900 theses in particular: commenting on one of  the 
Count’s favorite parts of  Plotinus’s Enneads – where the philosopher describes 
the soul’s ascent to God as a “passing of  solitary to solitary” – Busi describes 
how Pico develops this idea in the 900 theses, describing the passing of  the 
individual soul and of  the One in terms of  the cabalistic concept of  tzimtzum, 
the contraction of  God. According to Busi, the knowledge of  Kabbalah allows 
Pico to solve many of  the contradictions that arise between Greek philosophy 
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and Christian faith: in this case the kabbalistic concept of  tzimtzum enables 
Pico to describe the “passing of  solitary to solitary” as an imitation of  the 
transcendence of  God, establishing an agreement between Plotinus and the 
holy scripture through the kabbalistic interpretation of  the Torah. In Pico’s 
hands the “passing of  solitary to solitary” is interpreted as an allusion to 
Exodus 25, 22: just as God manifests his presence by contracting his infinity 
into a single point between the Cherubs on the Ark of  the Covenant, so in 
order to reach for God, the mystic needs to reproduce this movement – the 
tzimtzum – and concentrate on the “center of  his unity.” Only by fleeing from 
the external world will he be able to meet God in his own solitude. 
Moving on, the second part is rather peculiar because it is organized like 
a dictionary: each chapter discusses and elaborates a single symbolical trope. 
Here Ebgi analyzes each item with great detail and attention both to Pico’s 
edited texts and to the main sources of  inspiration for his philosophy. This 
creates a set of  very dynamic images, with each item synthetically describing 
the whole creative process of  the Count’s short-lived philosophical career. For 
example, the entry “Kiss” perfectly shows the evolution of  Pico’s thought: 
by arranging the material in a chronological order the author outlines the 
silhouette of  the Count’s thought process through the most intense years of  
his life. The chapter begins referencing his early poetry, underlining the sensual 
side of  this work as well as the debt to classical authors such as Moschus, 
Tibullus and Apuleius. As the chapter goes on, a more spiritual conception 
of  kiss emerges, but rather than repeating established notions such as Plato’s, 
Pico uses these ideas to cleave through the ordinary conception of  this symbol: 
Venus’s sensual kiss becomes the deathly kiss bestowed by God on Moses, a 
symbol of  divine rapture and spiritual communion with God. However, instead 
of  replacing the first image with the latter Pico employs this exegetical method 
to deepen the meaning of  the kiss in an attempt to explain the ambiguous 
double nature of  love: how can love be at the same time the strongest spiritual 
force and a source of  sorrow for the one afflicted by it? Completely aware 
of  the complexity of  the phenomenon, Pico relinquishes the need to give a 
definition of  love, and instead uses all kinds of  tools to expound this idea; in 
his pages, Kabbalah and philosophy, Jews, Christians and Greeks, poets and 
prophets, everyone and everything cooperates to apprehend the mysteries and 
contradictions of  reality. 
All in all the 32 entries of  this symbolical dictionary depict a very thorough 
picture of  Pico’s thought, a picture where complexity is never dropped in 
favor of  simplification and the hermeneutical guidelines are just developed 
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enough to make the book approachable without imposing a fixed point of  
view on the reader. The result is brilliant, even though the reading can be 
very demanding, and even frustrating if  one is not used to being confronted 
with such a wild variety of  ideas and authors. To any Italian reader interested 
in esoteric themes – or even just drawn by the Count’s mysterious charm – 
this book is an essential read. It opens a new dimension for studies on Pico 
and digs deeply into his most arcane doctrines; let’s hope that this work will 
someday find a translator.
Alessandro Vigorelli Porro
alessandro@vigorelli.it
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Ithell Colquhoun, with an introduction and notes by Richard Shillitoe and 
Mark S. Morrisson. I Saw Water : An Occult Novel and Other Selected Writings. 
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2014. 201 pp. ISBN: 978-
0-271-06423-9. Hardcover $54.95/Paperback $32.95.
It is difficult to understand how Ithell Colquhoun’s I Saw Water, an exemplary 
work of  surrealist fiction, failed to be published upon completion in the 1960s. 
Now, after half  a century, the novel finally comes to print (based on a 1967 
typescript) at the able hands of  Richard Shillitoe and Mark S. Morrisson, who 
also provide a comprehensive introduction and in-depth notes that provide 
context for some of  Colquhoun’s more obscure allusions. The editors also 
include a number of  short essays and poems (some previously unpublished) 
that display her interest in esoteric subjects such as occult colour symbolism, 
alchemy, and the Tarot. Both these texts and the novel itself  are complemented 
by nine brilliantly coloured reproductions of  Colquhoun’s surrealist paintings, 
for which she is, perhaps, best known. The publication also features an 
extensive bibliography—no doubt an extension of  the one already maintained 
by Shillitoe on the web.1 The focal point of  this publication, however—and 
its greatest treasure—is I Saw Water, a surrealist splashing of  image and colour 
onto a dream-like tapestry woven with the myths and symbols of  Christianity, 
alchemy, geomancy, Druidry, Wicca, and ceremonial magic. These traditions 
are only a few of  the tributaries that stream harmoniously together, floating 
Colquhoun’s effort to bypass the rational and connect with the reader on a 
more primal level—unconscious mind to unconscious mind.
Colquhoun considered I Saw Water to be less the product of  creative fiction 
writing and more a collage of  ‘found’ textual snippets—a sort of  automatic 
writing in which dream records were combined with conscious narrative. The 
dreams from which she gathered material to shape the characters, settings, and 
themes of  the novel were recorded over a 20 year period—from sometime in 
the 1940s as her activities amidst London’s influential surrealist circle began to 
wind down along with the movement itself, to mid-60s Cornwall, where she 
had permanently resettled in 1956. After these decades of  dream recording, 
Colquhoun set to work to synthesize these ‘found’ narratives with a more 
1 http://www.ithellcolquhoun.co.uk/bibliography.html
© 2015 Aren Roukema. 
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of  the 
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linear form of  story construction. The result is I Saw Water, a tale that relies on 
the Theosophical concept of  a second, astral life that awaits the self  between 
physical death and rebirth. Most of  the characters in I Saw Water occupy Ménec, 
an ‘Island of  the Dead’ (41) where inhabitants await a moment of  realization 
that will allow them to progress to their next physical reincarnation or, perhaps, 
elevation into rebirth on a higher plane.
The novel begins with little suggestion of  the surreal, ethereal scenes that are 
to come—as Colquhoun’s central character—Sister Brigid in astral form; Emma 
de Maine in her former physical life—wanders the seaside hills of  Brittany, 
tending the herds and flocks belonging to her ‘Parthenogenesist Order.’ By the 
third chapter, however, the narrative flashes back to Sister Brigid’s early life as 
a postulant, a time ‘seen as through torn clouds, which half-disclose a distant 
panorama’ (58). With the flashback the narrative thus takes on a spatially and 
temporally disjointed dream perspective. From this point Colquhoun rarely 
returns to the realist mode, though comprehensible plot-lines continue to 
progress through the somnambular onslaught of  colourful vignettes that come 
together, sometimes only tangentially, to carry the novel forward. Despite 
this progression, there is little linearity; characters and settings appear from 
nowhere—just as in a dream. Even the more established characters lack much 
in the way of  consistency—they are villains in one moment, heroes in the next, 
as in the case of  Sister Brigid’s lover who appears to her as a sort of  vampiric 
capitalist but then quickly morphs into the target of  a Byronic tryst (97, 103). 
These inconsistencies would be failings in most other narratives, but they lend 
well to the dream experience of  I Saw Water. Colquhoun’s aim seems to be that 
of  the Romantic poet—the evocation of  feeling and experience through the 
sharing of  dream, metaphor and vision. I Saw Water is thus no page-turner, but 
it is a feast for the reflective mind. 
Part of  the dream feel of  Colquhoun’s surrealist novel is lent by her 
heavy reliance on symbolism that proves obscure for what the editors call 
the ‘nonspecialist reader’ (2)—myths, images, and practices derived from 
Catholicism, Celtic lore, and a number of  different esoteric traditions, including 
modern forms of  pagan practice just beginning to gain significant traction at the 
time of  the novel’s publication, particularly Druidry and Wicca. Colquhoun’s 
motivation for integrating so much esoteric material seems fairly clear. She no 
doubt wished to explore and express her experiences with ceremonial magic, 
modern pagan activity, and Christian practice. Because I Saw Water is collaged 
from dream life and personal experience, it offers fascinating insight into the 
complex processes of  expression and exploration of  personal experience that 
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lie behind Colquhoun’s fictional portrayals of  setting, character, and action—a 
close relationship between fiction and reality that seems to be found more often 
in occult literature than elsewhere, perhaps because of  the inherent narrativity 
of  esoteric knowledge.2 Of  course, her frequent personal involvement with 
the traditions that underpin the symbolism in the novel indicates that such 
phenomena was not obscure for Colquhoun, but it is likely that she saw value 
in its obscurity for others. Marginal Catholic saints, pagan traditions, alchemical 
lore and occult colour symbolism all help perpetuate the ethereal and the 
abstract in the novel, bypassing rational modes of  interpretation in favour of  
the unconscious glimpses targeted by surrealist artistic practice. 
In an attempt to mitigate this obscurity and make the novel more accessible 
for a wider readership, Shillitoe and Morrisson take great pains to contextualize 
unfamiliar concepts and symbols for the reader, particularly those related to the 
esoteric traditions. Morrisson, a scholar of  literary modernism and historian 
of  esoteric movements, and Shillitoe, who recently analyzed Colquhoun’s 
synthesis of  art and magic in Ithell Colquhoun: Magician Born of  Nature (2007), 
are well suited to this task. Their 36 page introduction covers a wide range of  
topics—surrealism, occultism, geomancy, Breton geography, nature worship, 
the tripartite goddess, dream theory, astral travel, Kabbalah, alchemy and the 
late Victorian emergence of  the female magician are all introduced as part of  
the editors’ effort to explain unfamiliar concepts and suggest ‘important lines 
of  analysis’ (2). 27 pages of  endnotes are also provided to contextualize and 
interpret Colquhoun’s allusions to everything from etheric light (84) to rhubarb 
(108). 
Both introduction and notes are enormously helpful in granting the reader 
almost effortless comprehension, but it must be asked whether the analytical 
approach taken by the editors honours Colquhoun’s original intentions for 
I Saw Water. Shillitoe and Morrisson’s approach unquestionably prioritizes 
rational reading faculties over the surreal, unconscious experience the author 
intended. Perhaps with this problem in mind, the editors have placed the notes 
at the end of  the novel; those readers looking to access the surrealist exchange 
of  unconscious understanding can do so by assiduously avoiding both the 
2 On esotericism and narrative see Andreas Kilcher, “7 Epistemological Theses,” in Hermes 
in the Academy: Ten Years’ Study of  Western Esotericism at the University of  Amsterdam, eds. Wouter J. 
Hanegraaff  and Joyce Pijnenburg (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 147. For 
a discussion of  a similar relationship between the masonic-Rosicrucian experiences of  British 
fantasist Charles Williams and his seven novels of  occult fiction, see Aren Roukema, “A Veil 
that Reveals: Charles Williams and the Fellowship of  the Rosy Cross,” Journal of  Inklings Studies 
5, no. 1 (2015).
Book Reviews / Correspondences 3 (2015) 141–172 167
introduction and the editors’ notes. Still, the problem of  respect toward the 
priorities and intentions of  the author remains. Colquhoun offers her own 
notes of  context where she seems to feel a need (e.g. 88). She also included her 
own preface, which partially explains the concept of  the second, aphysical life 
after death. In large part, however, she seems to have intended the allusions 
and metaphors of  the 1967 version to stand for themselves. A passage from 
Colquhoun’s commentary on one of  her paintings, ‘Dance of  the Nine Opals’ 
(1942—included in this publication, 165–66) indicates that she may have seen 
further clarification as impossible, given the ‘found’ nature of  the images, 
symbols, and settings of  I Saw Water: ‘When a picture comes directly from 
the unconscious, it is almost as difficult for the artist as it is for the spectator 
to say what it means.’ The interpretation of  meaning delivered via the artist’s 
subconscious therefore remains relative to the experience of  the reading 
subject. While Colquhoun proceeds in the same essay to interpret and offer 
context for the images in ‘Dance of  the Nine Opals’—thus at least somewhat 
supporting the editors’ method—I would (rather stodgily) suggest that the 
creator of  a work has more place to do so than a critic. At times the notes 
attached to I Saw Water present a danger of  limiting the reader’s understanding 
of  the novel to the parameters set by the editors’ interpretation of  meaning; 
in such a layered, multivalent work, this bracketing inevitably reduces the 
full potential of  direct reader interpretation and experience. Examples of  
such notes are found on pages 149, 153 and 157, where interpretation of  
particular event sequences or dream snippets accomplish a task for the reader 
that could have easily been performed themselves. I don’t wish to suggest that 
there is no place for the critical extrapolation of  meaning seen in such literary 
interpretation, but it doesn’t seem fitting in the context of  supplementary 
notes attached to a surrealist novel. 
That said, despite these few overzealous interpretations and perhaps a little 
too much contextual information, Shillitoe and Morrisson do a masterful job of  
providing historically accurate, well-balanced, appropriate information for the 
reader to digest along with the novel itself. Those looking to better understand 
Colquhoun’s philosophy, thought processes, and artistic method will appreciate 
the approach taken, as will those interested more in comprehension than in 
experiential, visionary reception of  the written word. Inevitably, given the 
scope of  Colquhoun’s references, readers will sometimes find themselves 
wondering why particular obscurantisms are defined and contextualized while 
others are left to stand alone. For example, a mysterious reference to a group 
of  children running before Sister Brigid shouting ‘Aha!’ (64) would become 
Book Reviews / Correspondences 3 (2015) 141–172168
much clearer in the context of  Aleister Crowley’s Aha! or Liber CCXLII. In 
the preface of  this volume Crowley states that the dialogue which makes up 
the majority of  the text is intended ‘for the instruction of  the little children of  
the light.’3 There is little doubt that Colquhoun would have encountered this 
text as a member of  the Ordo Templi Orientis, a Crowleyite magical order, 
so the connection seems clear. It could also be argued that the editors could 
have spent more time contextualizing Colquhoun’s heterodox Christian beliefs, 
particularly since this context would help the reader unfamiliar with Christian 
imagery and tradition understand a novel that, on balance, is built more on 
Catholic material than that of  any other spiritual tradition. However, since the 
notes and context can already seem overwhelming, the editors likely made the 
right choice in assuming that this material would already be more accessible 
to the average reader. 
Such oversights are, moreover, unavoidable given the wide symbolic 
vistas through which Colquhoun’s creativity wanders. Those interested in 
the historical context provided by Shillitoe and Morrisson will encounter 
high-grade research performed by experienced scholars, who clearly have an 
excellent grasp of  the complexity of  the traditions Colquhoun draws upon. 
The editors tiptoe adroitly through the tripwires and land mines that seem to 
lie between historical or discursive approaches to esoteric knowledge and the 
interpretations of  those more closely invested in it—never finding themselves 
with a need to offer value judgments on the belief  systems of  Colquhoun or 
those who influenced her. This quality editorial contextualization and analysis, 
combined with the valuable supplemental materials, enrich an already impressive 
novel—a surrealist enchanting viewed through jagged dream fractals.
Aren Roukema
arouke01@mail.bbk.ac.uk
3 Aleister Crowley, Liber CCXLII, https://www.100thmonkeypress.com/biblio/acrowley/
downloads/equinox%201_%203/aha/aha.pdf  (accessed June 14, 2015).
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Thomas Karlsson. Amongst Mystics and Magicians in Stockholm. Gothenburg: 
Belzebez, 2014. 140 pp. £29.1
The Dragon whispered my name. Not my usual name, but my true name, my 
eternal name. The Dragon slowly coiled in front of  me, and the scales sparkled 
like millions of  diamonds, in all colours of  the universe. The Dragon whispered 
to me again. It whispered its own name. I fell over on the ground with surprise, 
and twisted from laughter. I cried from happiness. The Dragon. So close. And yet 
so far away. (135)
In Amongst Mystics and Magicians in Stockholm, Thomas Karlsson, a scholar of  
religion2 and the founder of  the magical order Dragon Rouge (Ordo Draconis 
et Atri Adamantis), relates occult experimentation and experiences he and his 
fellow travelers went through during the years 1989–1991. That is, experimen-
tation and experiences which were part of, and eventually led to, the founding 
of  Dragon Rouge. The order has since grown into one of  the most prominent 
occult organizations in the West, and today has a number of  active lodges both 
in Sweden and abroad.3
Amongst Mystics and Magicians was originally published in Swedish in 2012. 
The English language translation is relatively fluent, but there are quite a few 
minor errors in the text, which could have been corrected by more rigorous 
proof-reading. According to the publisher, Amongst Mystics and Magicians is the 
first release in a trilogy concerning the history and development of  Dragon 
Rouge, so hopefully the publisher pays more attention to proof-reading with 
the following parts of  the trilogy.   
The author himself  describes the work at hand as a “reading mystery” which 
1 This review was originally published as a blog post on the author’s blog, http://angleso-
vdisruption.blogspot.fi/2015/03/rest-in-arms-of-dragon.html, but is published here in a revised 
form. 
2 Karlsson has a PhD in History of  Religion from Stockholm University. He also has a teach-
ing position in the mentioned university. 
3 Dragon Rouge has also become subject of  academic enquiry, e.g. Kennet Granholm’s 
dissertation, Embracing the Dark: The Magic Order of  Dragon Rouge – Its Practice in Dark Magic 
and Meaning Making (Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2005) and his further study, Dark 
Enlightenment: The Historical, Sociological, and Discursive Contexts of  Contemporary Esoteric Magic 
(Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014.)
© 2015 Harri Linnera. 
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should function as a key to the other side of  reality (4). Thus the dedication to 
the demoness Lilith – the gate to the unknown (1.0°) in the initiatory scheme 
of  Dragon Rouge.4 It is rather easy to agree with the author’s perception of  
his work; Amongst Mystics and Magicians is not a matter-of-fact, well-balanced 
and dry academic presentation of  Dragon Rouge and the factors that led 
to its formation. It is, on the contrary, much more like a travelogue spiced 
with a sinister and paranormal twist. Karlsson’s academic background, keen 
intellect and obviously wide erudition shine through, but in Amongst Mystics 
and Magicians he is not writing as Dr. Karlsson – he is more like one of  those 
shadowy figures in H. P. Lovecraft’s Gothic horror stories; someone who, by 
the feverishly dancing campfire, tells wild and astounding stories which are 
both alluring and spine-chilling. 
The story told in Amongst Mystics and Magicians is full of  intrigue, interesting 
characters and paranormal happenings. The focus on those individuals who 
were there in the beginning of  Dragon Rouge, their personal experiences with 
the occult and the transformations that followed, as recollected and narrated 
by Karlsson, make it a rather unique work. This is not to say that the occult 
world – and especially darker hues of  it – has a shortage of  subjective histo-
ries, but, in contrast to more well-known and readily available publications,5 
the work at hand convinces with its down-to-earth sincerity. Accordingly, the 
characters – including Karlsson himself  – are not polished to a point of  being 
just billboards for Dragon Rouge’s esoteric philosophy and practice, but are 
brought out in a way that makes them seem lively and credible. A fine example 
of  this is one of  the most colorful characters in the book, Varg:
At the same time he [Varg] was grounded, street smart, and completely disre-
spectful to all powers, both earthly and otherworldly. He happily provided old 
gods and demons with playful nicknames. After having invoked demon Beelzebub 
with grave seriousness, in a dark room only lit by black candles, and filled with 
heavy incense, he could suddenly round off  the ritual by announcing that Bubbe, 
meaning Beelzebub, thought that we should go and have a beer at the pizzeria. (19)
Even though one could be forgiven for dismissing Varg as just another carefree 
4 Thomas Karlsson, Qabalah, Qliphoth and Goetic Magic (Jacksonville: Ajna, 2012), 112.
5 Blanche Barton, The Secret Life of  a Satanist: The Authorized Biography of  Anton LaVey (Los 
Angeles: Feral House, 1990) and Stephen Flowers, Lords of  the Left-Hand Path: A History of  
Spiritual Dissent (Rochester: Inner Traditions, 2012), to name just a few. One could also point to 
the rather voluminous literature focused on the Order of  Nine Angles and its founder, Anton 
Long. 
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and easy-going psychonaut, he, in fact, points to a quite important feature in 
the early Dragon Rouge, that is free and open experimentation of  the occult 
kind. 
When reading through Amongst Mystics and Magicians, one is faced with a 
collection of  household names in modern esotericism (e.g. Aleister Crowley, 
Kenneth Grant, Anton LaVey) as well as more surprising authors (e.g. Benoît 
Mandelbrot, Hannes Alfvén6), which, of  course, provides an interesting view 
of  the mystical and philosophical basis of  the order. But more interesting still 
is how the sources are translated into lived and empirical experiences through 
practice and experimentation. The book is a treasure trove for someone in-
terested in the practical side of  Dragon Rouge, as there are vivid and detailed 
depictions of  magical workings from simple meditations to ceremonial rituals. 
In most cases these workings are also accompanied by participants’ personal 
reflections, providing yet another angle to the practical side of  Dragon Rouge.
While Dragon Rouge underscores personal experience in its magical cur-
riculum, its varied pursuits also have a very rigorous philosophical grounding. 
There is a strong opposition to the nihilistic tendencies characteristic of  the 
time, and, conversely, a stout dedication to the ideals of  a true Renaissance 
man (48, 58–59). Accordingly, it is rather easy to recognize the dividing lines 
and connecting ties between Dragon Rouge and other such organizations, e.g. 
the Church of  Satan and Temple of  Set. 
While Anton LaVey’s The Satanic Bible seems to have provided at least some 
inspiration, especially in terms of  imagery, his carnal philosophy – not to 
mention his cynical tendencies – probably held very little interest for Karlsson 
and his circle of  friends  (21–22). The Temple of  Set, on the other hand, 
comes out in a much more positive light. In a way it seems that the Temple of  
Set influenced Dragon Rouge to a rather significant extent, even though its role 
in the text is quite limited. The connection is there – e.g. through Varg and his 
American-based magical teacher – but Karlsson never gets into specifics (21, 
37–38, 100–101). Also, at this point it is worth noting a certain resemblance 
between the founding myths of  both organizations: i.e. Set dictating The Book 
of  Coming Forth by Night to Michael A. Aquino and Thomas Karlsson receiving 
the prophecy to build a temple for the Red Dragon in Marrakech, Morocco. 
Both of  these instances point, of  course, to the shared influence of  Aleister 
Crowley. Then again, Amongst Mystics and Magicians is just the first part of  a 
trilogy; hopefully the following parts will shed more light also on Michael 
A. Aquino and his Temple of  Set. There is no need to stretch the alleged 
6 A mathematician and a plasma physicist, respectively. 
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connection between Dragon Rouge and Temple of  Set too far, though, as the 
book at hand provides ample evidence for Dragon Rouge having had its own 
voice and course since the very beginning. 
The qliphothic qabalah which has, since the early days, become one of  
the mainstays of  Dragon Rouge, is not heavily present in Amongst Mystics and 
Magicians; Karlsson’s interest in Jewish mysticism gets mentioned here and 
there, but it is not a very dominant feature in the text. Nevertheless, the other 
side of  qabalistic occultism, Sitra Ahra,7 shines forth from between the lines 
which depict the early magical experiences of  Dragon Rouge. An important 
facet in this is a conscious turning away from a civilized and orderly urbane 
environment towards a dark and chaotic world represented by nature. It is 
here, beyond man’s civilizing efforts, where a dedicated seeker may find his/
her initiation to the other side of  existence. The appreciation of  wild and 
untameable nature as a place for initiation also marks Dragon Rouge as quite 
different from the American groups mentioned earlier, which, usually, tend 
to conduct their magical workings in an urbane manner. This appreciation of  
nature has a distinctly Scandinavian pagan element in it. 
Its rather modest number of  pages notwithstanding, Amongst Mystics and 
Magicians is a highly interesting and informative publication for the scholar of  
modern-day Western occultism and the interested layman alike. As a first-person 
narrative about the birth of  one of  the most prominent occult organizations in 
the West it is also quite unique, especially because of  its down-to-earth sincer-
ity and credibility. Accordingly, for someone interested in Dragon Rouge – or 
in the inner workings of  a contemporary esoteric association in general – there 
is plenty of  food for thought in this slim volume.
Harri Linnera
linnera@uef.fi 
7 Sitra Ahra (“The Other Side”) is the opposite of  Sitra de-Kedusha (“the holy side”) in 
qabalistic mysticism, see Karlsson, Qabalah, Qliphoth and Goetic Magic, 80–81.

